

INFORMATION TO USERS

This material was produced from a microfilm copy of the original document. While the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original submitted.

The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand markings or patterns which may appear on this reproduction.

1. The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting thru an image and duplicating adjacent pages to insure you complete continuity.
2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a large round black mark, it is an indication that the photographer suspected that the copy may have moved during exposure and thus cause a blurred image. You will find a good image of the page in the adjacent frame.
3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., was part of the material being photographed the photographer followed a definite method in "sectioning" the material. It is customary to begin photoing at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue photoing from left to right in equal sections with a small overlap. If necessary, sectioning is continued again - beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete.
4. The majority of users indicate that the textual content is of greatest value, however, a somewhat higher quality reproduction could be made from "photographs" if essential to the understanding of the dissertation. Silver prints of "photographs" may be ordered at additional charge by writing the Order Department, giving the catalog number, title, author and specific pages you wish reproduced.
5. PLEASE NOTE: Some pages may have indistinct print. Filmed as received.

University Microfilms International

300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 USA
St. John's Road, Tyler's Green
High Wycombe, Bucks, England HP10 8HR

78-3158

YOO, Hakjong, 1942-
THE TWO KOREAS: A COMPARATIVE
POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF A DIVIDED NATION.

New York University,
Ph.D., 1977
Political Science, general

University Microfilms International, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106

© 1977
Hakjong Yoo
All Rights Reserved


THE TWO KOREAS:
A COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ANALYSIS
OF A DIVIDED NATION

by

Hakjong Yoo

A DISSERTATION IN THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICS
SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCE
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
AT NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

Approved by



Gisbert H. Flanz

June 1977

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Several individuals have been extremely generous in assisting the author during all stages of the preparation of this dissertation. I sincerely wish to extend my profound gratitude, first of all, to Professor Gisbert H. Flanz, my research advisor, who has given me the benefit of his wisdom and experience at every stage of the present study, and whose guidance and encouragement have been invaluable. I also wish to express my thanks to Professors Ellsworth Raymond and James C. Hsiung for their instruction, guidance and encouragement in all phases of the planning, research and writing of this dissertation. Professors James T. Crown and Martin A. Schain have read the draft of the dissertation, and have helped me with their comments, and I wish to acknowledge a debt of gratitude to them. I am deeply indebted to New York University for the Penfield Fellowship. Finally, I wish to express thanks to my wife, Patricia, without whose patience and understanding this study could not have been made.

New York, N.Y.

Hakjong Yoo

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ii
INTRODUCTION 1

PART ONE
THEORETICAL SYNTHESIS

Chapter

I. REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 9
II. A PARADIGM OF POLITICAL SYSTEMIC
STRUCTURE AND PROCESS 14

PART TWO
THE POLITICAL CULTURE

III. THE PATTERN OF POLITICAL CULTURE 42
IV. THE POLITICS OF TRANSFORMATION
OF THE POLITICAL CULTURE 69
V. THE IDEOLOGIES OF THE RULING ELITES 109

PART THREE
POLITICAL ACTION TENDENCY:
STRUCTURE AND PROCESS

VI. THE FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 141
VII. THE TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATIONS 182
VIII. THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 218
IX. THE PARTIES AND POLITICAL PROCESS 271
X. POLITICAL CULTURE, STRUCTURE AND PROCESS:
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 350

PART FOUR
CONCLUSIONS

XI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 375
BIBLIOGRAPHY 393

INTRODUCTION

Divided nations offer a unique opportunity to the comparative political analyst. Their history before division is the source of the fundamental similarities between the divided sectors, while the development of divergence in the two sectors in the period after division shows the potential for evolution toward vastly different political systems, due to a wide variety of internal and external influences. The subject of this research is a comparative political analysis of the political systems in divided nations, with an emphasis on the systems of North and South Korea. The main purposes of the research are to synthesize a paradigm of political systemic structure and process and to explain the political changes and continuity in a divided nation. The researcher wants to see the political systems in their entirety, from above. He intends to narrow the gap between abstract conceptualizations and the actual concrete data and its interpretations.

Some fundamental questions are posed: Diachronically, what are the differences and similarities between the two experiments of state building in the North and South Korean political systems? How does the Korean pattern of political culture affect the outcomes of state-building?

How do the various internal and external factors, such as political culture, political structure, political process dimensions, and international system affect one another? What political changes and continuities have there been in the two Koreas since their division in 1945? What are the determining factors of the pattern of 'system states' and their 'unit outcomes'? ¹ How can an analyst explain the stability and/or instability of the two Korean political systems? What effect have states of emergencies had on North and South Korea in terms of their long and short range impact? What possible alternatives to this analytical paradigm can be constructed to compare the political systems? Most importantly, what are the crucial dimensions of a political system from the perspective of the political culture approach? These questions have led to the examination of the political culture of the two Koreas.

The author will investigate the pattern of the Korean political culture; the transformation of political culture; the interaction between the deliberate transformation of political culture and

1. For a discussion of the 'system states' and 'unit outcomes,' see Robert Dubin, Theory Building (New York: Free Press, 1969), p. 149.

political structure and process; and the strategies taken for the transformation of political culture in the two Koreas. The analyst designates two "change by planning" models: a revolutionary change by planning model in the North and an incrementalist change by planning model in the South. Another question that especially concerns the author is how the elites have formulated the model for, and consequently the interactions between, the patterns of political culture and political actions.²

The comparative study of divided nations has hardly begun. Most of the previously written, related literature has no consciously constructed theoretical framework. Existing research on the subject is fragmented and partial, and has been written from the perspective of international relations rather than as a comparative political analysis of divided nations. This study will concentrate, first, on the identification of the various dimensions of the political systems; secondly, on the patterns of political change and continuity (by employing the diachronic analysis of politico-social data);

². Current research on political action shows a common boundary with the "general theory of action" in social psychology and sociology. Later in the paper, the analyst will further examine the applicability of the general theory of action in comparative political analysis. cf. Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils, ed., Toward a General Theory of Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), pp. 47-109; and John W. Atkinson and David Birch, The Dynamics of Action (New York: John Wiley, 1970), pp. 1-28..

thirdly, on the periodization of political change in the two Koreas; and finally, on the interrelationships between the variables. The analyst throws light on the prospect of reunification of Korea in the near future.

Some limitations of the research are set forth here: The analyst will deal mainly with the period from 1945 to 1975. This author will concentrate on the discussion of political phenomena, but will briefly explicate the economic structure as well. A theoretical framework will be constructed for the analysis of divided nations, and the author will limit himself to empirical analysis of the two Koreas.

This writer will generally employ an "eristic" and "postulational" style³ in his research, with an emphasis on specific propositions, and will also utilize the "pattern model of explanation."⁴ A pattern is explained when one element is related to a set of other elements of the extrinsic components of a theoretical framework⁵ so

3. Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry (San Francisco: Chandler, 1964), pp. 259-261.

4. Ibid., p. 333.

5. Jack Gibbs sees the substantive components of a theory in terms of the two main components: extrinsic (i.e., concepts, referentials and referents), and intrinsic (i.e., axioms, postulates, theorems and hypotheses). Jack Gibbs, Sociological Theory Construction (Hinsdale, Ill.: Dryden Press, 1972), p. 7.

that together they constitute a unified system. The pattern model of explanation could be used more effectively if it were used along with a synchronic cross-national comparison. In this study it would be limited to the comparison of Communist North and non-Communist South Korea. The diachronic method of comparing the two societies, which exhibit contrasts as well as similarities,⁶ could be used to explain the "temporal pattern" over "social time,"⁷ and the differences which arose from their originally similar setting (pre-1945 Korea). This analyst will also utilize an interdisciplinary approach which will benefit political science. The initial boundary-determining criterion⁸ of the research is the divided nation. Empirical conclusions will apply to the model within the boundaries specified by the researcher.

The main theme of this research is that an important factor determining the temporal pattern of domestic political structure and process over social time is the pattern of

6. Sylvia L. Thrupp, "Diachronic Methods in Comparative Politics," in Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner, eds., The Methodology of Comparative Research (New York: Free Press, 1970), p. 347. For research employing a diachronic analysis see Gregory B. Markus and Betty A. Nesvold, "Governmental Coerciveness and Political Instability: An Exploratory Study of Cross-National Patterns," Comparative Political Studies 5 (July, 1972): 231-244.

7. Max Heirich, "The Use of Time in the Study of Social Change," American Sociological Review 29 (June 1964): 389-397.

8. For the concept of "boundary of research" see Robert Dubin, op. cit., p. 127.

political culture in a society. This analyst will focus on the interaction of domestic realities with the foreign ideas which have determined the nature and development of political behavior patterns of North and South Korean elites, and will attempt to explain the failure of Korean society to translate foreign ideologies into practice. He will also show that the traditional pattern of the Korean political culture has affected the rise of today's oppressive virocracy and technocracy in the two Koreas, in what might be called the politics of distrust. In the study of political culture, the analyst will emphasize the psycho-sociological (or as Brodbeck calls it reductive-emergent) explanations.⁹ The analyst will examine the experiments in state building in the two Koreas since 1945 within this theoretical and methodological framework. This author will analyze the relative achievements of the political systems in carrying out the integration of the various dimensions of political structure and institutionalization.

This study begins with a review of related literature, and proceeds to the synthesis of a paradigm

9. For remarks on the reduction and emergent explanations, see May Brodbeck, "Methodological Individualisms: Definitions and Reduction," Philosophy of Science 25 (January 1958): 1-22; and Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner, The Political Basis of Economic Development (New York: Van Nostrand, 1966), pp. 27-28.

from the perspective of the political culture approach in Part I. A major assumption in this research is that "all human conduct is an interaction between the elements of human nature and the environment, natural and social."¹⁰ In this context, a political culture approach will be useful for analyzing the orientations toward a political system. Data analysis and interpretation, focusing on the nature of the Korean political culture and its interactions with political actions, will follow in Part II and Part III.

For the most part, the Korean words used in this study follow the South Korean Education Ministry system of transliteration¹¹ from the Korean phonetic alphabet into the Roman alphabet. This Romanization system has been chosen because it does not use special symbols. The names of familiar political figures appear in their usual Westernized spelling.

10. John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1944), p. 10.

11. For the South Korean Education Ministry System of transliteration, see Samuel E. Martin, Yang Ha Lee and Sung Un Chang, A Korean-English Dictionary (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. xv.

PART ONE

THEORETICAL SYNTHESIS

CHAPTER ONE

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

Studies of divided nations can be found in such publications as Gregory Henderson, Richard Lebow, and John Stoessinger (eds.), Divided Nations in a Divided World.¹ This book deals with the divided nations of Korea², Germany, China, Vietnam³, Cambodia, Laos, and Mongolia; and with the partitioned nations of Ireland, India-Pakistan-Bangladesh, Ruanda-Urundi, and Palestine-Eretz Israel. Each author employs the intra-systemic analysis approach. The case studies suggest that the relations between the political systems of a divided nation change as functions of (1) the degree of stability and legitimacy of each of the political systems in a divided nation, (2) the relationships between the political systems in a divided nation and their superpower patrons, and (3) the relations between the essential actors themselves in the international structure.

1. Gregory Henderson, et al., eds. Divided Nations in a Divided World (N.Y.: McKay, 1974), pp. 3-194 and pp. 433-454.

2. John H. Herz, "Germany," ibid., pp. 3-24. Gregory Henderson, "Korea," ibid., pp. 43-98. Nathaniel B. Thayer, "China;" "The Formosa Question," ibid., pp. 99-128. Le Thi Tuyet, "Vietnam," ibid., pp. 129-156. Bernard K. Gordon, "Cambodia and Laos," ibid., pp. 157-180. Harrison E. Salisbury, "Mongolia," ibid., pp. 181-194.

3. After the Spring Offensive of 1975, Vietnam was unified by the North Vietnamese military takeover of South Vietnam. Surrender of the South Vietnamese took place on April 30, 1975. See the account of North Vietnam's Chief of Staff, Gen. Van Tien Dung in the New York Times, April 26, 1976, p. 16.

Divided nations may evolve through a process of conflict and cooperation, which can be divided into four periods: the initial division; middle-term division; rapprochement; and finally, unification.⁴ However, the two Koreas have not yet reached the third period of evolution.

In another article, John H. Herz analyzes the problems of Korea and Germany as divided nations in terms of their international systemic impact. He argues that the divisions of Korea and Germany were less the result of politics than the consequence of world power relations at the end of the Second World War. What the East and West had been able to conquer for themselves during the War became the basis for the post-War division of power and influence between the two emerging power blocs. This determined the Communist or non-Communist characters of the controlled areas.⁵ The divided states as a group, Bruce R. Sievers argues, have strong ties to their respective sub-international systems. He concludes this from an examination of trade, aid, mail flow, and treaty indicators. After division, the direct ties between the two parts of a divided nation are either greatly reduced or non-existent, even though content analysis of newspaper editorials indicates that national identity increases after division, based on the emphasis given to the old

4. Gregory Henderson, et al., eds., op. cit., p. 439. Several other volumes have been written on Korea, but they deal mainly with foreign relations problems, such as the problem of Korean liberation, the Korean War, or Korean unification from the perspective of international politics. Others deal specifically with domestic problems in South Korea. Frank Baldwin, ed., Without Parallel: The American-Korean

nationality.⁶

Although the studies mentioned above deal mainly with divided nations from the perspective of international-systemic impact, some studies examine the divided nations from the perspectives of state building or the political structures of political systems. Gisbert H. Flanz analyzes the stages of constitutional and political development from the perspectives of nation building and state building. His main question is how the constitutional experiments manage to strike an effective balance between the elements of institutional strength and the provision for the responsible exercise of fundamental rights. The written constitutions which have endured over long periods of time have been based on a dynamic rather than a static equilibrium.⁷

Relationship Since 1945 (N.Y.: Random House, 1974). William J. Barnds, ed., The Two Koreas in East Asian Affairs (N.Y.: New York University Press, 1976). Young C. Kim, ed., Major Powers and Korea (Silver Springs, Maryland: Research Institute on Korean Affairs, 1973).

5. John H. Herz, "Korea and Germany as Divided Nations: The Systemic Impact," Asian Survey, XV, no. 11 (November, 1975), p. 958.

6. Bruce R. Sievers, "The Divided Nations: International Integration and National Identity -- Patterns in Germany, China, Vietnam and Korea," in Jan F. Triska, ed., Communist Party-State: Comparative and International Studies (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1969), p. 174, and see also Johan Galtung, "Divided Nations as a Process: One State, Two States and In-Between -- The Case of Korea," Unification Policy Quarterly 1 (April 1975): 43-60.

7. Gisbert H. Flanz, "Korea and Vietnam: Two Constitutional Experiments," St. John's Law Review 42 (July 1967): 21.

In another paper, Gisbert H. Flanz also analyzes the constitutional and political aspects of Korean unification from the perspectives of diachronic and comparative analysis. He again places particular emphasis on the differences between state building and nation building in the study of the political systems in divided nations.⁸ Hahn Baeho analyzes the political systems of North and South Korea within an analytical framework of the political elite, the political group, the political culture, the authority structure, and in terms of domestic and foreign policy. He examines the characters of the two political systems in Korea and classifies them as different movement types. He notes that the two political systems are transitional: North Korea is in the stage of revolutionary transition, while South Korea is an incrementally-oriented transitional political system.⁹

Several other studies deal with the political systems of North and South Korea as

8. Gisbert H. Flanz, "Korean Reunification: Constitutional and Political Aspects," delivered at the International Symposium on Change and Security in East Asia, in Seoul, January 21-24, 1974. See also Gisbert H. Flanz, "The Goals and Options of Small Nations," The Korea Herald, January 24, 1974, p. 2. Gisbert H. Flanz, "Hankuk ui Jetongil: Honbob mit Jongchijok Cheukmyon" (Korean Reunification: Constitutional and Political Aspects) in Park Jekyu, trans. and ed., Tong Asia ui Pyonghwa wa anbo (Peace and Security in East Asia) (Seoul: Kyongnam University Press, 1974), pp. 239-252.

9. Hahn Baeho, "Nambukhan ui tongchicheje bikuo sosol (I)," (Toward a Comparative Analysis of the North and South Korean Political Systems (I)) The Journal of Asiatic Studies, 14, no. 3 (September, 1972), pp. 3-47.

developmental systems.¹⁰ Jounghwon A. Kim concentrates on the consolidation of power in North and South Korea.¹¹ One of the basic distinctions between a developmental system and an established system is the creative role played by the leaders in formulating and shaping a new political order, and Kim looks at the political leadership in Korea in the post-war period in this light.

10. Daesook Suh and Chaejin Lee, eds., Political Leadership in Korea (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1976). Sejin Kim and Changhyun Cho, eds., Korea: A Divided Nation (Silver Springs, Maryland: Research Institute on Korean Affairs, 1976). Hyungyun Byun, "A Comparative Study of Economic Systems in South and North Korea," The Journal of Asiatic Studies, 12 (December, 1970), pp. 233-239. Walter C. Clemens, Jr., "GRIT at Panmunjom: Conflict and Cooperation in a Divided Korea," Asian Survey, 13, no. 6 (June, 1973), pp. 531-559. Dongsuh Bark, "Comparison of Administration under Different Ideologies," Journal of Asiatic Studies, 13 (December, 1970), pp. 279-292. Gerhard Breidenstein and W. Rosenberg, "Economic Comparison of North and South Korea," Journal of Contemporary Asia, 5, no. 2 (Summer, 1975), pp. 165-203.

11. Jounghwon A. Kim, Divided Korea: The Politics of Development, 1945-1972 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 86-114.

CHAPTER TWO

A PARADIGM OF POLITICAL SYSTEMIC

STRUCTURE AND PROCESS

There is an ongoing effort in comparative politics to build generalizations which are applicable to the widest possible variety of cases, and this leads to the search for paradigms which are similarly broadly applicable. A "paradigm"¹ refers to a conceptual framework at various stages of formalization, which serves to provide a set of categories for the collection and organization of data. The concepts in a paradigm must either be defined in terms of empirical indicators or be susceptible to being so defined. There are several criteria of evaluation for a paradigm. A paradigm should be applicable to a wide variety of cultural and political contexts. The relationship between the elements of the paradigm should be specified as rigorously as possible.² The paradigm should include enough relevant variables to suggest hypotheses that will withstand some empirical testing, yet it should be kept simple enough

1. Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Second Edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970, First Edition, 1962), p. 43. Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry (San Francisco: Chandler, 1964), p. 82. Before Kuhn, Merton discussed the purposes of a paradigm in Robert Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, Revised and Enlarged Edition (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1957, First Edition, 1949), p. 55.

2. Lawrence Mayer, Comparative Political Inquiry (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1972), p. 100.

to be manageable. The axioms or assumptions of a paradigm should have enough prima facie validity to enable the paradigm to guide propositions that will withstand empirical testing, and a paradigm should provide clear criteria of relevance for the collection of data.

A paradigm of political systemic structure and process (PSSP) will provide an analytical framework for the comparative study of the political systems in a divided nation. The independent variables of the paradigm of PSSP are three major dimensions: (1) the political culture dimension, (2) the structural dimension, and (3) the process dimension.³ Legitimacy and the constitutional pattern will constitute the dependent variables at the systemic level of analysis, later at time T_{0+a} , while policy-making and implementation are the intervening variables. In this paradigm, each dimension consists of exogenous variables at the dimensional level of analysis.⁴

3. The researcher gratefully acknowledges the helpful suggestions of Professor Gisbert Flanz.

4. The researcher refers to independent variables as exogenous variables at the dimensional level of analysis, though it will be necessary to allow for the possibility that the exogenous variables are interrelated. See Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Theory Construction: From Verbal to Mathematical Formulations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969), p. 35. The paradigm of PSSP is a revised form of the block-recursive system. In Blalock's recursive system, within each block (at the dimensional level in the paradigm of PSSP), there may be feedback or reciprocal causation, but the relationships among blocks are recursive. Op. cit., p. 72.

In the study of divided Korea, this analyst focuses on two different types of political systems: a Communist system and a non-Communist system. Scholars have employed various approaches to the study of Communist systems: the historical-cultural approach by Ulam, the cultural approach by Tucker, the totalitarian approach by Friedrich and Brzezinski (much criticized by others)⁵, the complex-organization approach by Meyer, the modernization or developmental approach by Kautsky, and the group-conflict approach by Skilling,⁶ among others.

5. For a criticism of the totalitarian approach, see Chalmers Johnson, "Comparing Communist Nations," Chalmers Johnson, ed., Change in Communist Systems (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970), pp.2-3. Paul Shoup, "Comparing Communist Nations: Prospects for an Empirical Approach," in Roger E. Kanet, ed., The Behavioral Revolution and Communist Studies (New York: The Free Press, 1971), p. 24. Alfred G. Meyer, "The Comparative Study of Communist Political Systems," in Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., Communist Studies and the Social Sciences (Chicago: McNally, 1969), p. 190.

6. Adam B. Ulam, "The Russian Political System," in Samuel H. Beer, et al., Patterns of Government, Third Edition (N.Y.: Random House, 1973); Robert C. Tucker, "Culture, Political Culture, and Communist Society," Political Science Quarterly 88 (June 1973): 173-190; Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, Second Edition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965); Alfred G. Meyer, The Soviet Political System (New York: Random House, 1965); John H. Kautsky, The Political Consequences of Modernization (N.Y.: John Wiley, 1971); M. Gordon Skilling, "Interest Group and Communist Politics," World Politics 18 (April 1966): 435-451; and H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths, eds., Interest Groups in Soviet Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).

This chapter will open with a discussion on the political culture approach to the study of political structures and processes of a divided nation.

The Political Culture Dimension. Starting with the assumption that the pattern of political orientations toward a political system is an important component of the broader cultural makeup of every society, studies of political culture attempt to determine the nature of political orientations and the significant factors that account for them.⁷ An important assumption in the political culture approach is that the pattern of political culture is positively related to the pattern of political action in a political system. A political system is a "system of action."⁸ Roles are units of a political system. The role is the organized sector of an actor's orientation, which constitutes and defines his participation in an interactive process. Man as an actor in a political system is both a thinking and a feeling animal and he is both simultaneously in one integrated act as he recollects, experiences and anticipates.⁹ Most complexes of sentiments

7. Leonard J. Cohen and Jane F. Shapiro, eds., Communist Systems in Comparative Perspective (Garden City: Anchor Press, 1974), p. xxiv.

8. Gabriel Almond, "Comparative Political System," Journal of Politics 18 (1956): 391-409 and reprinted in Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown, eds., Comparative Politics, Fourth Edition (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1972), pp. 35-49. The quote is from p. 37.

9. Alexander Leighton, My Home is Legion: Foundations for a Theory of Man in Relation to Culture (N.Y.: Basic Books, 1959), p. 246.

are shared to a varying degree with other people, such as the family, village, class, or nation. Therefore, two more assumptions are set forth; the extent of shared sentiments are circumscribed by an identity horizon, and people in a society have learned shared orientations, which Almond calls a political culture.¹⁰ These assumptions are concerned with two theoretical constructs: a pattern of political culture and a pattern of political action. Therefore, all these assumptions seem to lead to a "general theory of action"¹¹ from an interdisciplinary perspective, and the political culture approach partially shares a common boundary with the general theory of action. From the contributions by many scholars within this area, this author will attempt to synthesize a general theory of action in order to construct a conceptual framework for political culture.

10. Gabriel Almond, op. cit., in Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown, eds., p. 39.

11. Talcott Parsons, et al., "Some Fundamental Categories of the Theory of Action" A General Statement," in Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, eds., Toward a General Theory of Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), pp. 3-29.

The first principle of a general theory of action states that an initial activity (the activity already in progress) is an expression of the dominant behavioral tendency in an individual at time t_0 . Therefore, the representation of ongoing activity, as an expression of the dominant behavioral tendency in the individual, is included in the first principle of action. Because this model is dynamic, and incorporates a time dimension t_i , it differs from the static view of the S-O-R model. Therefore, the basic assumption in the dynamics of action in this research is that an action tendency, once it has been aroused, will persist at a given level until acted on by some force which will either increase or decrease its strength. Here, an "action tendency" T_i is defined as an impulse to act.¹² An action tendency is similar to a "performance vector."¹³ The concept of "force" is defined as a factor responsible for change in the strength of an action tendency. There are two types of psychological or behavioral forces that modify an action tendency: an instigating force (F) and a consummatory-inhibitory force (C).¹⁴


12. John W. Atkinson and David Birch, The Dynamics of Action (N.Y.: John Wiley, 1970), p.9.

13. E. C. Tolman, "Principles of Performance," Psychological Review 62 (1955): 315-326.

14. John W. Atkinson and David Birch, op. cit., p. 10. See the remarks by Easton on cultural inhibitors, David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: Wiley, 1965), p. 112.

The first concept, the instigating force, is a factor that functions to increase the strength of an action tendency; and the second concept, the consummatory-inhibitory force, is a factor that functions to decrease the strength of an action tendency. The revised model of the traditional S-O-R is displayed in Figure II.1. The revised S-O-R model includes a new conception of the functional significance of both stimulus and response relations to an action tendency, which governs the temporal pattern of behavior. Behavior is affected by both the instigating and consummatory-inhibitory factors mentioned above. The second principle in a general theory of action states that the rate of change in the strength of an action tendency at any moment in time is equal to the instigating factor minus the consummatory-inhibitory factor. It deals with the effects of an instigating or consummatory-inhibitory factor, which themselves affect the rate of change in the strength of an action tendency. Therefore, there are three alternatives possible between these factors. First, there is the case where an instigating factor is operative but a consummatory-inhibitory factor is not; secondly, where a consummatory-inhibitory factor is operative but an instigating factor is not; and thirdly, where both factors are operative. The strength of an action tendency changes in response to consummatory-inhibitory factors or new instigating factors.

FIGURE II.1
A REVISED MODEL OF THE TRADITIONAL S-O-R




SOURCE: John W. Atkinson and David Birch, op. cit.,
p. 11.

LEGENDS: S, stimulus;
R, response;
F, an instigating force;
C, a consummatory-inhibitory force;
T, an action tendency; and
 t_i , time $i = 0, 1, 2, 3, \dots n$

The third principle states that the time required to change one action (X) to another (Y) can be determined by measuring the time interval in which there is a shift of the dominance pattern from an X-dominance pattern to a Y-dominance pattern, as displayed in Figure II.2. The two factors produce the shift from one dominance relation to another. Here the conception of "time"¹⁵ is a

FIGURE II.2 A PATTERN OF CHANGE IN THE STRENGTH OF THE ACTION TENDENCY



fundamental factor in a general theory of action. In the first and second principles of the general theory of action, the two factors explicitly lead to the various aspects of political culture; while the change in action tendency is determined by variations in the instigating and consummatory-inhibitory factors, which in turn are affected by the orientations toward the political system. The political actions are relevant to the political system, and an actor's

15. The exclusive function of a "sequential law" is to handle a time dimension which cannot be incorporated in categoric and determinant laws. Robert Dubin, Theory Building (N.Y.: Free Press, 1969), p. 13. Sequential laws are what Abraham Kaplan designates as "temporal laws", and he subdivides them into internal, genetic, and pattern laws. Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry (San Francisco: Chandler, 1964), p. 109.

political orientation toward a political system is a determining factor in a political action tendency.

Now let us proceed to an examination of the relationship between the notion of political culture and the general theory of action. Here, one sees that the instigating factor is the individual's motivational and value orientations within the scope of the individual's interpretation of a stimulus; and a consummatory-inhibitory factor is an interpreted response within the framework of political culture in a society with time. The broad scope of a political action, together with the specific policies formulated by elites, constitutes an instigating factor of political actions. The political actions of elites, as actors, are constrained by a pattern of political culture, because a general action is shaped by the pattern of orientation toward social objects. A consummatory-inhibitory factor of political action tendency over a medium or long-range period of time is also determined by the pattern of political culture.¹⁶ Therefore, the orientations toward political authorities, structures, and

16. Apter employs the criterion of "consummatory values" to classify political systems. Here, a consummatory-inhibitory factor does not share a common meaning with Apter's notion of "consummatory-values." cf. David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1965), p. 70; Choice and the Politics of Allocation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), p. 31; and Political Change (London: Frank Cass, 1973), p. 48.

processes will determine the scope and intensity of instigating and consummatory-inhibitory factors in the changes in the political action tendency.

Political culture, a pattern of orientation within a society, generally connotes a psychological dimension of political behavior -- beliefs, feelings and evaluative orientations toward a specific political system. Somewhat similar phenomena in the past have been researched under topics such as national character, temperaments, ethos, spirit, political ideology, national political psychology, and fundamental political values.¹⁷ However, although these conceptual frameworks share boundaries, they do not completely overlap. Ever since the concept of political culture was introduced by Almond,¹⁸ the political culture approach has been employed by several scholars from a variety of perspectives and has been incorporated with the interdisciplinary approach in comparative political analyses of traditional, transitional, and modern societies.¹⁹ In the study of political culture,

17. For a variety of studies on this topic, see Alex Inkeles, "National Character," in Macridis and Brown, eds., op. cit., pp. 13-22; and Robert Lane, Political Ideology (N.Y.: Free Press, 1962).

18. Gabriel Almond, in Macridis and Brown, eds., op. cit., p. 39.

19. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965; First, 1963 by the Princeton University Press); Lucian W. Pye, Politics, Personality, and Nation Building (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962); Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965).

scholars have taken somewhat different but shared perspectives: the psycho-historical perspective by Lifton, the psycho-cultural perspective by Pye, the socio-psychological perspective by Richard Wilson, the ideological perspective by Starr and the communication perspective by Liu.²⁰ The various shared assumptions are: that each individual lives in a historical context; that he learns and incorporates knowledge and feelings about the politics of his people and his community in his own personality; that he shares the political orientations as a set of rules, implicit or explicit, for a standardized mode of political action.²¹ Cultural patterns, when internalized, constitute the elements of a personality and of a social system. All systems of action and systems of culture are a set of personality and social systems or subsystems.²² A political

20. Robert J. Lifton, Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism (N.Y.: Norton, 1963); Lucian W. Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1968); Richard W. Wilson, The Moral State: A Study of the Political Socialization of Chinese and American Children (N.Y.: Free Press, 1974); John Bryan Starr, Ideology and Culture (N.Y.: Harper and Row, 1973); Alan P. L. Liu, Communication and National Integration in Communist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971).

21. Milton Singer, "Political Culture," International Encyclopedia of Social Science (N.Y.: Crowell, Collier and Macmillan, 1968) 3:532.

22. Parsons, et al. in Parsons and Shils, eds., op. cit., p. 22.

culture implicitly or explicitly manifests political ideals and operating norms in a society. The focus of any study of political culture is the psychological orientations to political action.²³ The three components of an orientation to the situation are the cognitive, the affective and the evaluative modes;²⁴ in the sphere of political orientations, the cognitive orientation would involve knowledge about the political system, the roles of incumbents, inputs, and outputs of the political system; the affective orientations consists of feelings about a political system, its roles, personnel and performance; and the evaluative orientation consists of judgments and choices made about political objects that involve the combination of value standards, and the criteria of value standards, and the criteria by which one evaluates the political objects.²⁵ The actor's objects of political orientation are the political authorities, the regime and the political community. The political authorities are the incumbents of political offices. The components of the regime are the norms, values, and the authority structure; and the political community consists of members who see

23. Gabriel Almond, in Macridis and Brown, eds., op. cit., pp. 39-40.

24. Parsons and Shils, in Parsons and Shils, op. cit., pp. 58-59.

25. Almond and Verba, op. cit., p. 15.

themselves as a group of persons bound together by a "political division of labor."²⁶

Some relevant criteria for the classification of the significant aspects of political culture are the cross-nationally relevant aspects, the aspect of the political system, and the concerns with political modernization and change.²⁷ One can consider the four aspects of political culture to be (1) national identity, (2) identification with fellow citizens, (3) governmental performance, and (4) participation in the decision making process.²⁸ The pattern of national identity is concerned with the vertical form of identity: elite-mass culture, class culture, regional culture, and ethnic culture. An identification with one's fellow citizens is concerned with the horizontal form of identity: trust or distrust.

In the study of political culture, the researcher must decide whether to treat political culture as an independent or a dependent variable. As long as a researcher is aware of the theoretical and methodological problems, the question can easily be resolved. When a researcher examines a "puzzle,"²⁹ (factors determining a pattern of political culture in a society), the political culture

26. David Easton, op. cit., p. 177.

27. Pye, in Pye and Verba, eds., op. cit., p. 529.

28. Ibid., pp. 526-543.

29. Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Second Edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 36.

becomes a dependent variable. Especially in a study of divided nations, when a researcher deals with a question of whether the politics of a deliberate transformation of political culture³⁰ under the change by planning model³¹ is significant and relevant empirically and theoretically, political culture becomes a dependent variable in a diachronic analysis. However, on the other hand, when a puzzle is the relationship between political culture and political action, the researcher can generally treat political culture as an independent variable in the short run.³² Therefore, a relevant theoretical puzzle decides whether a researcher treats it as an independent or dependent variable in his research design. The study of political culture and political action requires two strategies of research design; especially in a diachronic analysis of

30. cf. Richard Fagen, The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969).

31. This author defines the "change by planning" model as one which refers to the strategies for deliberate change in the political system itself and the components of its total environment. For further discussion on the political and social changes, see Conrad M. Arensberg and Arthur H. Nichoff, Introducing Social Change (Chicago: Aldine, 1964); F. LaMond Tullis, Politics and Social Change in the Third World Countries (N.Y.: Wiley, 1973); Robert H. Lauer Perspectives on Social Change (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1973); Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966).

32. cf. Yung Wei, "A Methodological Critique of Current Studies on Chinese Political Culture," Journal of Politics 38 (February 1976): 135.

political systems, social time is a critical dimension in a transitional society. This research design will complement the shortcomings of a synchronic, cross-sectional research design.³³

A political ideology is defined as a belief system characterized by a high level of constraint, great range, and a centrality of political items. Political ideology provides conceptual and terminological channels into which political events can be diverted and managed.³⁴ An ideology is also a system of values that provides standards by which political events may be evaluated.³⁵ The ruling groups are the individuals, groups, and social classes which seek the maintenance of currently predominant values. These groups also have the option of directly exercising power--- and to a lesser extent -- authority, against countervailing groups, and social classes seeking a reallocation of values.³⁶

33. Sylvia L. Thrupp, "Diachronic Method in Comparative Politics," in Robert T. Turner and John E. Holt, eds., The Methodology of Comparative Research (N.Y.: Free Press, 1970), p. 350.

34. Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Politics," David E. Apter, ed., Ideology and Discontent (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1964), pp. 206-207.

35. Richard M. Merelman, "The Development of Political Ideology: A Framework for the Analysis of Political Socialization" American Political Science Review 63, no. 3 (September 1969), p. 750.

36. See Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, Power and Poverty (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 53-58.

The status of a group is relative and fluctuating through the stages of political change. The values are desired events, objects and conditions for which men strive.³⁷

A three-fold categorization that includes welfare values, power values, and interpersonal values is a reasonably parsimonious list, although there have been innumerable attempts to identify needs, goals, or values for purposes of psychological, sociological, and political analysis.³⁸

Political power refers to the subsets of relations among social units such that behaviors of one or more units depends in some circumstances on the behavior of other units. Both negative and positive coercion are included in the term "power."³⁹ The power relationship is also itself premised on the agreement of both parties that they will work together within the limits of shared assumptions about the common political community. The power relationship includes both a negative and positive kind of power, the former being the capacity to force other people to act against their wills, and the latter being a positive capacity for rallying social cooperation.

37. Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), pp. 55-56.

38. See James C. Davies, Human Nature in Politics (N.Y.: Wiley, 1963), pp. 53-56. A. M. Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation," Psychological Review, 50 (1943); 370-396.

39. Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 50-51.

The intensity of the cold war and the conflict dimension of ideology in the international system strongly affect the divided nation's domestic political structure and processes as well as the domestic ideological conflicts.⁴⁰ A conflict in which the participants feel that they represent collectivities and groups and feel the pressures so generated, fighting not for self but for the ideals of the group they represent, is likely to be more radical than one fought for personal reasons. A conflict serves to establish and maintain the identity and boundary lines of societies and groups, and conflicts can become an integrating force in the relationship within in-groups. However, this enhances the degree of hostility between the two political systems in a divided nation. Conflicts can also be a dividing force between the two political systems in a divided nation. However, as the contending sides in the divided nation develop internal strength, and the hostility between their respective superpower backers decreases, both sides are likely to possess greater freedom of action and they may seek improved relations with each other.⁴¹ Thus the phenomena of domestic-

40. Rosenau analyzes the national-international linkage as the recurrent sequences of behavior that originate in one system and are reacted to in another. James N. Rosenau, ed., Linkage Politics (N.Y.: Free Press, 1969), p. 56; and J.N. Rosenau, "Theorizing Across Systems: Linkage Politics Revised," in Jonathan Wilkenfeld, ed., Conflict Behavior and Linkage Politics (N.Y.: McKay, 1973), pp. 42-43.

41. Gregory Henderson, et al., Divided Nations in a Divided World, p. 439.

foreign linkages are clearly significant in the political systems of a divided nation.

Structural Dimension. In the Paradigm of PSSP, the structural dimension consists of three analytical categories: the functional organization, the territorial organization, and the economic structure. These three variables affect the pattern of the structural dimension, which is strongly related to the pattern of policy making and implementation. The interaction between political culture and political structure, and the interdependence of the elements of a politico-social structure strongly affect political process and behaviors, while also strongly affecting the effective possibilities for change or functional alternatives. Therefore, the functional deficiencies of the politico-social structure generate an alternative structure to fulfill existing needs somewhat more effectively than before. Thus a system is able to persist under stresses. For instance, economic development generally requires development of an alternative structure. Especially when the leadership adopts the policy of economic planning and pursues industrialization. The political elites may create new administrative organizations. The development of alternative structure generally takes the pattern of diffusion in the areas of administrative organizations and the rise of an urban middle class

in the socio-economic structure. The development of constitutionalism sets up governmental institutions with a system of checks and balances in the Western countries. In reality, the structural dimension is ordinarily defined as above. However, since neither North nor South Korea takes constitutionalism seriously, we should be cautious in the study of the structural dimension. At least we can compare functional equivalences. The development of functional organization is related to the dynamic equilibrium within governmental institutions, and the effectiveness of the system of checks and balances. Dividing power is itself not enough to limit power. A system of checks and balances provides the guidelines for the political, as well as legal, independence of the chief executive, the legislators and the judges, despite their mutual dependency in performing their constitutional functions.

Political power is distributed in two ways in a state; territorially and functionally. The territorial distribution of power involves the differences of degree in the relations between a government and the territory affected by it. It concerns the method employed to integrate the territory of a state or

of an association of states, that is, the extent to which political authority and administration are centralized. The method of territorial integration constitutes an essential aspect of the setting within which the functional distribution of power operates. The major problem in the territorial distribution of power is the degree of effectiveness and the methods of reconciliation between the national and local powers in achieving effective national political performance. There are three types of territorial distribution of power: the unitary, confederate, and federal systems.

The economic system refers to the institutional framework in which the preferences among the alternative purposes of economic activities are decided, and in which individual economic activities are adjusted for the attainment of these purposes. An economic system can be classified as capitalistic or socialist, according to the prevailing ownership of the means of production. It may also be classified into a market or a planned economic system when described in terms of the adjustment of individual activities. Thus

there are four ideal-type⁴² economic systems:
 the capitalistic market economy, the capitalistic
 planned economy, the socialist market economy,
 and the socialist planned economy, as displayed in
 Table II.1.⁴³

TABLE II.1
 TYPES OF ECONOMIC SYSTEMS

Forms of Ownership	Adjustments	
	Market Prices	Government Instructions
Private Ownership	Capitalistic Market Economy	Capitalistic Planned Economy
Public Ownership	Socialist Market Economy	Socialist Planned Economy

42. Weber notes that the ideal-type is the theoretically conceived pure type. Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, p. 92; H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, trans. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 59; Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (New York: Free Press, 1968), vol II, p. 601; Max Weber, The Methodology of Social Sciences (New York: Free Press, 1949), p. 92.

43. Gregory Grossman, Economic Systems (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 3.

Process Dimension. The third dimension in the paradigm of PSSP, the process dimension, consists of three analytical categories: the fundamental rights, the political parties, and the civilian-military relations. In the process dimension, this writer looks at the actual operating mechanisms and the methods which maintain a dynamic equilibrium within each analytical variable. The fundamental rights which are gained through the development of constitutionalism, include both civil rights and civil liberties. Civil liberties denote the rights of individuals, while civil rights refer to constitutional and legal status, and the treatment of minority groups that are marked off from the majority by race, religion, or national origin. Modern constitutional rights and liberties, as they have developed in the West, may be examined in six segments, bearing in mind their interlocking relationship and mutual interdependence, and their reinforcements as well as their conflicts and mutual erosion.⁴⁴ The six categories are: (1) guarantees of personal liberty, the right to privacy, freedom of thought, and the right to equality, (2) the right to social progress and happiness, (3) the

44. For a discussion of the constitutional guarantees of liberty, see Roscoe Pound, The Development of Constitutional Liberty (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), pp. 82-111.

right too impartial justice, (5) the right of access to decision making through the intermediaries of political parties and universal suffrage, and (6) the right to formulate specific demands and form interest groups for this purpose.⁴⁵ This classification can be very useful in a cross-national comparison. However, in our type of comparison, one might ask how the six categories of human rights apply to North Korea. We can examine the relative emphasis on some categories and the deemphasis on some others by the North Korean regime. Thus it is possible to compare the promise and reality of human rights in the two Koreas. The main problem here is how to maintain the dynamic equilibrium between the conflicting goals of stability in a political system and the exercise of liberties.

The political party is defined as the articulate organization of society's active agents, those who are concerned with the control of governmental power and who compete for popular support with another group or groups holding divergent views.⁴⁶ The party system, by taking into account the extent of the distribution of power, as well as the number of parties, may be divided into several types: the one-party, the hegemonic party, the predominant party, the two-party, the moderate multipartisan, the extreme multipartisan, and the atomized

45. Ivo D. Duchacek, Rights and Liberties in the World Today: Constitutional Promise and Reality (Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-Clio, 1973), pp. 41-42.

systems.⁴⁷

The nations in the Third World are often confronted with crises in civil-military relations. A new social system in the nation building process depends on a long period of sustained social mobilization, which itself may demonstrate many of the principal characteristics of rapid societal change.⁴⁸ In some new states that have experienced neither a military coup d'état nor leftwing subversion, the precarious leadership has relied heavily on military loyalty and support. The failure of the leaders and the political parties tends to create a leadership vacuum which is filled by the military profession, which has modern managerial and technological skills. The military has become a crucial institution and power bloc.⁴⁹ Even in the

46. Sigmund Neuman, Modern Political Parties (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 396. Leon D. Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies (N.Y.: Praeger, 1967), p. 9. Sorauf discusses three approaches to defining political parties: ideological, social structural, and functional approaches. Frank J. Sorauf, Party Politics in America, Second Edition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972), p. 9. See Michels' book for a discussion on the oligarchical tendencies of parties. Robert Michels, Political Parties, trs. Eden and Cedar Paul (N.Y.: Dover, 1959), pp. 365-392.

47. Giovanni Sartori, "The Typology of Party Systems: Proposals for Improvement," in Erik Allard and Stein Rokkan, eds., Mass Politics: Studies in Political Sociology (N.Y.: Free Press, 1970), pp. 322-352.

48. Deutsch lists eleven characteristics of rapid change. Karl Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," in American Political Science Review, 55, no. 3 (September 1961), pp. 493-514. Pye discusses six crises: identity, legitimacy, penetration, participation, integration, and distribution crises. Lucian Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), pp. 62-66.

49. Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. v.

Communist bloc, the military as an effective group is one of the major power groups in the policy making process. Therefore, the lack of control and command of the military by civilian leaders is a major problem in the Third World and in the Communist bloc.

Legitimacy and Constitutional Pattern. During the process of nation building and state building in the emerging nations, the legitimacy and constitutional patterns vary strongly with the degree of effectiveness in maintaining a dynamic equilibrium⁵⁰ between the political culture, structure, and process dimensions in a political system, as long as the dynamic disequilibrium in each intra-dimension does not reach a certain threshold. Legitimacy is defined as the quality of being justified or willingly accepted by the governed and it converts the exercise of political power into rightful authority.⁵¹ Legitimacy is fundamental to the persistent stability of political order in society.

50. Ludwig von Bertalanffy, General System Theory, Revised Edition (N.Y.: George Braziller, 1973), p. 131. Cynthia Russett, The Concept of Equilibrium in American Social Thought (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 55-56.

51. There are several notions of legitimacy. Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans. by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (N.Y.: Free Press, 1947), pp. 124-131. Alexander Passerin d'Entrèves, The Notion of the State (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 141-149. Max Weber, Basic Concepts in Sociology, trans. by H. P. Secher (N.Y.: Citadel Press, 1966), pp. 71-83. Gouldner discusses legitimacy and authenticity in Alvin W. Gouldner, The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology (N.Y.: Basic Books, 1970), pp. 423-424.

Without it, the political elite must rely on coercion to maintain their power, and this alone may be insufficient to preserve the persistence and stability of the political system. The degree of legitimacy ascribed to the authorities varies with the extent to which the members of the political system are perceived to occupy valid roles in the political structure. The "structural legitimacy," as Easton calls it, is required not only in the bureaucratic legal systems, but in all political systems, even those that are structurally undifferentiated to a great extent.⁵²

A particular structural arrangement and its norms become invested with a special sanctity. In America, the prevalence of a strong belief in constitutionalism reflects the separable consequences of regime structure and norms. The major elements of constitutionalism are legal limits to arbitrary power, political responsibility of government for the welfare of the governed, and the guarantees of the people's fundamental rights. In this sense, the degree of performance of constitutionalism is the measure of "performance legitimacy."⁵³

52. Easton considers legitimacy as a response to stress on the diffused support for the members of the political system. David Easton, op. cit., p. 279 and p. 299.

53. Carl J. Friedrich, Limited Government: A Comparison (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974), p. 114. McIlwain discusses constitutionalism in detail in Charles Howard McIlwain, Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1947), pp. 123-146.

The present chapter has been concerned with the paradigm of political systemic structure and process. In the following chapter, the analyst will discuss the political culture.

PART TWO
THE POLITICAL CULTURE

What was the nature of traditional political culture in Korea? Specifically, what are the Koreans' political orientations to national identity? How do they identify with their fellow citizens? What is their conception of governmental performance? In what ways do they participate in the decision making process?

How have political authorities sought the transformation of political culture in the two Koreas?

What is the nature of the political ideologies of the elites in the two Koreas?

These questions are the focus of analysis in this part.

CHAPTER III

THE PATTERN OF POLITICAL CULTURE

Since both political systems which emerged in Korea after 1945 were constructed on the same political culture base, it is one of our major assumptions that it is important to have a clear understanding of the pre-1945 pattern of Korean political culture in order to evaluate the ways in which the two Korean political systems have attempted to meet the identical challenges presented by the traditional pattern of Korean political culture and behavior. The main challenges from the traditional behavior pattern for leaders in the two political systems have been: the authoritarian pattern in the social order; factionalism; a lack of consensus on the rules of the game; and the family-centered behavior patterns. In Korea, bureaucratism has been the predominant characteristic of both governmental structure and process, in which the political leaders have sought an increasing concentration of power under a single authority. The traditional pattern of Korean political culture which developed out of the Yi dynasty period was not significantly changed under the 35 years of rule by Imperial Japan.¹ The traditional Korean political culture

1. Jounghwon A. Kim, Divided Korea (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975), p. 18 and 338.

pattern rested on Korean neo-Confucianism.² In this chapter, four aspects of the traditional pattern of Korean political culture will be examined.

National Identity

National identity refers to the beliefs of individuals about the political system and the extent to which they consider themselves members of the political system.³ National identity is made up of several vertical forms of identity: the elite political culture, the mass political culture, regional political culture, and ethnic political culture. Political orientations toward national identity tend to affect the degree to which the activities of the political elites are legitimized, and to determine the relationships among the regional and ethnic groups and between the elites and the masses. In Korean society, the issue of regional differences is insignificant, and ethnic groupings have never been a problem, so the problem of political orientations toward national identity is centered

2. Confucianism was introduced into Korea during the reign of Kokuryo King Sosurim (r. 371-384). Chu Hsi's (1130-1200) neo-Confucianism was introduced later, during the Yi dynasty (circa 1286). Yi Huidok, "Formation of Confucian Ethics in Korea," Korea Journal 13 (February 1973); 10-16. The neo-Confucianism which evolved in Korea indulged in metaphysical and abstract doctrines, rather than practicality during Yi Korea. Park Chonghong, "Historical Review of Korean Confucianism," Korea Journal 3 (September 1963): 5-11; and J.A. Kim, op. cit., p. 10.

3. Sidney Verba, "Conclusion: Comparative Political Culture," in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., Political

around the problems of elite and mass political culture in Korean society. During the Yi Dynasty, Korean society achieved a high degree of homogeneity and conformity and developed a cohesive political culture. In this period, Korean society also achieved a relatively high congruency between the authoritarian pattern of political culture and the autocratic pattern of political structure. In old Korea, the evolution of neo-Confucianism sporadically enhanced nationalistic orientations in the Korean mind. The neo-Confucianism of old Korea provided a nationalistic focus which helped to retain Korean identity when it was threatened by several invasions from the northern countries of Mongolia and Chin. Neo-Confucianism, which was adopted in Yi Korea, helped develop Korea's own history on the basis of her particular national identity. However, neo-Confucianism in Yi Korea failed to emphasize nation-centered political culture over family-centered political culture, except during the foreign invasions, when the Confucian literati encouraged a nationalistic resistance spirit. It enhanced social mobilization during these invasions, but only worked sporadically at other times.⁴ The Korean

Culture and Political Development (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 529.

4. Changgyu Choe, "The Concept of Loyalty and Filial Piety vs. Democracy," Korea Journal 12 (June 1972): 14-15.

literati culture, which stressed the family, directly caused the formation of the traditional Korean personality, which can be characterized as inward, family, and dependence oriented.⁵

The fact that Korean society has long been homogeneous has not produced a positive "system affect"⁶ on the masses in the two Koreas. The masses do not take much pride in the political systems of North and South Korea. It is most likely that they are not especially proud of their constitutions, levels of political freedom or democracy, their political institutions, social legislation, economic systems, or native religions. The Koreans may have cultural pride in the Korean language and in the myth of the Tankoon, the story of the founding of the Korean nation, but pride in the cultural heritage does not enhance the stability of the political systems of the two Koreas.

In the homogeneous society of Korea, the question "What is my nation?" is easily answered, but the central issue "What kind of nation do I belong to?" has not yet been resolved. The central political symbols which have become the primary focus of individual commitment have not yet evolved.

5. Thomas H. Kang, "Confucian Behavior Toward the Modernization of Korea, 1864-1910," Korea Journal 13 (July 1973): 6.

6. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, Civic Culture (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965), pp. 63-64. Positive system affect is a diffuse attachment to the political system as a whole, without reference to any particular aspect.

Even before the fall of the Yi Dynasty, the monarchy as a central symbol did not provide a positive system affect on the masses, and even the symbolic value of the monarchy was eliminated during the 35-year colonial period. After the liberation from Imperial Japan, Korea had no central political symbols of its own, so foreign ones were imposed: socialism became the political symbol of the North, while democracy became the political symbol of the South, but the loss of the inherently Korean symbols of the Yi period has not been completely compensated for by the new foreign political symbols. Part of the problem of national identity remains unresolved. The conservative nature of the traditional pattern of Korean political orientations has been reflected in the lack of Korean attitudes toward politics in South Korea, which is shown by the passivity of the masses toward political authority. In North Korea, passivity is not a political virtue, and the masses have been forced to play a mobilized subject role. The lack of system affect and the lack of central political symbols in South Korea, increases the importance of output affect on the stability of any political authority.

In addition to the problem of the incomplete synthesis of neo-Confucianism in old Korea, which might have enhanced nationalistic orientations in the modern sense, the enormously wide gap between the elite and mass political cultures created a deep cleavage between the two sectors of Korean

society. The subject pattern of orientations was imposed on the masses by the elites, who monopolized the decision making process. The despotic leadership thus estranged the masses, who lacked political competence. Lacking the socialization to affect the systemic input process, the masses were restricted to the output process, in which they were mobilized only for the implementation of decisions made by the political elite. There was no role for the masses as participants in old Korea; only the roles of the elites as participants were defined. Thus the pattern of Korean traditional political culture can be classified as a subject political culture.

Identification with One's Fellow Citizens

Identification with one's fellow citizens is a horizontal form of identity. The degree to which one trusts his fellow citizens is an important factor determining the pattern of political culture in society. With respect to Korean society, which has a highly paternalistic and authoritarian tone, the level of trust and confidence in fellow citizens has always been low. Hostility to people outside one's family in old Korea has carried over into recent years, in which there has been a high level of conflict and hostility between associational groups, such as labor and management, and between the individuals in

election campaigns.⁷ These patterns of hostility and conflict have led to political distrust among the citizens in general.

Non-elites in the Korean society do not identify with, or have confidence in, the political elites. This distrust toward outgroups stems from the interactions within the authoritarian family structure and within the authoritarian social structure. Authoritarianism in the traditional Korean family suppresses the members' strivings for autonomy. Children are socialized to believe that strangers are not to be trusted and are usually enemies. The family members are the only source of security, and in return for the sense of security given by the family, the child must always be ready to sacrifice his autonomy.

Although Confucian scholars⁸ exhorted the five constant virtues (human-heartedness, righteousness, wisdom, good faith, and propriety) as well as loyalty, filial piety toward the King as the father of his people, brotherly affection, marital harmony, charity, diligence, public spirit, respect for the law, and willingness to die for the King in battle; the strongest emphasis was placed on obedience and submission to political authority.⁹ Filial piety was also of crucial importance in the ethical system of the Korean

7. Pye and Verba, eds., op. cit., p. 535.

8. Confucian scholars are referred to as the literati. During Yi Korea, the Korean ruling class became factionalized. Some became officer-level bureaucrats, while those without official position became the scholar group or the literati. Gregory Henderson, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 37.

9. Pyongchoon Hahm, The Korean Political Tradition and Law

literati.¹⁰ Traditional Koreans could not conceive of an unfilial person as being virtuous, and they considered filial piety to be the foremost qualification for a successful bureaucratic career.¹¹

In the traditional Korean political culture, the main goal was to achieve humanness in interpersonal relationships, and the Korean elites and masses were strongly oriented toward the achievement of this goal. It was toward goals other than interpersonal decency (the faculty of maintaining a durable pattern of overlapping egos) that they refused to regiment themselves and their families.¹²

In the pattern of Korean literati culture, first priority was given to humanness in interpersonal relationships,¹³ while the accumulation of power and wealth was distrusted. The reason behind the distrust of those who had wealth was that a surplus of wealth was thought

Second Edition (Seoul: Hollym, 1971), p. 22.

10. For details of the lifestyle of the literati in old Korea, see Younghill Kang, The Grass Roof (N.Y.: Scribner's, 1951).

11. Pyongchoon Hahm, "Toward a New Theory of Korean Politics: A Reexamination of Traditional Factors," in Edward R. Wright, Korean Politics in Transition (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1975), p. 343.

12. Ibid., p. 344.

13. Ibid., p. 336. It is interesting to compare this attitude to that of James E. Carter, Jr., who, in a speech during his campaign for the American Presidency, stated that "Americans are entitled to decent, compassionate, honest, competent government because Americans are decent, compassionate, honest, and competent." The New York Times, November 4, 1976, p. 24

to destroy the basic decency in the man who accumulated this wealth. In the traditional Korean society, the accumulation of wealth through economy was interpreted as ruthless. Agriculture, for example, was considered the most honorable function, because haggling and bargaining with nature was impossible. Manufacturing was more esteemed than commerce, because it involved the honest labor needed to add new value to a commodity.¹⁴ Lacking from the Korean culture was the satisfaction of the urge to dominate nature. The literati political culture led the nation to the development of an agrarian society, which lacked the impetus for the industrialization process. Chiefly because the main agrarian resource, arable land, was limited, and because rapid population growth could not be accommodated in this agrarian society, the literati political culture caused several dysfunctional patterns to develop in the Korean political culture. These patterns included family-centrism, factionalism, an authority paradox which rendered the masses subservient to the political authorities while the literati elites were hostile to the political authorities, competition for foreign support, and lastly, the pattern of bureaucratism. The elite in Korea were divided into two groups: the bureaucrats who were power-oriented, and the literati elites who emphasized humanness in interpersonal relations.

14. Pyongchoon Hahm, op. cit., p. 347.

Factionalism within the literati elite became indistinguishable from the overall contests of power, in which there was no consensus on the rules of the game. Originally, factional division was thought to provide a system of checks and balances within the elite, and between the literati and the bureaucratic elite, but chronic, multi-level conflicts persisted. The literati elite emphasized interpersonal decency while the bureaucrats sought increasing power within the governmental structure and a favorable allocation of land resources for themselves at the expense of the masses. At the mid-point of the Yi Dynasty, the only developed natural resource, land, rapidly became scarce, both because of rapid population growth and because of the demands for land by the elites. No alternative power base, such as manufacturing or commerce, was developed, so all competition for power centered on the ownership of land.

Current Korean politics is still run on a low level of trust. A survey of changing attitudes over the last twenty-five years in South Korea was taken in 1971. Despite the fact that the level of confidence in party politicians increased from 1945-1970, it was still low at that time (from 4% of the respondents who felt they had trusted the party politicians in 1945, to 10% who felt so in 1961, and to 18% who felt they trusted the politicians in 1971).¹⁵

15. Ilmun Cho and Kyungwoo Yun, trans. Young Whan Kihl, "Popular Perception of Political Parties," in C. I. Eugene Kim and Young Whan Kihl, eds., Party Politics and Elections in Korea (Silver Springs: Research Institute on Korean Affairs, 1976), p.91.

However, the South Korean people have generally had greater trust in the political parties than in individual politicians. In answer to the question of the parties' trustworthiness, only 6% of the respondents showed confidence in the parties of the post-liberation period, while 12% supported party politics of the 1960's (during the Second Republic), and 27% supported party politics in the early 1970's. Nevertheless, 45% recognized the need for political parties in the future. Therefore, the South Koreans generally see the need for party institutions, even though they tend not to trust the party politicians or the existing political parties at this same level.¹⁶

Even though there is no comparable survey data on the level of confidence in the political institutions and leaders by the people of North Korea, one may assume that the traditional low level of confidence has persisted, at least in private and among the older generation of North Koreans.

Governmental Performances

The individual's orientation to governmental performances is based on his important beliefs about how the government operates; not so much what it is, as what it does. What people believe a government will or ought to do for them is relevant here. The orientations

16. Ilmun Cho and Kyungwoo Yun, op. cit., p. 92.

toward governmental performances will determine the scope and intensity of governmental policies and the expectations of the people. The orientations to governmental performances partially determine the goals of a political system and define the load on the political system.¹⁷

In the traditional political culture of Korean society, most governmental performances were judged in terms of one value: impact on the family, even though the political culture also emphasized a form of nationalism, whereby the national interest became a legitimate criterion for evaluating governmental performances. Several non-national criteria, such as personal, familial, and factional criteria, have been considered significant in traditional society; while in the conflict between national and non-national spheres, the non-national criteria often prevailed. Because of this conflict between the private and public sectors, the general level of respect for the regime was low. Another reason may be that the Koreans have a tradition of considering the law as a punitive system and nothing more. Law is generally considered to be the most important category of systemic output, if a political system is to persist. Instead of having respect for law, the Korean people have always seen the law as an agency of the elite for controlling the people; and it has never been considered by the people as a means for the realization of liberty, equality and justice. The Confucian ethical

17. Pye and Verba, eds., op. cit., pp. 537-538.

code¹⁸ evolved as a system which was supposed to regulate the behavior of the people while promoting humane interpersonal relations. Under this system the government would ideally be led by a benevolent ruler.

Instead of a Western-style normative legal system, an elaborate ethical code developed, which was centered on the family as the enforcer of ethics, but it was never successful enough to take the place of a legal system. Under the Confucian ethical system, laws were written primarily to handle the criminal element, so only the punitive aspects of the law were emphasized.¹⁹ It was thought that normal interpersonal relationships could be regulated by the ethical code. The individual in Korean society was more likely to see the elite's power to make laws as a threat of negative sanctions and possible relative deprivation,²⁰ than as a source of equality in human relations.

In traditional Korea, elites who gave the appearance

18. See the related remarks of Hsiung on the ethical code in China. James C. Hsiung, Ideology and Practice: The Evolution of Chinese Communism (N.Y.: Praeger, 1970), p. 291.

19. P. Hahm, The Korean Political Tradition and Law, p. 143

20. See the related remarks of Ted R. Gurr on relative deprivation. Ted R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 24 and p. 360. cf. "The potential for collective violence varies strongly with the intensity and scope of relative deprivation among members of a collectivity," p. 360.

of desiring power were, by definition, considered "shameful". Any prospective leader was required to show some reluctance to assume power. In Confucian literature it is said that the best should govern the nation. "He who knows the three virtues knows the means to self-discipline; he who can rule himself can govern others; and he who can govern others can govern the kingdom and the families of the empire."²¹ The elite group became divided into two sub-groups: the bureaucrats and the literati, as was mentioned earlier, and the bureaucrats made it their goal to strive continuously to secure their own participation in the decision making process; while the literati claimed that they stayed away from the political arena in order to devote themselves to scholarship. The literati also claimed that the factional division between themselves and the bureaucrats contributed to the preservation of humanness in the power processes, by restraining the excessive concentration of power in one coalition of the literati and the bureaucrats.

The traditional political culture emphasized self-discipline and the establishment of a model of conduct by honoring and promoting honest men of talent as guards against the deceitful.²² The conflict between the bureaucrats and the literati caused them to lose the three virtues.

21. The Unwobbling Pivot, XX:11, in Ezra Pound, trans. Confucius (N.Y.: New Directions 1969), p. 155. The three virtues refer to knowledge, humanity and energy. Ibid., p. 151.

22. The Unwobbling Pivot, XX:13, ibid., p. 157.

Political processes were confined to the upper class of old Korean society, in which the subject political culture prevailed. The masses were assigned to a role which might be described as that of quasi-output oriented subjects, because they participated only in the implementation of policies which had been decided upon by the ruling class. They were never active in the policy making process itself. The King and the political elites demanded the submission of the masses and claimed legitimacy based on the traditional heritage rather than on the basis of their outputs or achievements. The Confucian notion of the "benevolent government" was rarely put into practice. As the power elite became increasingly detached from the goal of humanness, the masses felt the edge of power ever sharper, especially since no countervailing forces had evolved during this period.

In old Korea, the government's role was perceived as that of tax collector and regulatory agency rather than as the guarantor of liberty, equality, and justice. The Korean mind, especially that of the masses, was more concerned with matters of food, clothing, and shelter, than about philosophical matters of government. The Koreans did not articulate their ideals in the same manner as the Greeks and Romans. In the Roman or Western mind, liberty presupposes regulation by law and the conception of liberty is almost always qualified by the phrase "under law."

This concept of liberty was never considered as practicable, but as a political ideal in the minds of the Korean political elite in old Korea. In fact, the concept of liberty was not even included among the five ethical virtues compounded by the Korean literati. It was never predicated, even as a minor attitude, for a good social life. Where it was comprehended at all it was considered as a part of the larger virtues of propriety or wisdom. In the Korean mind, a man was free when he was able to transcend the fetters of vice, and government was not regarded as the guarantor of liberty for the masses.

The denial of the intrinsic equality of all men has led to a negation of free citizenship in Korea. The idea that every man ought to take part in governmental activity was limited to the upper classes in old Korea. They believed in a division of labor among the classes of society, in which the government was only the responsibility of the learned and virtuous, who would form the ruling elite.

The Greeks perceived justice in the harmonious life among the citizens in the community.²³ The Greeks nevertheless believed that justice was to be secured through freedom and the rule of law, which were regarded as two supplementary aspects of good government. Justice was also based on some kind of equality between the citizens. The conception of justice in the Korean mind did not include the elements of freedom, equality, or sovereignty of rule.

23. George H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory

The Koreans of both the elite and mass culture conceived of justice in its distributive aspect, on the one hand, while lacking a conception of the commutative and rectificatory aspects of justice, on the other. The judicial means to enforce contracts and to judge men on an equal basis was singularly lacking from the traditional Korean political culture.

The Korean ideal of the nation-state can be summed up as a "benevolent government" in which the rulers decide governmental policies. The ruling elite would claim that the benevolent government of a state should be for the people, but not by them. The masses acquiesced. Under this system, the absolute power of the ruler is recognized. However, a ruler could be removed if he did not carry out his duty as the elites and the masses saw it. Mencius, a prominent Confucian scholar, said, "People are of supreme importance; the altars to the gods of earth and grain come next; last comes the ruler. When a feudal lord endangers the altars to the gods of earth and grain, he should be replaced."²⁴ The elites, who utilized the concept of the benevolent government, succeeded in mobilizing subject support but failed to institutionalize a system of checks and balances which would secure liberty, equality, and justice against autocracy. The only available means of redress

(Hinsdale, Ill.: Dryden, 1973), 4th ed., p. 39.

24. Mencius VII.B.14, trans. C. D. Lau (Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1970), p. 196.

of grievances was a palace revolution in which the masses, together with another sector of the aristocrats, could replace an incumbent official. The traditional pattern of Korean political culture impeded the notion of societal revolution²⁵ by any members of the society.

Participation in the Decision Making Process

The fourth aspect of political culture is the orientation to the participation in the decision making process in a political system. The traditional Korean masses' behavior pattern was one of habitual obedience and subjugation to authority. Their sentiments were that government was not for the benefit of the common people, but only for the upper class at the expense of the masses. Thus the masses' subject orientation to politics, which bordered on cynicism, together with the lack of political efficacy, indicated that the political system was one in which democratic and participatory attitudes were not established.

25. A societal revolution here refers to the radical change of both a pattern of social structure and social order, and to the pattern of political structure. cf. Mostafa Rejai, The Strategy of Political Revolution (Garden City: Doubleday, 1973), p. 8. Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), p. 140.

The low level of political efficacy derives from the socialization process of the Koreans. Korean children are taught that they are to be submissive before any form of authority and that a passive and yielding attitude is desirable toward those in power. In his socialization, the child perceives the notion of "we" as a collectivistic orientation toward the kinship group, and does not extend his perception of the "in-group" to the larger political community. The child learns that "they" refer to anyone outside the family or village, and that an out-group member is not to be trusted. In adult political behavior, this socialization process results in a form of family-centrism and aggression toward out-groups,²⁶ in which bargaining and negotiation with them is not encouraged. The experiences of the child within the family environment have a formative influence on the development of political orientations and on political behavior. Under the authoritarian pattern of Korean political family structure, the effect of political socialization on the child is negative and dysfunctional; and the active participation of the child in family decision making is rarely practiced.²⁷

26. See the remarks of Wylie on related aspects of the child's political socialization process, Lawrence Wylie, Village in the Vaucluse (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961) pp. 206-208.

27. See the remarks of Sigel on the related aspects of the middle class family. Roberta S. Sigel, "Assumptions About the Learning of Political Values," Annals 361 (September 1965): 6.

The success of democratic institutions basically depends on the level of political consciousness, which is shown in political participation and in the process of "agenda building:"²⁸ Active participation and non-authoritarian personalities are a middle-class phenomena, and traditional Korean society lacked a strong middle class. Let us examine Korean social stratification briefly.

TABLE III.1

THE NUMBER OF FARMERS: IN KOREA (%)

YEAR	OWNER	OWNER AND TENANT	TENANT	TOTAL
1913-19	21.8	38.8	39.4	100.0
1939	19.0	25.3	55.7	100.0

SOURCE: Aiki Buyu, Chosen no Keijai (Korean Economy) (Tokyo: Japanese Hyouronsha, 1941), p. 246.

NOTE: The data of 1913-19 is the annual average of the period.

28. Agenda building processes are classified into three types: inside-access, mobilization, and outside initiative models. Roger Cobb, Jennie-Keith Ross and Mark H. Ross, "Agenda Building as a Comparative Political Process," American Political Science Review 70 (March 1976): 128-135.

In the predominantly agrarian society of Korea, with its "skewed or concentrated pattern of landholding"²⁹ as displayed in Table III.1, the middle class has been structurally weak.³⁰ Among the ruling class (Yangban) which totalled 89,050 domiciles in 1910, 15,758 domiciles represented government employees of the Yi Dynasty, 19,075 domiciles were classified as Confucian scholars, and 54,217 were unemployed. In Yi Korea, the ruling class formed a small percentage of the total population and the society was not industrialized.³¹ The middle class was very small and the bulk of the population made up the large lower class. This situation has not been substantially modified in South Korea, where, according to the 1972 survey, the social stratification is as follows: upper class 0.06%, upper middle class 7.0%, lower middle class 17.9%, upper lower class 39.1%, and lower lower class 35.9%. These statistics are further broken down in Table III.2.

29. James B. Palais, Politics and Policy in Traditional Korea (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), p. 63. In a land survey of six selected districts in 1898-1904, 50.9% of all households were owner-tenants, while another 24.0% were simply tenants. Ibid., p. 65.

30. For the occupational distribution of the commoners in Yi Korea in 1910, see C. I. Eugene Kim and Hankyo Kim, Korea and the Politics of Imperialism, 1876-1910, p. 227; Nihon Tokei Nenkan (1910), p. 947; and Chosen Jinko Gensko, p. 94.

31. C. I. Eugene Kim and Hankyo Kim, op. cit., p. 227. Among the work forces of the commoners, who totalled 2,805,727 domiciles, only 0.08% were mainly involved in industry and mining.

TABLE III.2
 SOCIAL STRATIFICATION BY TYPE OF COMMUNITY
 IN SOUTH KOREA IN 1972

Class Category	National Average	Seoul	Industrial Cities	Small Cities	Towns	Rural Villages
Upper	0.06	2	1	1	-	-
Upper-middle	7.60	12	13	8	6	3
Lower-middle	17.90	25	31	14	25	11
Upper-lower	39.10	46	33	39	57	39
Lower-lower	35.94	13	17	37	13	47

SOURCE: Bom Mo Chung, et al., Psychological Perspectives: Family Planning in Korea (Seoul: Korean Institute for Research in the Behavioral Sciences, 1972); as quoted in Herbert R. Barringer, "Social Stratification and Industrialization in Korea," ILCORK Working Paper #11 (Social Science Research Institute, University of Hawaii, 1972), pp. 11 and 23.

Although industrialization has contributed to the growth of the middle class, it has been limited mostly to the urban population. After the Korean War, the expected growth of the middle class has been attenuated by a tendency toward over-urbanization, which is reflected in an unusually large segment of the population in the urban lower class.³² This is despite the fact that the general form of urban stratification structure is indicative of a transitional society in which the middle class should grow rapidly. The rural villages appear to have retained the typical pre-industrialization stratification structure. Overall, the middle class made up only 24.9% of the population of South Korea in 1972. Freud Allport argues that conformity to the standard of behavior in a population varies in the shape of a J-curve as population increases.³³ Both the Korean family structure and the structure of the social order tends to socialize children into authoritarian personalities. A high percentage of the population tends to conform to authoritarianism in Korea. In this setting, the development of role-taking and role-playing abilities

32. Herbert R. Barringer, op. cit., p. 33.

33. Freud Allport, "J-Curve Hypothesis of Conforming Behavior," Journal of Social Psychology 5 (1935): 141-183.

is restricted.³⁴ Narrow perspectives are related to several components of authoritarianism -- the conservative complex, unreflective conformity to external authority, rigid conventionality, and vilification of the people.³⁵

The rise of authoritarian leadership in Korea can be conceived of as a "compensation for the declining role of the traditional father."³⁶ The authoritarianism which developed in the family-centered structure of Korean society has been extended to the political structure and process. The authoritarian style prevails in Korean political culture. In old Korea, the inside access model of agenda building was used. Much of the political agenda originated from the ruling class which had easy and frequent access to the decision making process. In the setting of the authoritarian family structure and the agrarian society, the development of "entrepreneurial orientations"³⁷ has been impeded.

34. D. Steward and T. Hoult, "A Socio-Psychological Theory of the Authoritarian Personality," American Journal of Sociology 65 (November 1959): 278.

35. Howard Gabennesch, "Authoritarianism as a World View," American Journal of Sociology 77 (March 1972): 860-861.

36. Verba argues along similar lines about the evolution of the German political culture, see Pye and Verba, eds., op. cit., pp. 154-160.

37. Everett E. Hagen, On the Theory of Social Change (Homewood: Dorsey, 1962), pp. 123-160. G. L. Field also argues that an agrarian society does not have a large "decision-audience", which is characteristic of large-scale and impersonal organizational complexes in an industrial society or representative-consensual regimes. G. Lowell Field, Comparative Political Development (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967), p. 42.

When one classifies the orientations toward problem-solving on a continuum from instrumental orientation to consummatory orientation, the Koreans of the Yi Dynasty would best be classified in the category of consummatory orientation. This orientation makes a cult of activities which conform to the ideology of "possessive conservatism"³⁸ among the Korean elite and of pessimistic conservatism among the masses. The instrumental orientation is one which leans toward ideological goals by various means and is judged according to the goals' effectiveness. It did not take root in traditional Korea.

In the recent period of South Korean history, the orientation toward participation is still a passive one and its level of efficacy is low. Recent political survey research in South Korea shows that a large portion (44.3%) of the respondents said that the political parties did not adhere to the principles of democracy in matters of party administration and in the decision making process.³⁹ The level of conscious political participation is low in

38. Clinton Rossiter, Conservatism in America, Second Edition (N.Y.: Random House, 1962), p. 8.

39. Ilmun Cho and Kyungwoo Kim, op. cit., in C. I. Eugene Kim and Young-whan Kihl, eds., op. cit., p. 93.

South Korea,⁴⁰ and South Koreans regard the government as an organization controlled by the elites, not the people. Therefore, the historical pattern of autocracy and administrative centralization in Yi Korea provided the setting for the easy rise and maintenance of an authoritarian regime in Korea.

In summary, in this chapter the focus has been on the pattern of culture in traditional Korea, with some references to contemporary Korea. We have identified the pattern of Korean political culture as a subject political culture, which resulted from the narrow world view of the Koreans, which in turn was based on the Koreanized Confucian culture in an agrarian society. The interactions between the closed society and the narrow world view contributed to the formation of authoritarian personalities. Authoritarianism caused the evolution of the subject political culture in Korea. The characteristics of this subject political culture are as follows: (1) it is a kinship centered culture with a low level of system affect; (2) there is a low level of confidence and trust in persons outside the kinship group; (3) governmental performance is measured on the basis of personal benefit rather than

40. In addition, it may be caused by the low level of efficacy among the people, who are discouraged by the authoritarian leaders.

the public interest; and (4) there is a low level of participation by the masses in the decision making process. The leadership has imposed a passive role on the masses in the political process.

The present chapter has been a discussion of the traditional political culture in Korea. The following chapter will be a brief examination of the pattern variables of traditional political culture and the politics of transformation of the political culture in the two Koreas.

CHAPTER IV
THE POLITICS OF TRANSFORMATION
OF THE POLITICAL CULTURE

In the previous chapter, the pattern of political culture in the transitional society of Korea has been identified as a subject political culture. In this chapter, we will briefly examine the value orientations of the traditional Koreans and will identify the types of adjustments in their action tendencies. This will be followed by a discussion of the transformation which has taken place in the Korean political culture since World War II.

The value orientations of the Koreans toward objects have emphasized the ascriptive status, diffused roles, particularistic values, collectivity-orientations, and finally, the affectivity which could be summed up as the characteristics of a "traditional" society rather than of a "modern" one, in which the pattern variables would be achievement, specific roles, universalistic values, self-orientation, and affective neutrality.¹ This is

1. Talcott Parsons, et al., "Values, Motives, and Systems of Action," in Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, eds., Toward a General Theory of Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 77.

the Parsonian definition of the "modern" society. All this is Western industrial, not necessarily "modern." We may have to revise the concept of "modern" society. For instance, James C. Hsiung asks whether there was a "premodern development" prior to and at time zero (t_0) that made a country less amenable to the essential dictates of modernization later, at time t_1 . He thus recognizes the need for a new concept, "epidevelopment," which is defined as a "phenomenon in which a prior form of development hampers further progress because the society is so entrenched in the existing structure that it cannot freely reorient itself to meet new challenges."² Using ascriptive patterns of norms, one judges other people on the basis of their status rather than on their performance. This was the case in traditional Korea. An achievement pattern, on the other hand, would have called for the evaluation of the person's work. Roles were diffused in traditional Korea. The same person who administered the tax laws, for example, might also judge the tax case.

2. James C. Hsiung, "A Revisionist View of Modernization Theory: From the Asian Perspective," a paper delivered at the 1971 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 7-11, 1971, p. 11.

When one judged others in traditional Korea, he used particularistic norms rather than universal values or performance standards. Everyone was not to be judged by a common standard, such as the common law. Most people gave a higher priority to personal, family or kinship interests than to public interests. Even public officials tended to favor their personal interests over public needs. Affectivity refers to the emotional involvement of the actor in the decision making process. When evaluating or deciding upon a specific policy in the government, scientific evaluation of data was not emphasized. Rather, impulsive, unscientific decision making was the rule.

There are in general four types of adjustment in action tendency: dominance, submission, aggression, and withdrawal. As depicted in Table IV.1, when one measures the relationship between two actors, there are two possible alternatives of behavior. One actor can choose either an active or a passive approach to adjust the action tendency. The action tendency can also be adjusted by dependence or independence. Thus there are four possible alternative courses available to adjust the action tendency.

TABLE IV.1

THE TYPES OF PRIMARY MECHANISMS
OF EXTERNAL RELATION ADJUSTMENT

	Retention (dependency)	Relinquishment (compulsive independence)
Active alternative	Dominance	Aggressiveness
Passive alternative	Submission	Withdrawal

SOURCE: Parsons and Shils, eds., op. cit., p. 256.

With respect to traditional Korea, the masses' primary mechanism for adjustment of the action tendency in their relationship with the elites was submission, which resulted from their passivity and their dependence on the elite. Another aspect of the interactions between the elites and the masses was the masses' withdrawal as a passive and compulsive independence alternative in their action tendency. On the other hand, the ruling elites exhibited an aggressive, dominant pattern of political behavior.

The leaders in the two Koreas have used the strategies of paradox; they have attempted to transform certain aspects of the transitional pattern of political orientations, while utilizing the masses' submission-withdrawal adjustment of action tendency. The politics of transformation is the main focus of the following pages.

The Politics of Transformation

Changes in basic political orientations are indeed a crucial problem for the political elites in developing nations;³ and the two Koreas have been affected by this problem. Politics in the two Koreas has been the politics of transformation in the post-war era.⁴ One of the fundamental problems of political development is to break the traditional pattern of political culture, to release individuals from narrowly-defined perspectives and primordial patterns of sentiments (such as the subject political culture), and to extend every individual's political horizons in the process of societal mobilization (as under the change by planning model in the two Koreas). Although the models

3. Sydney Verba, "Conclusion," in Lucian W. Pye, and Sydney Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 520.

4. For a study of transformation in another country, see Richard Fagen, The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969).

adopted by the two Koreas are different in their conception of the rate of change, they share the common policies of planning. North Korea has undergone radical change, while South Korea has undergone an incremental change.

In the two sectors of divided Korea, the political elites have sought to direct the socialization process toward the creation of new motivational and value orientations, and new patterns of political behavior. The political socialization process has been centered on the learning process through which the political elites hoped to create a new political culture, which would result in a new pattern of mass political behavior. Part of the strategy of transformation has been direct attacks on the traditional Korean culture itself by the political leaders in the two Koreas. Park Chung Hee urged the transformation of South Korea's political culture in a major thesis in which he states:

Is there no way for national regeneration? Is there no way to mend our decayed national character and build a sound and democratic welfare state? Is there not some way to accomplish a human revolution, so that our people may stop telling lies, cast away the habits of sycophancy and indolence, and make a new start as industrious workers, carry out social reform, and build a country without paupers, a country of prosperity and affluence? 5

5. Park Chung Hee, Our Nation's Path (Seoul: Danga Publishing Co., 1962), p. 3.

Kim Il Sung, urging socialist cultural development, states:

Socialism and Communism require not only a high level of development of the productive forces but a high cultural standard of the working people. Only when the cultural revolution, along with the technical revolution, is pushed ahead continuously and vigorously, can the complete victory of socialism be hastened and the essential requirements of socialist and Communist society be satisfied.....For the sound development of socialist culture, it is also necessary resolutely to oppose the trend of restorationism. 6

Although political socialization is essentially regarded as a conservative process which facilitates the maintenance of the status quo by strengthening the communal affect of the system, in the long history of Korea, there has never been a similar effort to deliberately transform the political culture.

Social change in the two Koreas, displayed in Tables IV.2, IV.3, IV.4 and IV.5 has been rapid. The urban population has increased substantially in the years since World War II. The percentage of urbanites in the total population was more than 52% in South Korea in 1976 and more than 40% in North Korea in 1960. The distribution of employment by industry has changed rapidly as well. The percentage of workers in the mining and manufacturing area has increased from 7.6% in South Korea in 1960 to 16.4% in 1973; while in North Korea it increased from 14.0% in 1946

6. Kim Il Sung, Revolution and Socialist Construction in Korea (N.Y.: International Publishers, 1971), pp. 197-199.

to 41.2% in 1965, as displayed in Table IV.4 ⁷

TABLE IV.2

THE URBAN POPULATION IN KOREA (1919-1940)

Year	% of population in urban areas	urban population	number of cities
1919	3.4	583,611	12
1930	4.7	969,835	13
1940	11.5	2,818,460	20

SOURCE: Pak Munok, "Uri nara eui sahoi byondong kwa buljon . eul wihon hengjong jongchek" (Social Change and Administrative Policy for Development) Jungdae nonmun jib (Journal of Chungang University) (1967): 42.

7. 1960 is the most recent year in which North Korea released the North Korean Central Yearbook's comprehensive statistics on the national economy. Any statistics about the North Korean economy after 1960 have been collected by the researcher from the speeches of North Korean leaders, or have been estimated by scholars from the West.

TABLE IV.3
URBAN POPULATION OF SOUTH KOREA AND
NORTH KOREA (1946-1976)

SOUTH KOREA			NORTH KOREA ^c		
YEAR	TOTAL (1,000s)	% OF URBAN POP.	YEAR	TOTAL (1,000s)	% OF URBAN POP.
-	-	-	1946	9,257	-
1949 ^a	20,189	17.2	1949	9,622	-
1955 ^a	21,526	24.5	1953	8,491	17.7
-	-	-	1956	9,359	29.0
-	-	-	1959	10,392	38.0
1960 ^b	24,526	28.0	1960 ^f	10,789	40.6
-	-	-	1963 ^f	-	44.5
1966 ^b	29,143	33.6	1967 ^f	-	47.5
1970 ^b	31,469	43.2	-	-	-
1972 ^d	32,360	-	1972	14,680	-
1973 ^d	32,905	-	1973	15,090	-
1976 ^e	-	52.0	-	-	-

Sources: a. ROK, Economic Planning Board, Korean Statistical Yearbook, 1963, p. 31. An urban area was defined as a city with more than 50,000 population.

b. ROK, Economic Planning Board, Preliminary Count of Population and Housing Census, 1970 (Seoul: 1971), p. 10.

c. Joson jungang yonkam 1961 (North Korean Central Yearbook 1961) (Pyongyang: North Korean Central News Agency, 1961), p. 321; and The North Korean Yearbook 1963 trans. U.S. Department of Commerce, JPRS (Washington, D.C.: 1963), p. 470.

d. Donga yonkam 1975 (The East Asia Yearbook 1975) (Seoul: Donga Ilbo Sa, 1975), p. 643.

e. Choi Taejoon, "70 yonda dosi haengjong eui kwaje," (The Tasks of Urban Public Administration in the 1970's) Joongang haengjong (Central Administration) 2 (January 1970):83. The figure is an estimate.

f. Bukhan chongkam 1945-1968 (Yearbook of North Korea 1945-1968) (Seoul: Institute of Communist Bloc Problems, 1968), p. 36. Bukhan yoram (Survey of North Korea) (Seoul: Ministry of Public Information, 1968), p. 191.

TABLE IV.4
THE INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE OF EMPLOYMENT
IN THE TWO KOREAS, 1946-1973 (%)

Year	Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishery	Mining and Manufacturing	Social Overhead, Capital, etc.
<u>SOUTH KOREA</u>			
1960 ^a	65.7	7.6	26.7
1972 ^a	50.6	14.2	35.2
1973 ^b	50.0	16.4	33.6
<u>NORTH KOREA^c</u>			
1946	74.1	14.0	11.9
1949	69.3	20.1	10.6
1953	66.4	22.3	11.3
1956	56.6	28.7	14.7
1959	45.7	40.5	13.8
1960	44.4	41.6	14.0
1965 ^d	43.2	41.2	15.6

Sources: a. Kim Kyungdong, "Social Change in South Korea," Journal of Korean Affairs 4 (January 1975):9.

b. Donga yonkam 1975 (The East Asia Yearbook, 1975), p. 648.

c. The North Korean Central Yearbook 1961 (Pyongyang, 1961), p. 321.

d. Kang Indok, et al., Bukhan jonso (Complete Book of North Korea) (Seoul: Research Institute of the Far East, 1974), I: 106.

Rapid social change probably creates conflicting social norms in the two Koreas which result in the formation of a modern sector which is not in agreement with the traditional cultural norms of the population, and which results in the movement of the cultural norms in competing directions.⁸ Urbanization and industrialization also help create a modern sector in transitional societies such as the two Koreas.⁹ Some sources of conflict between the traditional and the modern sectors of the population lie in the contradiction between political reality, the political norms and their environment (such as the general cultural, economic, and social systems) which socialize citizens as modern men. Because of these basic conflicts, an individual may become cynical or apathetic, as in the case of many of the intellectuals in South Korea. Some people readjust their political orientations to conform with norms which are prescribed by the deliberate manipulation process of the political authorities. In the two Koreas, as in other transitional societies, the new political orientations subsequently encountered conflict, such as that between the old and new cultural norms. The new orientations may lead to further revolutionary changes, such as those which occurred in North Korea under the

8. See Easton's related remarks on cultural mechanisms as regulators of want conversion. David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: Wiley, 1965), p.105.

9. For remarks about the interactions among industrialization, urbanization and modern cultural norms, see Alex Inkeles and David H. Smith, Becoming Modern (Cambridge:

revolutionary ideology of Marxism-Leninism. They have sought a restructuring of reality in the image of their own motivational and value orientations in the younger generation of revolutionary elites.¹⁰ Even under the incrementalism of the "Change by Planning" model in South Korea, those who were socialized under the impact of modernity in economic and social systems attempted to restructure the society toward their own orientations.¹¹

The politics of the transformation of the political culture and the politics of modernization inevitably have an impact on one another. However, the conflicts between the traditional sector and the newly-formed modern sector, which developed under the influence of intra- and extra-societal environments of the political system in South Korea, have persisted. For example, South Korean college

Harvard University Press, 1974), p. 261. Bert F. Hoselitz and Wilbert Moore, eds., Industrialization and Society (UNESCO-MOUTON, 1966), p. 299. David C. McClelland, The Achieving Society (N.Y.: Free Press, 1961), p. 15.

10. The younger generation of North Korean elites, such as Kim Jongil (a son of Kim Il Sung) and Kim Yongjoo (a younger brother of Kim Il Sung) do not show indications of moderate political behavior. See similar remarks by Kim Joongin, a North Korean spy who defected to the South. Hankuk Ilbo, October 31, 1976. Kim Changsun, "Hyokmyong jontong keseung kwa Kim Jongil lukeron," (The Continuity of the Revolutionary Tradition and the Succession of Kim Jongil) Bukhan 5 (August 1976): 52-60; and see also the interview with Nam Changu, Jungang Ilbo, April 26, 1976, p. 3.

11. The Student Revolution of 1960 is a good example of this type of behavior in South Korea. See John K. Oh, Korea: Democracy on Trial (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968), pp. 60-71; and Nena Vreeland, et al. Area Handbook for South Korea (Washington, D.C.: Governing Printing Office, 1975), pp. 132-183.

students, acting as "idealists" and "marginal men"¹² have often confronted and opposed what they perceived to be non-modern measures by the governmental elites. In 1960 and in 1967, they demonstrated against election irregularities. Students at Koryo University, at the Business Administration College of Seoul National University, and at Seongkyunkwan University, demonstrated against the suppression of freedom of the press in April 1971, and spoke out for the establishment of democratic government in October 1973 and in October 1974. Journalists in South Korea have also struggled for freedom of the press themselves. The Catholic Church, which owned the minority party-oriented newspaper, Kyonghyang, watched the paper banned after a columnist criticized the government.¹³

12. Lipset, who characterized college students as idealistic, argued that the propensity of youth to zealously pursue an ideal can be seen as a direct outgrowth of their socialization process. Seymour M. Lipset, "Youth and Politics," in Robert K. Merton and Robert Nisbet, Contemporary Social Problems, Third Edition (N.Y.: Harcourt, 1971), p. 744. For remarks on students as marginal men, see Seymour M. Lipset, "American Student Activism," in Gary R. Weaver and James H. Weaver, eds., The University and Revolution (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1969), p. 25.

13. Donga Yonkam 1975 (The East Asian Yearbook 1975) (Seoul: Donga Ilbo Sa, 1975), p. 86. Hereafter cited as The East Asian Yearbook 1975.

Individuals are socialized under both traditional and modern norms simultaneously, which results in a somewhat disjointed political socialization. The result of this disjointed progress in the socialization of some South Koreans has led to discontinuities and incongruencies in individual political orientations, which were once relatively congruent.

The conflicts between the majority (those in the subject political culture sector of the Korean population in the North and South) and the minority (those influenced by the modern and participant political culture) led to developmental crises.¹⁴ The survey of South Korean college students shows that 61.8 % of them would not "keep quiet on public affairs and thus stay away from trouble."¹⁵

The dominant modes of the Korean political system have shifted from the centralized autocracy

14. One of the major crises was the Student Revolution of 1960 in South Korea. See Byunghun Oh, "Students and Politics," in Edward R. Wright, ed., Korean Politics in Transition (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1975), pp. 122-123; and C.I. Eugene Kim and Kesoo Kim, "The April 1960 Korean Student Movement," Western Political Quarterly 17 (March 1964): 83-92.

15. Byunghun Oh, op. cit., in Edward R. Wright, ed., op. cit., p. 145.

of Yi Korea, through the stage of authoritarianism of the Rhee administration period, and through the relatively democratic system of the Chang cabinet period, to the neo-authoritarianism of the Park administration in South Korea; and from autocracy and virocracy under the coalition of Kim, Soviet-Korean and Yenan factions to the monolithic virocracy of Kim Il Sung.

In the last 30 years of the history of the two Koreas there has been one common characteristic: the politics of transformation of the political culture. The leaderships in the two Koreas have promoted two different types of "new man," as a goal for the transformation of the political culture; North Korean elites prescribed the "socialist man," while South Korean leaders advocated the "modern man." The following pages will be concerned with the agencies and strategies of the transformation.

Agencies for the Transformation of the Political Culture

(A) North Korea

The six major goals of instructional programs in North Korea, stated by Kim Il Sung, are:

- (1) to indoctrinate the superiority of socialism and Communism over capitalism,
- (2) to indoctrinate the truth that things new are destined to conquer things old,
- (3) to eliminate individualism and egoism and to indoctrinate collectivism and love for organization,
- (4) to indoctrinate socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism, and
- (5) to indoctrinate revolutionary ideology.¹⁶

The North Korean political authorities utilize all available agencies for the transformation of political culture: the KWP, the public educational system, peer groups such as the Socialist Labor Youth Association (all youth from 14 to 30 year old), the North Korean Vocational General League (2.2 million members), the North Korean Democratic Women's Association (2.5 million members), and the North Korean Farmers' Association (2.6 million members).¹⁷

The major structures for propaganda for the KWP are the "Democratic Propaganda Offices" (DPO) located in every factory and agricultural cooperative.¹⁸ The main task of the DPO is to carry out Kim Il Sung's aforementioned goals of instructional programs and to indoctrinate all the KWP members in their work places in the monolithic thought of Kim Il Sung. The Propaganda and Agitation Department (PAD) of the KWP controls all propaganda activities within the various levels of the KWP and governmental agencies, including the Political Affairs Division of

16. Kim Il Sung, Kim Il Sung sonjib (Selected Works of Kim Il Sung) (Pyongyang: the KWP Press, 1966), VI:131-138.

17. Yom Hongchol, "Bukhan eui jongchi sahoihwa kwajong," (The Political Socialization Process in North Korea) Bukhan 4 (October 1975):111.

18. All the local chiefs of the DPO are salaried bureaucrats according to the DPRK Cabinet Decree of March 12, 1951. Kang Indok, ed., Bukhan jonso (Complete Book of North Korea), I:248. Hereafter cited as Complete Book of North Korea.


Defense, Culture and Arts, and Publications Departments of the executive branch, as exhibited in Figure IV.1. Each local KWP Committee has their own Propaganda Department, which is charged with the duty to educate all KWP members, in order to mold them into "socialist men." The PAD of the KWP also controls the various cultural associations, such as the North Korean General League for Literature and Arts (which maintains such sub-structures as the Korean Writers' League, Musicians' League, Artists' League, Actors' League, etc.,) which control the socialization process of KWP members as well as non-members. The PAD of the KWP also tightly controls the organ of the Central Committee of the KWP, Nodong Sinmun (The Labor News); the organ for the Cabinet and the Supreme People's Assembly, Minju Joson (the Democratic Korea); and other newspapers. There are 27 newspapers, which claim to have circulations of 252.3 million copies.¹⁹ Since 1956, the KWP Press has published 350,000 copies of Kim Il Sung's Selected Works (Korean-language edition) in addition to more than 200,000 copies of various books on Kim.²⁰ Nodong Simun²¹ and Minju Joson have published articles which support the cult of personality of Kim and his family, as well as articles

19. The North Korean Central Yearbook 1961, p.353. There was a circulation of 71.4 million copies in 1948.

20. Complete Book of North Korea, I:247. The North Korean Central Yearbook 1969 lists more than a dozen books on Kim. Exerpts from 1969 North Korean Central Yearbook, JPRS:53,693, pp.248-252.

21. The Nodong Sinmun claims to publish 300,000 copies daily. Authur S. Banks, ed., Political Handbook of the

FIGURE IV.1
THE STRUCTURE OF PROPAGANDA AGENCIES
IN NORTH KOREA



concerning the revolutionary tradition, the KWP policies, economic development, and unification policy; they also promote anti-imperialist and anti-Japanese sentiments.²²

In order to indoctrinate the younger generation in the monolithic ideology of the KWP, the public educational system has been rapidly expanded in North Korea. As shown in Table IV.5, the percentage of elementary and secondary school students was smaller in North Korea (12.64 % of the total population) than in South Korea (13.57 % of the total population) in 1949. However, after 1950, the percentage of elementary and secondary school students of the North Korean population exceeded that of South Korea. The figure reached over 21% in North Korea in 1954 (in South Korea in 1964). North Korea's total number of all schools (from elementary schools to four-year colleges)²³ increased from 2,731 in 1946 to 9,172 schools in 1967, while the number of students increased from 1.026 million in 1946 to 3.2 million in 1966. North Korea claims that there were six million students from kindergartens to four-year colleges in 1972.²⁴ North Korea implemented the ten-year compulsory education in September 1972, and the eleven-year education, in 1975.²⁵

World, 1975 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975), p.190.

22. ROK, Unification Board, Nambukhan bikyo (Comparison of North and South Korea) (Seoul: Unification Board, 1973); and Yom Hongchol, op cit., p.112.

23. North Korean Yearbook Publication Committee, Bukhan chongkam, 1945-'68 (Yearbook of North Korea, 1945-'68) (Seoul: Institute of Communist Bloc Problems, 1968), p.583. Hereafter cited as Yearbook of North Korea, 1945-68.

TABLE IV.5
THE PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL ENROLLMENT
IN THE TWO KOREAS

Year	North Korea		South Korea	
	Total (in 1,000s)	% of total population (in 0.01)	Total	%
1948	1026	1110	2738	1367
1949	1151	1264	2741	1357
1950	1276	1423	2746	1338
1951	1401	1586	2750	1330
1952	1526	1755	2755	1302
1953	1651	1928	2991	1395
1954	1776	2136	3228	1488
1955	1901	2144	3455	1546
1956	2026	2151	3683	1601
1957	2151	2109	3911	1753
1958	2276	2183	4045	1735
1959	2401	2253	4179	1752
1960	2526	2320	4314	1760
1961	2651	2395	4642	1829
1962	2776	2447	4971	1902
1963	2901	2507	5300	1971
1964	3026	2564	5630	2035
1965	3151	2604	5946	2096
1966	3276	2641	6262	2052

Source: Arthur S. Banks, comp., Cross-Polity Time-Series Data (Cambridge: the MIT Press, 1971), p.222.

The contents of school textbooks reveal the intensive efforts to indoctrinate youth in socialism. In November 1948, Kim Il Sung already emphasized the ideological works of youth in a speech²⁶ which he delivered at the Third Congress of the North Korean Democratic Youth Association. In the North Korean elementary, junior, and senior high school textbooks for courses on the Korean language, Korean history, natural sciences, and mathematics, the main positive themes which the North Korean leaders have prescribed include Communism (22%), historical facts (9%), nation (24%), personal anecdotes of Kim Il Sung (36%), and economic development (9%); while the main negative themes include criticism of liberal democracy (13%) and the historical facts about liberal democracy (18%), anti-American and anti-Japanese sentiments (61%), criticism of foreign politicians (7%), and information on foreign countries (1%).²⁷ A close examination of the Korean language education course shows how the students are indoctrinated. Content analysis of the sixteen Korean language textbooks used in

Rinn-sup Shinn, et al., Area Handbook for North Korea (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), p.142.

24. Pyongyang Press, Oneul eui joson (North Korea Today) (Pyongyang: Pyongyang Press, 1973), p. 173.

25. The People's Korea January 14, 1976, p.1.

26. See the text in Kim Il Sung, Kim Il Sung jojak sonjib (Selected Works of Kim Il Sung) (Pyongyang: People's Press, 1970), I:150-156. Hereafter cited as Selected Works of Kim Il Sung 1970 ed.

27. ROK, Unification Board, Nambukhan kyoyuk yokryang bikyo (The Comparison of Educational Capacities of North and South Korea) (Seoul: Unification Board, 1972), p. 17.

elementary, junior, and senior high schools in North Korea reveals six main themes: the primacy of the thought of Kim Il Sung, the anti-American sentiments, the submission to the Party, the revolutionary tradition and spirit, the anti-Japanese sentiments, and the glorification of Kim Il Sung's partisan activities against Japan.²⁸

Besides the public school system, the KWP established party schools, which were located in the provincial capitals and major cities; such as the Political Research School of the KWP, the Evening School for the ranking KWP cadres, and the Party Cadres Schools in the provincial capital cities. Additionally, each week local committees run "symposiums" on Communism, current affairs, the economy, and party policies. Every local KWP committee also sponsors "Learning Through Dialogue" Meetings. The upper levels of the KWP committees send propaganda specialists to lower level committees to supervise the propaganda activities.²⁹ Among the military, the importance of propaganda works is reflected in the rank of the cultural officer, who is in charge of propaganda activities, and is second in command only to the tactical planning officer in each military division.³⁰ The

28. Pak Yonghon, "Bukhan kyokwaso eui neyong bunsok," (A Content Analysis of the Textbooks of North Korea) Bukhan 4 (May 1975): 105-7.

29. ROK, Ministry of Home Affairs, Bureau of Police, Bukhan kongsan jongkwon e dehan kochal (An Analysis of North Korean Regime) (Seoul: Ministry of Home Affairs, 1956), p.104.

30. U.S. Air Force, Air University, Human Resources Research Institute, Preliminary Studies of Impact of Communism upon Korea (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University, 1951), p.204.

self-criticism method and autobiography writing are also major methods to indoctrinate the masses in Marxism-Leninism in North Korea.³¹

However, the efforts toward the transformation of the political culture have had limitations and were not always completely satisfactory to the North Korean leaders. In 1955, Kim Il Sung criticized ideological works, stating that the members of the KWP indulged in "dogmatism and formalism"³² in their ideological works. Kim again stated that some reports from local agencies claiming that "their youth were thoroughly indoctrinated and enthusiastic socialists," were exaggerated and falsified.³³ Therefore Kim himself recognized the difficulties of molding North Koreans into the role of the new socialist man.

Now let us examine the politics of the transformation of political culture in South Korea.

31. Kim Changsun, Fifteen-Year History of North Korea, U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Technical Service, trans. JPRS:18,925 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Commerce, 1963), pp. 49-51.

32. Selected Works of Kim Il Sung, 1970 ed. I:322.

33. From the speech by Kim "Instruction to all Educators on March 14, 1969," quoted in Jong Doyol, "Bukhan jumin eui juyo kachi kwan," (The Value System of North Koreans) Bukhan 2 (May 1973):294.

(B) South Korea

In South Korea, the strategy for the socialization process and transformation of political culture, which was manipulated by the leaders, took an incremental approach, mainly through public education system and government-run mass media. The ruling Democratic Republican Party (DRP) in South Korea has not taken as active a role as the KWP in North Korea as an agency for the transformation of political culture. The major effort for the transformation of political culture in South Korea started with the National Reconstruction Movement (NRM) on June 10, 1961, immediately after the military coup d'état. Local committees of the NRM were established, which had an interlocking structure with every provincial, city, town and village administrative agency. The major goals of the NRM were to educate the local people and mobilize their support for the military government (especially in the rural areas). The NRM's efforts to transform the political culture were not effective, but the effort to mobilize the support of village people was relatively successful; its local bases became the organizational foundation of the local committees of the DRP in 1963, which was before the first general election

after the military coup d'état. Once they completed the formation of the local committees of the DRP, they abolished the NRM. This took place in December 1963.

The major vehicles for the transformation of political culture have been the public school system for the younger generation and the mass media for the adults. The educational policy is claimed to have been based on the ROK Constitution and the National Charter of Education, which was intended to inspire the student with a high sense of morality and the mission of regenerating the nation. The Charter reads, "With a sincere mind and a strong body, we will improve ourselves in the learning arts, develop our innate faculties, overcome existing difficulties for the rapid progress of the nation; and we will do our best to participate in building the nation."³⁴ The major goals of the education policy are to develop a new understanding of human relations through education in public ethics, to encourage scientific and technical education, to provide for balanced educational development, and to improve the educational environment and physical fitness of youth. Conspicuously absent from the National Charter of Education are the notions of liberty, equality, and justice for the individual; rather it emphasizes the primacy of the nation. The Charter also emphasizes the importance of the economic development of the

³⁴. The government declared the Charter in 1968. Korea Annual 1974 (Seoul: Hopdong News Agency, 1974), p.197.

nation and the importance of the individual commitment to modernization and the construction of an industrial society, rather than the fulfillment of individuality. At any rate, to most Koreans in the South, modernization simply meant industrialization; in a survey study by Youngho Lee, 27% of the assemblymen, and 69% of the general public held this view, while in another survey study by Hong, 29% of the intellectuals have this view. The conception of distributive justice is never emphasized by any group in survey studies. Only a few of the intellectuals (5.9%) regarded the democratization of the political system as an indicator of modernization. ³⁵

The transformation of the political culture was further reinforced by the uniform, single textbooks developed for each course, which were published by the government in South Korea, as in North Korea. The Ministry of Education of the South Korean Government banned the publication of junior high school textbooks written by eminent college professors and instead the Ministry published a single textbook for each course in the areas of Korean history, social science, and English in 1973, and mathematics, natural

35. Youngho Lee, "Modernization as a Goal Value in Korean Society," Korea Journal 12 (April 1972):25; and Sungchick Hong, The Intellectuals and Modernization: A Study of Korean Attitudes (Seoul: Social Research Institute, 1967), P.179.

science, geography and gymnastic in 1974. The government claimed that the main reasons for the change in textbook policy was to prepare the educational system for the further compulsory education of junior high school students and to teach a monolithic view of the philosophy of history to the South Korean students.³⁶ The South Korean government has published a single textbook for each course in the elementary schools, which have been compulsory since 1945. The tradition of the monolithic textbook system for compulsory education has been in existence since 1945.³⁷ The North Korean government has also imposed a single textbook for each course in its 11-year compulsory education system.³⁸ It could be conceived that a monolithic textbook system might possibly reinforce the development of a narrow world view and decrease the student's flexibility in problem-solving, which would consequently reinforce the formation of an authoritarian world view in the minds of the youth.

The public school system in South Korea under the centralized government structure has grown rapidly in the last 30 years, especially with the development of new course

36. East Asia Yearbook 1975, p. 526.

37. The American compulsory education system generally imposes syllabi published by each state government, but does not specify the textbook for each course.

38. North Korea implemented a nine-year compulsory system in 1967, a ten-year system in 1972, and 11-year system in 1975. Yearbook of North Korea, 1945-68, p.577; and Pyongyang Press, Oneul eui joson (Korea Today) (Pyongyang: Pyongyang Press, 1973), p.173. The People's Korea January 14, 1976, p.1.

contents and new textbooks, compared with the Yi dynasty and the Japanese colonial periods. First let us consider the growth rate of schools in South Korea from 1945 to 1972; the number of elementary schools increased 218.0% (to 6197 schools in 1972). The number of junior and senior high schools increased 1,714.0% (to 2828 schools in 1972); and the number of junior colleges, four-year colleges and universities increased 490.0% (to 39 higher educational institutions in 1972). In this period, the student population growth was much greater than the overall population growth rate of approximately 28% (from 1943-1973). Secondly, the number of students also increased dramatically in the same period; the number of elementary school students increased 420.0%, the number of junior and senior high school students increased 288.0%, and the number of college students increased 230.0%,³⁹ so that by 1974, 28% of all South Koreans were in school. High school syllabi were revised periodically. For example, the military government revised the high school syllabi in 1963. The Ministry of Education also changed the syllabi of high school courses in 1974, in order to

39. East Asia Yearbook 1975, p.52.

reflect the ideas of the Revitalizing Reform Movement.⁴⁰

The Ministry of Education established several new compulsory courses such as the courses in national ethics and military training, which were introduced in 1974. The educational policy prescribed by the Ministry set out to teach about such themes as the nature of national modernization, an individual's commitment to national development, peaceful unification, the Revitalizing Reform Movement and the New Community Movement.

On June 5, 1974, the Ministry of Education implemented a new course in anti-Communism. The themes of this course included a criticism of Communism, emphasis on Korean unification and nationalism, an explanation of the philosophy of the nation-state, the idea of democracy, the past and current development of a Korean way of democracy, the diversity of democratic institutions, one's role and tasks for national modernization, and promoted active participation in the New Community Movement. In addition, the Ministry of Education ordered the local education boards to introduce the theme of anti-Communism into every other courses in the schools,

40. Wallace conceptualizes a "revitalization movement" as the psychological equivalent of revolution. He defines a revitalization movement as a deliberate, organized attempt by some members of a society to construct a more satisfying culture by rapid acceptance of a pattern of multiple innovations. Anthony F. Wallace, "Revitalization Movements," American Anthropologist 58 (April 1956):246, and Anthony F. Wallace, Culture and Personality, 2nd ed. (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 188.

to provide ample supplies of textbook 'anti-Communism' for all students, to distribute the 'anti-Communism' syllabi to teachers of this course, and to sponsor more frequent symposiums among college professors, inspectors of the education board⁴¹, and teachers of the 'anti-Communism' course.

In addition to these new courses, the Park administration, in line with the Revitalizing Reform Movement, announced that the education policy would stress the teaching of Korean history to reintroduce the nationalistic sentiment, which was missing from the translated versions of science, mathematics, and English textbooks. For the purpose of achieving a systematic political socialization education, the government experimented with a new course in Korean civics in some elementary school called "Politics and Society." The course included such topics as the Korean constitution, citizen's rights and duties, and Korean political institutions. The purposes of the course were to strengthen the citizen's sense of duty, to promote confidence in political institutions, to maximize institutional effectiveness, and to socialize the youth to play active participant roles.

However, a recent survey indicated the ineffectiveness

41. Career bureaucrats administer the education boards at the provincial level. Currently there are no elected board members.

of this new civics course in South Korea. In a survey of the sixth graders in an elementary school, 85% of the students who took this course demonstrated an above average level of knowledge about their citizenship duties, while 84.0 % of those who did not take this course also had a similar level of knowledge on the subject. In the question of public institutions, 84% of the first group and 80% of the second group had at least a moderate level of confidence in current political institutions.^{4 2} The difference of only 4% would not seem to warrant the effort made in developing and implementing this course.

Mass media in South Korea has developed rapidly in the post-1945 period. Newspapers, radio and television reach a large number of citizens. Radio has been the most important agent for the transformation of political culture, while newspaper have played a secondary role. Television has become a tool for political socialization, but only in the major cities. Newspapers have not been a very significant government instrument for socialization because the major daily Korean-language newspapers Donga Ilbo (East Asia Daily), Joson Ilbo (Korea Daily), and Jungang Ilbo (Central Daily) are privately owned and tend to take an opposition position

^{4 2}. Jungang Ilbo (The Central News) May 12, 1976. The survey was carried out by Saekoo Chung, Professor of Education, Seoul National University.

while another privately owned newspaper, Hankuk Ilbo (Korean Daily) takes a more or less neutral position.⁴³

Journalists have been the most liberal group in South Korea and are often critical of governmental policies. For example, a survey of 754 journalists showed that 73.8% of them thought that the government actually restricts individual freedom of the intellectuals, while 45.2% of them thought that the government should give a higher priority to the control of injustice and corruption.⁴⁴ The Park government indirectly controls two newspapers, the Seoul Sinmun and the Kyonghyang Sinmun,⁴⁵ but they have a small circulation and are not widely subscribed to in the rural areas, except by government agencies and large corporations.

The major agent for the transformation of political culture has been the government-controlled radio and television network, the Korean Broadcasting System (KBS). The KBS television and radio networks have an editing policy which is intended to cultivate the sense of independent defense capabilities, to internalize the Revitalizing Reform movement, to promote frugality as a way of life, and to

43. The numbers of subscribers to the daily newspapers are as follows: Donga Ilbo, 520,000; Joseon Ilbo, 250,000; Jungang Ilbo, 400,000; and Hankuk Ilbo, 350,000. Arthur S. Banks, ed., op. cit., p. 192.

44. Sungchik Hong, op. cit., pp. 192-193.

45. The number of subscribers to these newspapers are: Seoul Sinmun, 250,000 and Kyonghyang Sinmun, 250,000. Arthur Banks, ed., op. cit., p. 192.

develop and revitalize the traditional Korean culture and arts. In the short run, the impact of mass media has been significant in both urban and rural areas, due to the distribution of large numbers of radios to the masses. There are fifty-two radio stations (including 17 government-controlled KBS affiliated stations) and 47 radio transmission stations (all of which are government-controlled). In 1971, the total number of radios in South Korea was 3,575,165 and speakers connected to a central radio amplifier totalled 512,884.⁴⁶ This came to an average of 286 radio receivers for every thousand people in 1971.⁴⁷ Only the 47 government controlled KBS radio transmission stations have the facilities to transmit radio programs to the rural areas. In Table IV.5 we can see that the KBS stations allocate 52% of their time to "cultural" programming, as opposed to an average of 36.85% for the commercial networks, who must use some of their air-time for advertising. The "cultural" programs, as they are called in South Korea, serve an important propaganda function. Documentaries, commentaries and symposia on government policies and achievements are designed to support the positions of the ruling party and the executive

46. Arthur Banks, op. cit., p. 600.

47. In 1967, the number of radios and speakers was estimated at 864,000 in North Korea. In 1967, that was about 72 radio receivers for each thousand people; and 61 per thousand in South Korea. Morris L. Ernst, The Comparative International Almanac (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1967), pp. 82-83.

branch. None of the commercial radio networks, whose programs tend to be more liberal and sometimes critical of governmental policies, had radio transmission stations capable of reaching the rural areas of South Korea in 1975. Thus most of the farm households heard only the KBS stations.

Rural North Korean villages have a similar network of radio speakers through which they receive radio programs. All North Korean radio sets are fixed on one governmentally controlled radio frequency to prevent the radios from being used to receive programming from South Korea or from other countries. Cultural programming with political propaganda content makes up the bulk of North Korean air time.

TABLE IV.6

THE RELATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF RADIO PROGRAMS IN SOUTH KOREA
IN 1974 (%)

	KBS	All Commercial Networks	Minimum Time Requirement for Each Type of Programming by Law
News	18.0	17.45	10%
Culture	52.0	36.85	30%
Entertainment	30.0	45.70	20%

SOURCE: East Asia Yearbook, 1975, p. 598.

NOTE: This table is probably weighted in favor of the KBS, because the time used to transmit commercial messages on the commercial networks is not accounted for.

Television has had less of an impact than radio on the political socialization process. In South Korea, the number of television sets increased from 29,540 in 1967, to 1,540,807 in 1974, and to 2,537,449 in 1976. There are thirty-five television transmission stations, all of which belong to the government controlled KBS.⁴⁸ However, the distribution of television sets is geographically uneven. Those who live in the two largest cities (Seoul and Pusan) owned 45.4% of the television receivers in 1974. Thus, it has been mainly the urban areas which have felt the impact of the television media. The political authorities have socialized the South Koreans to feel nationalistic sentiments and to accept a new work ethic through the use of the mass media. Ceremonies of national observance have been politicized to the advantage of the leadership, and radio and TV programming is used to bring these events to the citizens. Eleven days are set aside for nationalistic observances in South Korea.⁴⁹ Ten other observance days have the purpose of promoting orientations toward economic development, industrial production and the work ethic.

48. East Asia Yearbook, 1975, p. 599.

49. The eleven observance days are the March 1st Uprising, the April 19th Student Revolution, and days in honor of General Lee Sunshin, the Constitution, the liberation, the military, the National Founding, the Korean language, the culture, and the National Charter of Education, as well as a Memorial Day.

In rural areas especially, small numbers of libraries and televisions, and the limited number of subscribers to newspapers and magazines, has made the KBS radio the most important, and often the only, information source. The urban areas, however, have available a variety of mass media. This diversity of mass media in the urban areas has caused the rapid transformation of the urban people into "modern men," while the rural people have maintained more of their traditional behavior patterns.

The present chapter has focused on how the political authorities have utilized the agencies of transformation of the political culture in the two Koreas. In respect to North Korea, such agencies as the political party, the public education system, and the mass media have been used by the leadership in a deliberate transformation of the political culture. In South Korea, the same is true, except that the South Korean leadership has not utilized the political parties to the same extent as the North Koreans.

In summary, both the deliberate transformation of political culture and the rapid social change in the two Koreas has resulted in discontinuities in the political culture, which have taken the form of conflicts between the masses and elites, urban and rural citizens, the upper and lower classes, and between the older and younger generations.

In South Korea, the mobilized urban masses and the extremely authoritarian political elite do not have a cooperative relationship. The older and younger generations in North Korea have experienced increasing friction, which may result, in future years, in a succession crisis. The general result of these long-standing conflicts has been the politics of distrust in which the link between the leaders and the led, and between the various intra-elite factions has been strained. The conflict within an individual and among groups of individuals arises out of their conflicting political orientations; between role specialization and role multiplicity; between private interests and public interests; between the saliency of private and public emotional ties; between status based on ascriptive status and that based on achievement; and between decision making based on non-scientific knowledge and that based on scientific methods. The discontinuities of political culture are more critical and visible in South Korea than in North Korea. A pattern of conflicts has persisted between those who are positively oriented toward modern social life and those who are of a traditional mind, and between the urban masses, who have experienced a "revolution of rising expectations" and the governmental elites who have maintained their traditional authoritarian orientations in the political arena, while

adopting modern managerial skills in the economic sphere, in which they act as Korean technocrats. The rhetoric of the South Korean leadership has tended to advocate the development of "the modern man," but in reality they were only interested in the development of technicians and managerial technocrats in the economic sphere. The rhetoric of the North Korean leadership has tended to advocate the development of "the socialist man," but in reality they were specifically interested in the combination of the character of the revolutionary ideologue with that of the productive technician.

The tradition of the politics of distrust has persisted throughout the last 500 years of Korean history; the masses' distrust of the elites has deep roots in the Korean mind and in the traditional pattern of political culture, as was discussed in Section One of this chapter. The Korean people's search for a virtuous ruler was frustrated, and despotism was imposed on them. Because they emphasized the search for a virtuous ruler, the Korean people neglected to develop a system in which there would be the supremacy of the law, or to establish a consensus of the rules of the game. Several scholars⁵⁰ have argued that the unproductive pattern

50. cf. Edward W. Wagner, The Literati Purges: Political Conflict in Early Yi Korea (Cambridge: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University Press, 1974), p. 1 and p. 121; Gregory Henderson, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex (Cambridge Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 265-269; Han Wookeun,

of political behavior in Yi Korea (1390-1910) and in the recent past is the outcome of bitter factionalism.

However, the researcher argues that it is not the factionalism and group conflict itself which prevents the evolution of an effective democratic system of government, but the lack of a consensus on the rules of the game in the political processes, which results in distrust among the various factions of the political elite. None of the groups expected that the others would abide by the rules of the game, or that anyone would play a fair game. Thus, the politics of distrust have a dual structure of distrust. First there is the distrust between the elites and the masses, and secondly, there is the distrust between the factions within the elite.

The History of Korea (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1971), pp. 298-302; Key P. Yang and Gregory Henderson, "An Outline History of Korean Confucianism," Journal of Asian Studies Part 1, 18 (November 1958): 81-101; Part 2, 18 (February 1959): 259-276; William E. Henthorn, A History of Korea (N.Y.: Free Press, 1971), pp. 192-194; Song Nakhun, "Hankuk dangjeng sa," (A History of Factionalism in Korea) in Hankuk Munhwa sa Dekye (General Survey of Korean Cultural History) Seoul: 1965), II: 282-288; Kang Jujin, Ijo dangjeng sa yonku (A Study on Factions in Yi Korea) (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1971); James B. Palais, Politics and Policy in Traditional Korea (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 40-48; and Bongyoun Choy, Korea: A History (Rutland, Vt.: Tuttle, 1971), pp. 80-87.

The politics of distrust impeded the establishment and use of fair rules of the game among the Korean elites -- both the bureaucrats and the literati ruling class in Yi Korea.⁵¹ The lack of widely shared beliefs about how the political authorities or various groups of politically relevant members in a political system ought to behave has been a crucial factor determining the politics of distrust in contemporary Korea as well. In the traditional pattern of Korean culture, the goal of humanness in interpersonal relations has been an unattained ideal throughout the last 500 years.

The rules of the game, which are essentially normative and procedural, are missing from the traditional pattern of Korean political culture and have not been put into practice in Korean political processes. The assertion that the masses in the political system must agree on the rules of the game before political democracy is possible is an ideal and a myth, as far as one can see. On the mass level, even in an established democratic political system, it has been found that mass agreement with the rules of the game is much less widespread than had previously been assumed.⁵²

51. For a study of political conflicts and factionalism, see Edward W. Wagner, op. cit., pp. 1-3.

52. James W. Prothro and Charles M. Grigg, "Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement," Journal of Politics 22 (1960): 276-294.

However, the political elite's widespread agreement on the rules of the game is a precondition for democratic politics. It has been found that the elite are in agreement not only on what norms are implied by the abstract democratic creed but also in supporting the norms currently operating in successful democratic political systems.⁵³

In the present chapter, the focus has been on the transformation of the political culture in the two Koreas. The next section is concerned with the ideologies of the ruling elites. Ideology is a set of beliefs which affects political actions. Before we undertake a study of political structures (the action patterns in a political system) we will examine the ideologies underlying the actions of the ruling elites. The processes by which transplanted ideologies were adopted and Koreanized in North and South Korea will be discussed. The thoughts of Kim Il Sung and Park Chung Hee will be scrutinized and one speech by each of them will undergo content analysis.

53. For related remarks, see Robert Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven; Yale University Press, 1961), p. 319; and Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," American Political Science Review 58 (1964): 361-382.

CHAPTER V
THE IDEOLOGIES OF THE RULING ELITES

Uniformity of ideology of the ruling elites in a political system -- in formation, promulgation, and acceptance -- varies highly with other perspectives and nonsymbolic uniformities.¹ The available elites in the Korean peninsula in 1945 were diverse in terms of their social stratification, formal education, careers, and in the site of their political socialization (i.e.: in Japan, China, the Soviet Union, the United States, or Korea itself). Thus, in terms of the criterion of the geographical base of the available elites, they could be divided into two main categories: the domestic elites and the foreign-trained elites, who are further divided into those socialized in China, the USSR, and the U.S. Most of the domestic-based elite were closely tied up with the politics of Imperial Japan, since Korea was a Japanese colony for 35 years. Leaders from the four main groups were socialized differently; (1) The domestic elite group included the conservative nationalists (i.e., "the Bosong group"² under the leadership of Kim Sungsoo); the so called

1. Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), p. 124.

2. The "Bosong group" is named after the privately-run Bosong College, whose President was Kim Sungsoo.

"Southern Faction" of Communists (e.g., Pak Honyong); and the former native Korean bureaucrats of the Imperial Japanese Government in Korea; (2) the coalition group made up of Kim Il Sung's partisan group and the Soviet-Korean Community in the USSR (e.g., Nam Il); (3) the China trained elites who can be subdivided into the nationalists (e.g., Kim Ku; the so called "Korean Provisional Government Group"), and the Communists (Mujong and the so called "Yenan Faction" of Communists); and (4) the American-trained elites (e.g., Rhee Syngman) who were conservative-nationalists. These four groups were socialized in either the conservative-nationalist perspective or the Communist perspective. In 1945, Korea, which had been homogeneous and unified for 1300 years, faced the problem of a division in world views among her elites. The task of establishing a uniform ideology in the Korea of the post-war era seemed difficult to the leadership. Except for the bureaucrats of the colonial government, all the elite groups shared the common characteristic of being self-proclaimed independence movement leaders, who had little administrative or organizational skills or experience.³

3 . Among the members of the Constituent Assembly in 1948, political entrepreneurs were the largest group (25.9%); they were mostly independence movement leaders who stayed in foreign countries. Bae-ho Hahn and Kyu-taik Kim, "Korean Political Leaders (1952-1962): Their Social Origins and Skills," Asian Survey 3 (July 1963): 308. The members of the first Cabinet in 1948 were also mostly the leaders of the independence movement in South Korea (i.e., the President, Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs, Interior, Defense, and Commerce department heads). For a list of Cabinet members, see Lee Hanbin, et al., Hankuk haengjong ui yoksajok bunsok (Historical Analysis of Korean Public Administration), (Seoul: Korean Institute of Public Administration, 1969), pp. 544-549.

Partly because of their experiences with Japan in the independence movement, their political orientation was to take an uncompromising attitude toward competitors, which resulted in bitter conflicts between factions. During this bitter infighting, in which there was no firm consensus of the rules of the game, another factor determined the direction of the state building; military occupation. The superpowers determined the direction of state building by transplanting ideologies and the support of their own Korean proteges.

The political ideologies of the sponsoring superpowers and of the various Korean leadership groups in the authoritarian political culture became essential factors in the political system of the divided nation in the initial stage of state building. However, since the mid-1950's, the transplanted ideology of Marxism-Leninism in the subject political culture of North Korea, and the liberal democracy and gradualist conservatism in the subject political culture of South Korea, have undergone a process of Koreanization, i.e. the Juche⁴ (national identity and self reliance) in North Korea and the Yushin (The Revitalizing

4 . Kim Il Sung, Let Us Embody More Thoroughly the Revolutionary Spirit of Independence, Self-sustenance, & Self-defense in All Fields of State Activity (New York: New World Liberation Front, 1970, (hereafter cited as Revolutionary Spirit), p.10; Kim Il Sung, Revolution and Socialist Construction in Korea (New York: International Publisher, 1971), p.87; Kim Il Sung, For the Independent Peaceful Reunification of Korea (New York: International Publishers, 1975), p.111; and Lee Yuk-sa, ed., Juche: The Speech and Writings of Kim Il Sung (New York: Grossman, 1972), pp.149-205.

Reform), Koreanic democracy, and administrative democracy⁵ in South Korea. In the pre-1945 period, neo-Confucian culture remained stable, unchallenged and unchanged for hundreds of years in Korea, with the prevailing outlook of conservatism.⁶ The realists in the Yi Dynasty exhorted the realistic mind, realistic reasoning, and practical learning,⁷ but their impacts were minimal on old Korea. Neo-Confucianism produced cultural and urbane agnostics with authoritarian orientations.

After Korea was divided into two sectors in 1945, both sectors chose to accede to the ideologies of their sponsoring powers. But the North and South Korean leaderships were divided into two conflicting ideological groups. The Communist leaders in North Korea sought to build a mobilization system, to socialize the masses with Communism and to alter the traditional and conservative behavior patterns derived from the Yi Dynasty system, and they became the ruling groups, advocating Marxism-Leninism. The counterelites in North Korea, who

5. Park Chung Hee, Our Nation's Path, pp.207-209. See a section entitled "Democracy in the Revolutionary Period -- Administrative Democracy." This book originally was published in 1962.

6. For the conservative nature of Confucian culture, see Paul T. Welty, The Asians: Their Heritage and their Destiny (New York: Lippincott, 1973), p.141; with respect to Korean Confucian culture, see James B. Palais, op. cit., p.273; and Yi Myonggu and William A. Douglas, "Korean Confucian Today," Pacific Affairs 40 (Spring-Summer 1967):43-59.

7. The scholars of realism in Yi Korea were Yi Hwang, Jong Dasan, Yoo Hyongwon, Ahn Jongbok and Pak Chiwon. Jonghong Pak, "Philosophy," in Sungnyong Lee, et al., eds., Korean Studies Today (Seoul: Institute of Asian Studies, 1970), pp.70-73.

centered around the leadership of Cho Mansik and the North Korean Democratic Party were later arrested or fled to the South.⁸ Kim Il Sung and the Communist groups consolidated their leadership and formed the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 1948.⁹ Kim announced the programs of the government of the DPRK,¹⁰ which advocated the socialist economic system. There were then two non-Communist, nationalist groups in North Korea. There were the 200,000 Christians and the 420,000 followers of the religion of the Heavenly Way.¹¹ The North Korean Democratic Party (nationalist) was formed in 1945, and was headed by

8. The South Pyongyang Branch of the Preparatory Committee for National Construction consisted of only two Communists among more than 20 initial committee members in August 1945, a ratio that probably reflected faithfully the true balance of strength between Communists and non-Communist nationalists throughout Korea. Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee, Communism in Korea (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 314-5.

9. The Supreme People's Assembly declared the state of the DPRK on September 9, 1948. Baik Bong, Kim Il Sung wonsu (General Kim Il Sung) (Pyongyang: Social Science Press, 1972), p. 226.

10. See the text in Kim Il Sung, Selected Works of Kim Il Sung, 1970 ed., I:147-149. There are several editions of selected works of Kim which were published by different publishers in North Korea: two Korean-language editions by the KWP Press, one Korean-language edition by the People's Press, and one English edition by the Foreign Languages Publishing House in North Korea.

11. Benjamin B. Weems, Reform, Rebellion and the Heavenly Way (Tuscon: University of Arizona Press, 1964), p. 90.

Cho Mansik, who later was arrested by the Soviet Military Government.¹² When the North Korean ruling groups were integrating their power structure under the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, the South Korean ruling groups, while condemning the dysfunctional behavior patterns of the past, remained too preoccupied with the consolidation phase of their system's development to be able to work toward altering the patterns of traditional behavior. The South Korean ruling leadership groups relied on the ideology of conservatism and the theory of evolutionary social change. They accepted the idea that social change is evolutionary and operates according to a particular rationale, and that social programs are gradually achieved by the activities of incrementalist, reform-oriented people. Those in South Korea who advocated socialism and radical social change attempted to cooperate with the North Korean Communist leaders in 1945-1948, but failed to integrate Communist power. In July 1946, there were 460 associations, including political parties, in the two Koreas. In South Korea, there were 251 right-wing groups, 68 centrist groups and 103 Communist groups, while in North Korea there were 28 Communist groups.¹³

12. Koon Woo Nam, The North Korean Communist Leadership, 1945-1965 (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1974), pp. 26-28.

13. U.S. Army Military Government in Korea, Summation, no. 9 (Seoul, 1946), p. 16.

The transplanted ideologies of Marxism-Leninism in the North and individualism and liberal democracy in the South have undergone a process of Koreanization since the mid-1950s. Both the North and the South Korean leaders learned belatedly that the use of an externally-provided idea system would lead to conflicting interpretations over the applications of the ideology, and to clashes with the sponsoring powers. The North Korean ruling elites sought to meet the challenge by adapting the ideology through the thought of Kim Il Sung. The Juche (self-identity and national identity) idea was an attempt to transform the political culture¹⁴ and an attempt to construct an indigenous value system. Kim expounded the Juche idea in a speech entitled "On Exterminating Dogmatism and Formalism and Establishing Juche in Ideological Work" at a meeting of the KWP propaganda¹⁵ and agitation workers in December 1955. Kim further delineated his thought in the speech, "Let us Embody the Revolutionary Spirit of Independence, Self-Reliance, and Self-Defense more Thoroughly in All Fields of State Activities,"¹⁶ to the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA)

14. Ilpyong Kim, Communist Politics in North Korea (New York: Praeger, 1975), p. 45; and Bong Baik, Kim Il Sung: A Political Biography (New York: Guardian Books, 1969-1970), II: 475.

15. Kim Il Sung, Kim Il Sung jojak sonjib (Selected Works of Kim Il Sung) (Pyongyang: the KWP Press, 1967), II: 560-585; and Selected Works of Kim Il Sung, 1970 ed., I: 322-335.

16. Kim Il Sung, Revolutionary Spirit, p. 111.

on December 16, 1967. It was officially proclaimed as the primary goal in the ten-point political program of the DPRK government. The Juche has now been institutionalized as the monolithic ideology of the Party and government. In a book published by the Social Science Press of the Academy of Social Science of the DPRK, comprehensive indices of the written texts of Kim Il Sung are listed. The book categorizes the works of Kim, and contains chapters on the "monolithic thought of the Party." (Chapter One),¹⁷ "our party's revolutionary tradition," "the KWP," "the DPRK," "labor groups," and "the revolution and construction." It shows the primacy of the thought of Kim. The essence of the Juche is said to be the model in which Kim is able to apply the general theory of Marxism-Leninism creatively to the concrete problems of Korea. Article Four of the DPRK Constitution of 1972 reads that "the Juche idea of the Workers' Party of Korea is a creative application of Marxism-Leninism to our country's reality."¹⁸

17. Social Science Press, Kim Il Sung dongji eui rojak saekin (Indices of Comrade Kim Il Sung's Works) (Pyongyang: Social Science Press, 1970). In this 705-page volume, the first nine pages cover this theme. pp.3-11.

18. Albert P. Blaustein and Gisbert H. Flanz, eds., Constitutions of the Countries of the World (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, 1971-1976), vol.V, Section on "Korean People's Democratic Republic." For the Korean-language text, see Joson jungang yonkam 1975 (The North Korean Central Yearbook, 1975) (Pyongyang: Korean Central News Agency, 1975), pp.1-8. The DPRK Constitution adopted on

While, in the North, Kim has adopted a new policy of self-reliance and has institutionalized a monolithic ideology,¹⁹ the leaders in the South have tended, instead, to condemn themselves for being too backward to conform to western ideology, and this attitude clashed with national pride. The South Korean leadership's decision to promote a modernization movement temporarily reversed this feeling in the 1960's.²⁰ Park Chung Hee resurrected the traditional concept of Hongik Inkan, the fundamental ideal of Korea's national foundation which means "giving much help to the multitude." This was the creed of the mythological King Tankoon, and implies that both the individual and the nation-state have an obligation to help others, and that men in all walks of life are brethren. Park has expressed the view that this thought finds a consistent modern expression in today's democracy.²¹ He has further attempted to synthesize the idea of state building and modernization

September 8, 1948 does not contain such an article on the Juche idea. For the 1948 Constitution, see Jan Triska, ed., Constitution of the Communist Party-States (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1968), pp. 242-253.

19 . The "monolithic ideology of the party" is identical to the thought of Kim, according to the North Korean dictionary. DPRK, Academy of Social Science, Hyondae joston mal sajon (Modern Korean Dictionary) (Pyongyang: Academy of Social Science Press, 1968), pp. 286-287.

20 . See the speeches of Park Chung Hee, "For the Modernization of Korea," and "Modernization of Man," in Shin Bum Shik, ed., Major Speeches by Korea's Park Chung Hee (Seoul: Hollym, 1970), pp. 85-6, and pp. 316-333; "Presidential Address of the DRP Tenth Anniversary," in ROK, Secretariat of the President, ed., Park Chung Hee daetongryong yonsol mun jib (Collection of Speeches of President Park Chung Hee) (Seoul: Secretariat of the President, 1973), X: 150-152.

with the concept of Hongik Inkan. As an addition to the notion of Hongik Inkan, Park has conceptualized the Revitalizing Reform Movement.²² The Revitalizing Reform Movement was launched on October 17, 1972. The basic conception lies in the establishment and development of a national identity with the ultimate aim of attaining national survival, prosperity and the peaceful reunification of Korea. This is, it was claimed, based on the democratic and capitalistic ideas of social change. The goals of the Revitalizing Reform Movement (RRM) are the maximization of national strength, the formulation of a national unification organization, the adaptation of the democratic system to the realities and ideals of the nation, the modernization of Korean society, and incremental social reforms.²³ The politics of the RRM has an underlying theme of the politics of distrust, as can be seen in the following quotation from Park: "The irresponsible political parties have already lost the sense of national mission ... The free democratic

21. Park Chung Hee, To Build a Nation (Washington, D.C.: Acropolis Books, 1971), pp. 24-5.

22. See the inaugural speech on December 27, 1972, in Park Chung Hee, Major Speeches by President Park Chung Hee (Seoul: Samhwa, 1974), pp. 135-141. Institute of Contemporary Politics, Yushin jongchi eui jido inyom (The Idea of the Revitalizing Reform Politics) (Seoul: Kwangmyong Press, 1976), pp. 3-34.

23. ROK, Korean Overseas Information Service, The October Revitalizing Reforms, Korean Policy Series no. 10 (Seoul: Korean Overseas Information Service, 1972), pp. 15-22.

system, being superb," says Park, "may be more vulnerable than any other political system if it is not assured with the ability to uphold itself."²⁴ Revitalizing reforms were designed to adapt Western-style democratic systems to the realities and ideals of Korea.

One can compare the ideas of the two leaders, and one can see that the terms they use for national identity have an almost identical meaning for both of them. The emerging nations need a unified symbol and a guiding ideology, so both leaders have attempted to indoctrinate the masses to accept the underlying concepts, goals and values of their ideology. Both leaders have used the term national identity to legitimize their political authority.²⁵ Park stressed the linkage between the Revitalizing Reform Movement and national identity;

The fundamental objectives of the October Revitalizing Reforms were to achieve national identity and prosperity, and the reunification of the country ... The ideology of the October Revitalizing Reforms is identical to that of the May 16, 1961 Military Revolution in that

24. "The Special Declaration by the President of the Republic of Korea," on October 17, 1972, in East-West Crosscurrent Center, The October Revitalizing Reforms of the Republic of Korea (Seoul: East-West Crosscurrent Center, 1972), p.61 and 65.

25. See the related remarks of Easton on ideology as legitimizing source, in David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: Wiley, 1965), p.301.

it lays special emphasis on our national identity. 26

Kim Il Sung's Juche thought is embodied in two triple concepts: first, the concepts of independence in politics, self-reliance in the economy, and self-defense in national defense; and secondly, in technical, cultural and ideological revolutions.

This is an independent stand, discarding the spirit of dependence on others, displaying the spirit of self-reliance, and being responsible for one's own affairs under all circumstances. 27

However, an analysis of the behavior of Park and Kim suggests that the ideals of national self-identity, independence and self-reliance are less a palpable reality than a lofty aspiration, and that their primary significance is as yet largely symbolic.²⁸ Again, since "Juche" and "Juche song" connote nationalism and the idea of Juche song expresses an ideal of national individualism and modernization, the two Korean leaders use the term in similar way.²⁹

26. Donga Ilbo (the East Asia Daily) January 12, 1973, p.1. A similar theme appears again in the New Year Message of 1975. The DRP 10 (January 1975):4. Kim Il Sung uses the term "Juche" while Park Chung Hee uses slightly different term "Juche song."

27. Li Yuk-sa, ed., op cit., p. 45.

28. Byung C. Koh, "Chuchesong in Korean Politics," Studies of Comparative Communism 7 (Spring-Summer 1974):95.

29. Gregory F. Winn, "Ideology and Reality in Korean Behavior," Studies of Comparative Communism 7 (Spring-Summer 1974):98;

The basic difference between the ideologies of the two Korean leaders lies in their different world views: Kim's revolutionary thought and Park's gradualist conservatism.³⁰ Because of gradualist conservatism and the subject political culture in South Korea, strong nationalism could not evolve in South Korea. Additionally, South Korea's commitment to anti-Communism, resulting from personal experiences during the Korean War, impeded the evolution of any revolutionary ideology in South Korea. The combination of anti-Communist and conservative policies limited the use of the change by planning model to an incrementalist approach in South Korea, while the North Korean leaders have used a radical change by planning model. One can more precisely compare the two different conceptions of change by planning models through a content analysis of the speeches by Park and Kim.³¹

for further discussion of post-independence nationalism, see Rupert Emerson, "Post-Independence Nationalism in South and Southeast Asia: A Reconsideration," Pacific Affairs 44 (Summer 1971): 173-192.

30. Kyungwon Kim argues that South Korea lacks both nationalism and a revolutionary ideology. Kyungwon Kim, "Ideology and Political Development in South Korea," Pacific Affairs 38 (Summer 1965): 164.

31. In 1963, Scalapino characterized the political phenomena in the two Koreas as the "politics of change." Robert A. Scalapino, "Korea: The Politics of Change," Asian Survey 3 (January 1963): 31-40. A similar theme is found in the studies by James C. Hsiung. He discusses the development by design model and modernization theory. See James C. Hsiung, "A Revisionist Review of Modernization Theory: From the East Asian Perspective," delivered at the 1971 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 7-11, 1971, pp. 3-22.

Content analysis is a research technique which is used for making inferences by systematically and objectively identifying specified themes of a text.³² The study of value positions has been a central topic in intellectual, political and social history.³³ The content analysis of written texts has been fruitful in the study of political values and themes. Values are a preferred goal status.³⁴ To assess the value positions of the leaders in the two Koreas, I have chosen to investigate the 1976 New Year's message given by each leader³⁵ because these documents are accessible and concise communications, and because they incorporate most of the general topics of Korean politics. I have constructed value categories (or categories for a "content analysis dictionary")³⁶ for analyzing the two speeches. Manual content analysis, rather than computer content analysis, was performed. The value categories and the relative frequency of reference to these values by Park Chung Hee and Kim Il Sung are

32 . Philip J. Stone, et al., The General Inquirer: A Computer Approach to Content Analysis (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1966), p.5; and Arnold Brecht, Political Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971, 3rd printing), pp.46-7.

33 . J. Zvi Namenwirth and Harold D. Lasswell, The Changing Language of American Values: A Computer Study of Selected Party Platforms (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1970), p.5. For other studies of content analyses, see William Eckhart and Ralph K. White, "A Test of the Mirror-Image Hypothesis: Kennedy and Khrushchev," in Erik P. Hoppman and Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., eds., The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy (Chicago: Aldine, Atherton, 1971), pp. 308-317; and Ole R. Holsti, et al., Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Studies (New York: Wiley, 1973), pp.239-47.

displayed in Table V.1.

The six major categories of values (actors, time, space, ideology and political behavior, economic values, and international relations) have similar general distribution patterns with reference to values: for both Park and Kim they form an S-curve, as exhibited in Figure V.1. The values in Table V.1 include both positive values, which the speaker accepts and negative values, which he rejects. The values most often expressed by both leaders were: the collective actor (i.e., reference to themes including us, our, ours, and ourselves rather than I, me, my, mine, and myself) in the actor category, future in the time category; there was no clear leader in the space category; revolution in the ideology and political behavior category; economic development, the work ethic, achievement, and industry in the economic category; and finally, conflicts and military strength in the international relations category. These subcategories of values are compared in Figure V.2.

34. J. Zvi Namenwirth and Harold D. Lasswell, op cit., p.6.

35. Park Chung Hee, "Sinnyon sa 1976," (The 1976 New Year's Message) Sisa (The News) January 1976:8-11; In the research, the Korean-language text is used. For the English text, see New Year Press Conference by President Park Chung Hee (Seoul: Korean Overseas Information Service, 1976), pp.3-10. The Korean text of Kim's speech is used; Kim Il Sung, Sinnyon sa 1976.1.1 (The New Year's Message, January 1, 1976) (Pyongyang: Samhak sa, 1976), pp.1-8. For the English text of Kim's speech, see the People's Korea January 14, 1976, p.1.

36. Currently more than a dozen content analysis dictionaries are available. For the methods used to construct a dictionary, see Philip J. Stone, et al., op cit., pp.134-168.

TABLE V.1
THE RELATIVE FREQUENCY OF REFERENCE
TO VARIOUS VALUES BY PARK AND KIM

Value Categories	Park		Kim	
	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
I. ACTORS				
I and self (indiv.)	9	2.70	5	0.87
We (Collectivity)	32	9.62	40	6.94
Family	5	1.50	-	-
Students	-	-	1	0.17
Political Parties	-	-	16	2.78
Private sector	3	0.90	-	-
Gov't & State	4	1.20	7	1.22
People	16	4.80	27	4.69
SUBTOTAL	69	20.72	96	16.67
II. TIME				
Past	10	3.00	18	3.13
Current	3	0.90	15	2.60
Future	24	7.22	22	3.82
History	2	0.60	3	0.52
SUBTOTAL	39		58	10.07
III. SPACES				
Rural area	1	0.30	-	-
Urban area	-	-	-	-
N. Korea	5	1.50	5	0.87
S. Korea	5	1.50	7	1.22
Korean Peninsula	5	1.50	4	0.69
SUBTOTAL	16	4.80	16	2.78
IV. IDEOLOGY & POLITICAL BEHAVIOR				
Liberal democracy	-	-	-	-
Socialism	-	-	16	2.78
Communism	2	0.60	1	0.17
Marxism-Leninism	-	-	1	0.17
Democratic	-	-	7	1.22
Revitalizing Reform	4	1.20	-	-
Juche	-	-	3	0.52
Fundamental Rights	-	-	3	0.52
Nationalism	10	3.01	11	1.91
Unity	2	0.60	4	0.69
Culture	-	-	4	0.69
Revolution	-	-	47	8.16
"Red" Ideologue	-	-	5	0.87
Transformation	-	-	2	0.35

TABLE V.1 (Continued)

Humanness	2	0.60	-	-
SUBTOTAL	20	6.01	103	17.88
V. ECONOMIC VALUES				
Economic development	22	6.61	29	5.03
Work ethic	26	7.81	44	7.64
Achievement	30	7.0.	30	5.21
Industry	1	0.30	53	9.20
Agriculture	1	0.30	11	1.91
"Expert" & Practical	2	0.60	13	2.26
Welfare	5	1.50	3	0.52
Self-sacrifice	16	4.80	11	1.91
Optimism	1	0.30	8	1.39
Pessimism	1	0.30	1	0.17
SUBTOTAL	105	31.53	203	35.24
VI. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS				
World & Int'l org.	5	1.50	16	2.77
Free world	1	0.30	-	-
Communist Bloc	4	1.20	5	0.86
Asia	4	1.20	-	-
Foreign countries (non-Asia)	1	0.30	3	0.52
Imperialist	-	-	13	2.55
Balance of power	1	0.30	-	-
Conflict & aggression	18	5.41	21	3.64
Dialogue	7	2.10	-	-
Unification of Korea	8	2.40	8	1.38
Military strength	18	5.41	12	2.08
Peace	5	1.50	3	0.52
Korean War	1	0.30	-	-
Victory & honor	1	0.30	8	1.38
National security	3	0.90	8	1.38
National independence	7	2.10	3	0.52
SUBTOTAL	84	25.22	100	17.36
GRAND TOTAL	333	100.00	576	100.00

FIGURE V.1

THE RELATIVE FREQUENCY OF REFERENCE TO
THE MAJOR CATEGORIES OF VALUES BY PARK AND KIM





FIGURE V.2

THE RELATIVE FREQUENCY OF REFERENCE TO THE NINE SUBCATEGORIES OF VALUES BY PARK AND KIM



When one compares the sub-categories of value positions in the speeches of Park and Kim, the patterns of value position are different: first, Kim places the greatest emphasis upon revolution and industry, which differs significantly from Park's value position, which emphasizes the collectivity as an actor, economic development and governmental achievement. Kim strongly advocates the revolutionary change by planning model. Kim's emphasis upon revolution is illustrated by such phrases as "the struggle for the party and revolution," "strengthen the revolutionary front," "ideological revolution," "technical revolution," "cultural revolution," "revolutionary tasks," and "revolutionary development."³⁷ Although all references to the pronoun "we," economic development, and industry values are related to the "socialist" revolution in Kim's speech, Park never mentions the notion of "revolution" in his speech. Park's emphasis is upon the collectivity, economic development, and achievement value categories, illustrated by such phrases as: "we should accelerate the economic development ... pursue our hope ... and continuously make efforts ... accomplish the Third Five-Year Economic Development Plan ..." Conspicuously missing from both speeches

37. Kim Il Sung, Sinnyon sa, p. 1-3, and 6.

are the notions of the fulfillment of individuality and the pursuit of fundamental rights. It is striking that references to liberty, equality, and justice are completely missing from both speeches even in a symbolic context.

Language forms and terms reinforce the perspective established by the use of other political symbols, subtly interweaving with other political actions to help shape values, norms and assumptions about future possibilities. If one uses abstract terms like democracy and justice, they are reified and identified with existing political institutions.³⁸ If one assumes this to be true, what are the consequences of the absence of even symbolic references to the concepts of democracy and justice? This question will be one of the concerns in the next chapters. Even these short speeches by the two leaders of divided Korea reveal the aforementioned subject and authoritarian pattern of Korean traditional political culture, although they also reflect a subtle transformation from traditional orientations, as in the case of the socialist

38. Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Chicago:University of Illinois, 1964), p.191.

revolution in the North and economic values in both the North and the South. Park once wrote that " a leader should be a creative person who delivers what all the people want." ³⁹ It seems that the leaders have interpreted what the people want to heavily reflected their own world views. The Korean masses in both the North and the South have been mobilized into a subject political culture in which there is a strong emphasis on economic productivity.

In summary, in the initial phase of state building, the lack of strong non-state social institutions or the destruction of existing non-state structures tends to increase the probability of acceptance of transplanted ideologies by politically relevant members; for example, in the two Koreas, internally, there was an absence of well-organized social institutions such as indigenous religious tenacity, labor unions, intellectuals, multi-ethnic groups, a middle class, organized groups of peasants, or a traditional bureaucracy, due to its destruction by Japan. In North Korea, this

39. Park Chung Hee, Park Chung Hee daetongryong son jip (Selected Works of President Park Chung Hee) (Seoul: Jimun Kak, 1969), III:28.


was the setting which tended to facilitate rapid Communization. In addition, the occupation by the Soviet Army was the foremost external determining factor in the rapid Communization of North Korea. In South Korea, however, such social institution as the small traditional bureaucracy and the middle class were preserved intact. This structural diversity impeded the harmony between the traditional elements of the political culture and the newly transplanted Western ideology. In the scope of "goal culture"⁴⁰ of ideology, the North Korean leaders advocated socialism in the world as their stated goal and the construction of a classless society in North Korea as their operational goal; while in the "transfer culture,"⁴¹ they promoted the completion of the socialist revolution in the Korean peninsula and the development of the economy. In the interpretation culture, Kim Il Sung formulated the Juche idea. The South Korean gradualist-conservative leaders (Rhee Syngman, John M. Chang, and Park Chung Hee) neglected the goal culture of ideology. South Korea has a non-revolutionary ideology in which the promulgation of democracy is minimal.

40. Anthony F. Wallace, Culture and Personality, 2nd ed. (New York: Random House, 1970), p.192.

41. Ibid.

Both North and South Korean leadership groups were themselves divided into two conflicting ideological groups: the Communist and the democratic-gradualist-conservative. Post-war politics in the initial phase of state building began on a less moderate note in South Korea than in North Korea, because all the prominent Communist leaders of the domestic faction were active in the major urban areas and in the center of politics around Seoul, which was located in the southern sector. In the initial phase in South Korea, the combination of a strategic commitment to anti-Communism, Confucianism and the authoritarian political culture produced a relatively low level of nationalistic sentiment and an absence of revolutionary ideology.

In any developing society, as the leadership groups consolidate the power structure under given environmental constraints, the leaders tend to gradually promote nationalism. Divided Korea, as a traditional society, has been no exception. It showed the following pattern of interaction; modernization movements generate nationalism by integrating the social groups, and they are primarily a phenomenon of transitional societies. An integrated group is necessary for generating organized demands, which consequently tend to take the form of nationalistic demands. Korean nationalism in both sectors tends to stabilize the political authorities and regimes, and to integrate groups.



The greater the strength of the traditional political culture in a nation, the greater the emphasis on traditional methods of ideological indoctrination and rule, even if the leaders' values are partially those of a modern society. Thus, North and South Korea have attempted to shift public values from particularism to universalism. Accordingly, the public educational system has been greatly expanded and politicized in both sectors to create the "new socialist man" in the North and the "modern man" in the South. In a traditional society, it is easier to personalize loyalty than to cultivate loyalty to new institutions. Thus, the leaders in both sectors tended to rely on the cult of personality to legitimize their political authorities and regimes, although the likelihood of effectiveness of their cult of personality varies with their concentration of political power.

Depending upon the point of view of the political community, political ideology can perform either an integrative or a divisive function. In divided Korea, differences in ideologies tended to perform a divisive function against the other sector in the initial phase of political integration within their domain of power, but in the later phases, the leadership groups have tended to begin a shift in emphasis of the function of ideology from a divisive to an integrative function, in order to mobilize support for the political authorities.

In the present chapter, the focus has been on the traditional pattern of Korean political culture and its transformation. The next chapter will proceed to examine the political structure and its interactions with the political culture.

PART THREE

POLITICAL ACTION TENDENCY:
STRUCTURE AND PROCESS

In Part Two, this analyst examined the political culture dimension of the political systems of the two Koreas. This analyst will now proceed to explore the structural and process dimensions of the political systems in the two Koreas. Structure refers to the pattern of related roles, action patterns, and formal organizational aspects of government and politics. The equations of political life in the two Koreas have two components: the political culture dimension and political action. This Part will focus on the interactions between political culture and political actions in North and South Korea. The researcher will discuss the structural dimension of political life in the two Koreas and will analyze the interactions between political culture and political action. What are the differences and similarities in the structural dimension of the experiments of state building? How do the political culture and structural dimensions affect each other? What political changes and continuities have occurred in the structural dimension of the two political systems since their division? Why? In seeking answers to these questions, this author was

led to inquire into the nature of the functional organizations, the territorial organizations, and the economic structures of the two Koreas. The author will concentrate on the analysis of political parties and political processes in the last chapter of Part Three. In the first chapter, he will discuss the functional organizations of the two Koreas.

CHAPTER VI
THE FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

The set of interrelated political structures in a society tends to survive despite changes in their function; and a political structure tends to perform its given function at a given time, although the structure's functional scope and effectiveness are related to other power structures and environmental changes. The persistence of a given structure offers no assurance that its past functions have continued into the present (Time T_a) or will continue into the future (Time T_{a+i}). As in most other developmental systems, the leaders in both the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) set about building strong political organizations to penetrate society in the early stages of state building. The two political systems formed functional organizations which had their highest concentration of power in the executive branch.¹ However, both their similar pattern

1. Ilpyong J. Kim, Communist Politics in North Korea (New York: Praeger, 1975), pp. 39-41. Kyung Cho Chung, Korea: The Third Republic (New York: Macmillan, 1971), pp. 76-77. Edward R. Wright, "The Constitutional and Governmental Structure," Edward R. Wright, ed., Korean Politics in Transition (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1975), pp. 49-51. Park Moonok, Hankuk Jongburon (Korean Government) (Seoul: Bakyongsa, 1963), pp. 453-468.

of political culture and their different ideological perspectives were reflected in the structures of their functional organizations: North Korea developed a "sacred-centralized" type of system,² while South Korea adopted a "secular-centralized"³ type of system. The sacred-centralized Communist government in North Korea has encompassed the total community, and the social objective of the government has been to transform the material conditions of life and the consciousness of the people. The Korean Workers' Party (KWP) in North Korea has control of supreme power and it is an authority structure unto itself, while the political parties in South Korea have merely performed a candidate-nominating function, mainly through the leadership of the oligarchic central party committee.⁴

In the last thirty years, South Korea has had five different types of formal governmental structure, as summarized in Table VI.1.

2. David Apter, Political Change (London: Frank Cass, 1973), p. 82. David Apter, Choice and the Politics of Allocation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), p. 66. David Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 31.

3. David Apter, Political Change, p. 82.

4. See the remarks of Michels on oligarchy, Robert Michels, Political Parties, trans. Eden and Cedar Paul (New York: Free Press, 1962), pp. 342-356.

TABLE VI.1

THE FORMAL GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE OF THE TWO KOREAS

Period	Republic of Korea	Period	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
8/1948 to 8/1960	Presidential System Chief of State President Chief Executive President Legislature Bicameral	9/1948 to 12/1972	Soviet Model Chief of State Chairman of SPA Chief Executive Premier Legislature Unicameral
8/1960 to 5/1961	Parliamentary System Chief of State President Chief Executive Premier Legislature Bicameral		
5/1961 to 12/1963	Military Government Chief of State President Chief Executive Premier Legislature: The Supreme Council for National Reconstruction		
12/1963 to 12/1972	Presidential System Chief of State President Chief Executive- President Legislature- Unicameral		
12/1972 to date	Presidential System: Chief of State President Chief Executive President Legislature Unicameral	12/1972 to date	Presidential System: Chief of State President Chief Executive President Legislature Unicameral

A presidential system with a bicameral legislature (the First Republic, 1948-60) was adopted in South Korea; followed by the short-lived parliamentary system with a bicameral legislature (the Second Republic, 1960-61); then the Military Government (1961-63); followed by a presidential system with a unicameral legislature, in which the President was elected by popular votes (the Third Republic, 1963-1972); and most recently, the presidential system with a unicameral legislature in which the President is elected by the National Conference for Unification (the Fourth Republic, 1972-date). In North Korea, in the period from 1948-1972, the formal governmental structure was based on the Soviet model, in which the chief of state was the chairman of the legislative body and the chief executive was the premier. In 1972, North Korea adopted a presidential system.

In the course of nearly thirty years, North Korea has moved toward a pattern of integration with the Communist party-state system. The external integration pattern of North Korea has changed from a high degree of integration with Imperial Japan, to a virtually exclusive integration with the Soviet Union, and more recently, to a varied pattern within the nation-state itself. In the DPRK, the structural change in the government under the constitutional amendment of 1972 brought about a concentration of political power in the new office of the President, who is both the

head of state and the head of the executive branch.⁵ The government structure⁶ under the constitutional amendment of 1972 consists of three pillars of power: the Central People's Committee (CPC), the State Administration Council (SAC) and the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA), which is symbolic and which functions as a legislative body, as depicted in Figure VI.1. The President of the DPRK is to provide leadership to the CPC, which itself has the function of presiding over the Cabinet or SAC. All three functional organizations are directed by the President. The system of checks and balances is effective only on a minimal level: about a dozen key members of the party's Politburo maintain interlocking positions in the four organizations (KWP, SAC, CPC and SPA), as displayed in Figure VI.2.⁷ The Standing Committee of the SPA elects the judges of the Central Court, which is tightly controlled by

5. Article 89 of the DPRK Constitution of 1972 in Albert P. Blaustein and Gisbert H. Flanz, eds., Constitutions of the Countries of the World (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1971-76), Vol. V; see the Korean Language text in Joseon Jungang Yonkam 1975 (North Korean Central Yearbook, 1975) (Pyongyang: The Korean Central News Agency, 1975), pp. 1-8. Hereafter cited as North Korean Central Yearbook.

6. For general surveys of governmental structures in North Korea, see Chin O. Chung, "The Government and Power Structure in North Korea," in Se-Jin Kim and Chang-hyun Cho, eds., Korea: A Divided Nation (Silver Springs, Md.: Research Institute on Korean Affairs, 1976), pp. 141-170; Sung Yoon Cho, "The Judicial System in North Korea," *ibid.*, pp. 200-222; Rinn-Sup Shinn, et al., Area Handbook for North Korea (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 203-211; Ilpyong J. Kim, Communist Politics in North Korea (N.Y.: Praeger, 1975), pp. 37-41; Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-Sik Lee, Communism in Korea (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), II: 789-844.

7. But it was reported that Choi Yongkon, Kim Il, and

the Party.⁸ The DPRK's Constitution provides for a triangular relationship between the SPA, the CPC, and the SAC; but the three institutions are merely the instruments of policy execution for the Party, in actuality.


In South Korea, although the formal governmental structure is designed on Western models, traditional behavior patterns are still instrumental in what happens in practice.⁹ The present constitution provides for a presidential system with a single-house National Assembly which is clearly subordinate to the executive branch in practice. The President of the Republic of Korea is elected by the National Conference for Unification (NCU), of which he is also the Chairman. The members of the NCU

Choi Hyon were purged in June 1976. Jungang Ilbo (The Central Daily), June 7, 1976, p. 1.

8. Article 134 of the DPRK Constitution of 1972, and Bang Insun, Bukhan joson nodongdang eui hyongsung kwa baljon (The Formation and Development of the Korean Workers' Party) (Seoul: Asiatic Research Center, 1967), p. 278.

9. For a general survey of the government structure in South Korea, see Se-Jin Kim, "The Government and Power Structure in South Korea," in Se-Jin Kim and Chang-hyun Cho, eds., op. cit., pp. 41-48; C. I. Eugene Kim, "The Institutional Framework of the Fourth Republic," in C. I. Eugene Kim and Young Whan Kihl, eds., Party Politics and Elections in Korea (Silver Springs, Md.: Research Institute on Korean Affairs, 1976), pp. 48-51; Hahn-Been Lee, Korea: Time, Change, and Administration (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1968), pp. 74-175; Nena Vreeland, et al., Area Handbook for South Korea, Second Edition (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 143-159; Kyung Cho Chung, Korea: The Third Republic (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1971), pp. 76-121.

FIGURE VI.1
THE OPERATIONS OF THE POWER STRUCTURE
OF NORTH KOREA IN 1976



- LEGENDS:
- > Direct authority
 - ←—— Interlocking membership
 - ====> Elect
 - > Control
 - - - -> Influence

CPC : Central People's Committee, (PC);
CAC : Central Administration Council (AC); and
SPA : Supreme People's Assembly.

FIGURE VI.2

THE ELITE IN NORTH KOREA (1973-1976)

	KWP			STATE ORGANS		
	Politburo	Secretariat	CC	SPA	CPC	SAC
Kim Il Sung	M	SG	M	D	Pres	
Choi Yongun	M	M	M	D	VP	
Kang Yanguk	M	M	M	D	VP	
Kim Il	M	M	M	D	M	Premier
Pak Sungchol	M		M	D	M	V. Ch.
Choi Hyon	M		M	D	M	
Kim Yongju	M	M	M	D	M	
O Jinu	M	M	M	D	M	V. Ch.
Kim Dongkyu	M		M	D		
So Choi	M		M	D		
Kim Jungin	M	M	M	D	M	
Han Iksu	M	M	M	D	M	
Kim Jongil		M				

LEGEND: M = member, SG = Secretary-General, Pres = President, VP = Vice President, V. Ch. = Vice Chairman of Committee, D = Deputy, the 5th SPA (elected Dec.12, 1972), SPA = Supreme People's Assembly, CPC = Central People's Committee, and SAC = State Administration Council.

SOURCES: Kang Indok, ed., Bukhan jonso (Complete Book of North Korea) (Seoul: The Research Institute of the Far East, 1974), III: 348-394; U.S. C.I.A., comp., Directory of North Korean Officials (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1972).

NOTE: Data as of December 1, 1976.

cannot belong to a political party. The new system of government structure evolved from the Revitalizing Reform Movement in 1972 and was implemented under a constitutional amendment later that year. The powers of the President are extremely broad: in times of crisis, he has the power to take necessary emergency measures in a whole range of state affairs, and can temporarily suspend freedoms and rights.¹⁰ The President may dissolve the National Assembly at any time,¹¹ but the National Assembly may impeach the President¹² if he violates the Constitution or other laws in the performance of his official duties. They may also pass a motion for the removal of the Prime Minister or an individual state council member.¹³ The National Assembly consists of two groups: two-thirds of the members are popularly elected, and one-third are appointed by the President with the approval of the NCU. The National Assembly cannot increase appropriations for any budgetary item, and cannot add items to the budget proposed by the Executive.

10. Article 53 of the ROK Constitution of 1972 . See the English text in Blaustein and Flanz, eds., op. cit., Vol. V; see the Korean text in Six Codes Publication Committee, ed., Yukbob jonso (The Complete Book of the Six Codes) (Seoul: Bobjon Press, 1974), pp. 1-7.

11. Article 59 of the ROK Constitution of 1972.

12. Article 99 of the ROK Constitution of 1972.

13. Article 97 of the ROK Constitution of 1972.

All National Assembly powers may be overridden by the executive when a crisis requires the implementation of emergency power or martial law. The National Assembly is directly subject to the greater weight of executive authority and cannot exercise any significant powers not approved by the executive authority. The court structure consists of the Supreme Court, the Appellate Court, the District Courts, the Family Courts, the Courts Martial, and the Constitutional Committee. Though the court system has regular judicial functions, it offers little political balance to affect the dominant role of the executive in governmental decision making. In South Korea, some of the leaders of the DRP have interlocking positions in both the political party and governmental organizations, as depicted in Figure VI.3. Assemblymen are allowed to hold positions in the State Council, and currently four ministers have positions in both state structures. Assemblyman Kim Jungpil held the position of Premier, and former Premier Jong is currently (1976) speaker of the National Assembly. One member of the Revitalizing Reform Association (which includes only the assemblymen appointed by President Park) holds a position in the State Council at this time. The President of the ruling party is also the Chief of the NCU, of State, and of the executive branch. He is not a member of the legislative branch, however, as exhibited in Figure VI.4. North Korea's Kim Il Sung

FIGURE VI.3

THE ELITE IN SOUTH KOREA

	DRP				STATE	
	Leader	PAC	SEC	CC	NA	SC
Park Chung Hee	Pres			M		Pres
Kim Jongpil				M	A	FP
Yi Hyosang	Ch. P			M	A	
Jong Ilkwon				M	Speaker	FP
Pak Junkyu	C. Ch.			M	A	
Kil Jonsik			SG	M	A	
Kim Yongtae				M	ML	
Jang Hyongsun				CHCC	A	M
Yuk Insu		M		M		
Choi Kyuha						Premier
Nam Doku						V. Premier
Yi Cholseung					OC	
Kim Yongsam					OFC	


NOTE: The data is as of December 15, 1975

LEGENDS: DRP = The Ruling Democratic Republican Party
PAC = Party Administration Council
SEC = Secretariat of the Party
CC = Central Committee
NA = National Assembly
SC = State Council (Cabinet)
Pres = President
M = Member
FP = Former Premier
A = Assemblyman
CH = Chairman of the Party (Second Ranking)
C.CH = Committee Chairman
SG = Secretary General
C.CC = Chairman of the Central Committee
ML = Majority Leader
OC = Opposition Party Chief (New Democratic Party)
OFC = Opposition Party Former Chief ("")

NOTE: On December 4, 1976, President Park reshuffled the Cabinet. Four Assemblymen held minister positions as of December 15, 1976. Assemblyman Chang resigned as Chairman of the Central Committee of the DRP and became a minister without portfolio. The three other Assemblymen who held minister positions as of December 15, 1976 were Shin Hyongsik (Minister of Construction), Shin Hyonsok (Minister of Health), and Min Byongkwon (Minister without portfolio; a member of the Revitalizing Reform Association).

FIGURE VI.4

THE OPERATIONS OF THE POWER STRUCTURE OF SOUTH KOREA



LEGENDS:
 ←→ interlocking membership
 → elect
 → control or appoint
 - - - - - influence

CC = Central Committee
 PAC = Party Administration Council
 NCU = National Conference for Unification
 RRA = Revitalizing Reform Association
 SEC = Secretariat

is a deputy of the Supreme People's Assembly (a legislative branch). But both the Chiefs of State in the two Koreas have authority in the organizations which elected them. The NCU elects the President of South Korea, but after he is elected, he becomes the Chief of the NCU. In North Korea, the legislative body elects the President of the State.

Patterns in the functional organization depend, to a certain degree, on the perspectives of the ruling elites in the initial phase of state building, but more so on the economic structure in the later phases of state building. As economic goals of change are implemented, more and more of the specialist elite are created. The expansion and reorganization of the executive branches in the two Koreas have occurred primarily within the scope of economic development. The increasing number of ministry-level agencies¹⁴ is shown in Table VI.2. As the economy has grown and become more complex, earlier ministries of the executive branch have frequently been consolidated and/or subdivided. Additionally, reorganization has also occurred in such fields as education, culture, and propaganda. The military government

14. Only those agencies whose chiefs are members of the State Council are counted as ministry-level agencies in South Korea. There were two ministers without portfolio who were members of the State Council in November 1976.

TABLE VI. 2

THE REORGANIZATION OF THE MINISTRY LEVEL OF THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCHES OF THE TWO KOREAS

	THE NUMBER OF MINISTRY-LEVEL AGENCIES	
	South Korea	North Korea
1948	11	18
1955	12	18
1957	12	24
1962	15	28
1967	16	37
1974	17	22

implemented twelve major reorganizations, while in the thirteen year period of the previous administration (1948-1961), only six reorganizations on a similar scale are recorded. The military government did not regard reorganization of the government as a method for economizing, but as a way to institute specific programs. There were eleven ministries and four offices (subministries) in the original design of the executive branch on July 17, 1948. The Ministry of Health was added by the Rhee Administration on March 25, 1949. In 1955, the Rhee Administration eliminated four offices and created two new ones. Two ministries were combined to create the Ministry of Health and Social

Affairs, while the Offices of Monopoly and Ocean Affairs, and the Ministry of Economic Reconstruction were created.¹⁵ The Monopoly Office was to control production, quality and distribution of salt, tobacco and ginseng (materials which brought in a large portion of the government's revenue.) Profits from the Office of Monopoly made up 75% of the South Korean domestic revenue in 1946, but had dropped to 50.9% in 1950. Direct taxation generated only 9.0% of the government's income in 1946 and 23.3% of the national revenue of the South Korean government in 1960. The Foreign Investment and Resources Office was established for the economic area, along with the position of Secretariat of the State Council. Since 1955, the Ministry of Economic Reconstruction has become the key functional organization of the South Korean economic reconstruction. This ministry was important because the Korean War had destroyed \$300 million worth of economic resources, the equivalent of 200% of the South Korean GNP of 1953.¹⁶

15. See the Government Organization Law: Law No. 1, promulgated in July 1948. It has been amended many times in South Korea. House of Representatives, Secretariat, Selected Laws and Regulations Pertaining to the National Assembly, Republic of Korea, Revised Ed. (Seoul: House of Representatives, 1958), p. 205.

16. Lee Hahnbeen, et al., Hankuk haengjong eui yoksajok bunsok (Historical Analysis of Korean Public Administration) (Seoul: Korean Institute of Public Administration, 1969), p. 45.

The Military Government (1961-1963) created many agencies in an attempt to implement three major programs: the reconstruction of the national economy, a strengthened anti-Communist posture, and a strong morality -- anti-corruption program. The new agencies established during this period can be classified under the goals they were intended to serve; (1) for economic reconstruction: the Economic Planning Board, the Ministry of Construction, and the Offices of National Construction, Rural Development, National Railroads, Urban Area Development Planning, Labor, Supply, General Administration, Legal Affairs, and Veteran's Affairs, as well as the National Reconstruction Movement Committee; (2) for improved anti-Communist posture: the Central Intelligence Agency and the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and (3) for the promotion of morality and anti-corruption: the Revolutionary Prosecutor's Office and the Revolutionary Court. Therefore, the organizations of the executive branch were expanded on December 14, 1963 to one board, thirteen ministries, and eight offices (see Table VI.3). A significant change in the economic area was the creation of the Economic Planning Board on July 22, 1961 to control the Bureaus of Comprehensive Planning, Budget, Resource Planning and Statistics.¹⁷ It was placed above the ministry level and

17. Lee Hahnbeen, et al., op. cit., p. 537.

TABLE VI.3
 THE NUMBER OF MINISTRY-LEVEL AGENCIES
 IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH IN SOUTH KOREA

Administration	Date	Total	Economic Field (Subtotal)
Rhee	July 1948	11	4
Rhee	February 1955	12	5
Chang	July 1966	13	5
Park	December 1963	15	5
Park	November 1976	17	6

NOTE: The "Offices" which are sub-ministry level independent agencies are not shown in this table

has drafted comprehensive economic plans. It has also coordinated economic affairs. After 1963, reorganization in the economic area was further implemented by the creation of new agencies such as the Offices of Taxation, Forestry, Fishery, Science and Technology, and Nuclear Energy. On July 24, 1968, both the National Unification Board and the Office of Culture and Public Information were established to replace the Ministry of Public Information.¹⁸ Economic development was emphasized as the primary goal of the Park government, so several more agencies were

18. Articles 26 and 42 of the Government Organization Law, in The Six Codes Publication Committee, ed., op. cit., pp. 101-102.

created under the direction of the Administrative Management Bureau of the Ministry of General Administration and the Administrative Improvement Research Commission (AIRC) to study, comprehensively, possible administrative reforms. At the end of 1967, the AIRC submitted 28 reports to the President, which contained recommendations for various administrative reforms.¹⁹

The study of the history of the executive branch in South Korea has been divided into periods on the basis of the four Republics (led by Rhee, Chang, Park (1961-1972), and Park (1972-date)). One can also periodize the history of the executive branch in North Korea on the basis of the five cabinets, which coincide with the Supreme People's Assemblies of the legislative branch. The periods of the five cabinets are shown in Table VI.4. In 1948, at the beginning of the First Cabinet, there were sixteen ministry-level agencies, nine of which were concerned with economics. In this period, the Industry Ministry was reorganized several times and the Commission of National Construction was created in 1953. The Ministry of Electrical Energy, the Ministry of Coal Industry, and the Ministry of Machinery Industry were also created. Thus,

19. Sukchoon Cho, "Korean Experience of Administrative Reform Since Her Independence," Korean Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 7, No. 2 (1969): 296-297.

TABLE VI. 4
THE NUMBER OF MINISTRY-LEVEL AGENCIES IN THE
PERIOD OF THE FIVE CABINETS IN NORTH KOREA

No.	Period ^a	Number of Ministry-Level Agencies ^b	Subtotal in the Economic Field
1	September 1948 - September 1957	16, 18	9
2	September 1957 - October 1962	24	15
3	October 1962 - December 1967	28	16
4	December 1967 - December 1972	37	20
5	December 1972 - date	22	13

NOTES: (a) The totals and subtotals of ministry-level agencies were counted in the following years:

1948, 16; 1957, 18;
1957, 24;
1962, 28;
1970, 37; and
1973, 22.

(b) A ministry-level agency refers to a ministry, board, or commission in the Cabinet in the years between 1948 and 1973.

the number of ministry level agencies increased to eighteen in this period, as shown in Table VI.4.

During the Second Cabinet, in 1957, the Ministries of Culture and Education were first combined into the Ministry of Culture-Education, and then this single ministry was subdivided into the three Ministries of Culture,

Elementary and Higher Education in 1960. Also in 1960, in the area of industry, three separate ministries were consolidated into the Commission of Heavy Industry.

The Science and Technology Commission was established in 1962; thus the number of economy-related ministries increased to fifteen. In the period of the Third Cabinet, light industry was emphasized and there were several reorganizations in this area. The National Light Industry Commission was created and provincial, city and county commissions were established in 1964. The Urban Administration Ministry was eliminated and the Internal Affairs Ministry was expanded to take charge of Urban Affairs. The Metallurgic Industry Ministry was subdivided into the Ministries of Metallurgy and Chemicals in 1964. In the period of the Fourth Cabinet, several reforms in the construction area were implemented. The urban affairs and construction ministries were again established in 1967. The National Territory Management Ministry was reorganized into the National Construction Ministry in 1969. In this

period, the number of ministry-level agencies increased to 37 and the number of economy-related ministries increased to twenty. In the period of the Fifth Cabinet, the total number of ministry-level agencies decreased to twenty-two. Several areas, which had been divided into specific industries, were combined into one ministry or commission. After the Constitutional Amendment of 1972, the executive branch consisted of eight commissions and fourteen ministries. The eight commissions are currently those of State Planning, Heavy Industry, Light Industry, Mechanical Industry, Agriculture, Transportation, Postal Service, Education, and People's Welfare. The most significant change in this period has been the creation of the People's Welfare Commission, which is in charge of commerce, the distribution of daily goods, urban affairs, and housing affairs. Of the fourteen ministries and eight commissions, thirteen are concerned with economic development, industry and agriculture; four are concerned with education, culture, and health; three with international relations; and two with national defense and public security. The expansion has occurred primarily in the areas of economic development and the various industries. Reorganization has been frequent in such fields as culture and education.

The expansion of the middle-elite and the dependent

class has tended to strengthen the stability of the political authorities and regimes in North and South Korea. The elites are those with most of the power in a group; the mid-elites are those with less power. The subelites are those who have high-ranking positions in the government below the mid-elites.²⁰ The ruling class is the class from which rulers are recruited and in whose interest they exercise power; a dependent class is one indulged by the power process, but not sharing in the rule. The dependent class thus shares to a considerable extent in the benefits of government, but does not participate in it. To ensure the continuation of support from their essential power bases, the leaders in the two Koreas have chosen different instruments: the South Korean leaders have expanded the bureaucracy, while the North Korean leaders have expanded the membership of the KWP. This difference in strategy tends to determine the pattern of institutionalized authority relations. The two different patterns which have emerged in the two Koreas are the Politburo-centered authority relations in North Korea and the President-centered authority relations in South Korea, as depicted in Figures VI.5 and VI.6.

20. Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), pp. 201, 206, and 279.

FIGURE VI.5

THE INSTITUTIONALIZED AUTHORITY RELATIONS
IN NORTH KOREA





FIGURE VI.6

THE INSTITUTIONALIZED AUTHORITY RELATIONS
IN SOUTH KOREA



LEGENDS: —————> directives
 - - - - -> information

The patterns of relations among the executive branch, the legislative branch, and the parties can be classified into five possible types: executive-dominance, cooperation, legislative-dominance, stalemate,²¹ and party-dominance types. In South Korea, a pattern of executive-dominance has prevailed from the First to the Fourth Republics (1948 - date). The President-centered pattern of South Korea can be characterized by the following:

- (1) the Secretariat of the President has played the role of communications control center;
- (2) the interactions between the state council and the legislative branch are minimal;
- (3) the President of the ROK, who is also the head of the ruling party, has sole control of the legislative branch through the Party Administration Council, and
- (4) the public security forces, which include the Central Intelligence Agency and the police, are the major instruments of control, and have increased steadily in number.

The number of police and firemen²² increased from 29,477 in 1961 to 40,384 in 1967, a rate of 6.1% per year.

21. Ripley lists the first four relationship patterns between the legislative and executive branches in Randall Ripley, Congress: Process and Policy (N.Y.: W.W.Norton, 1925), pp. 19-26.

22. This number does not include the employees of the CIA of the ROK. Jounghwon A. Kim, Divided Korea (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975), p. 269.

Another source²³ lists the number of internal security forces in South Korea as 34,058 in 1964. This is an average of 2.3 per 1,000 working age population in South Korea; while in North Korea the number of internal security forces was estimated at 25,000 in 1965, an average of more than 3.9 per 1,000 working age population. The same source estimates that the number of South Korean internal security forces ranks 76th among 122 countries in the world, while North Korea ranks 42nd.²⁴ in the same period. The number of government employees increased by 45.1% in 1954 (after the Korean War), as shown in Table VI.4. In the political turmoil of the early 1960's (the Student Revolution of 1960 and the Military Coup d'état of 1961) the number of government employees decreased, apparently because a large number of political appointees resigned, were fired, or were not appointed during the period of political crisis. However, once the military government consolidated political power, the number of government employees increased at an annual rate of 27.0% in 1964. The South Korean government

23. Charles L. Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), p. 44 (Table 2.5).

24. In 1950, the U.S. Dep't of State estimated the number of employees of the Central Administration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs as between four and five thousand. Its local network encompassed 12,000 regular police, 3,000 political police, and 5,000 security guard units, 40,000 in the border constabulary and the railroad guard brigade. Thus there were a total of approximately 64,000 internal security forces. U.S. Department of State, North Korea: A Case Study in the Techniques of Takeover (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1961), p. 39.

increased the number of new government employees on the government payroll between 1961 and 1975, most of them in the executive branch. The number of government employees was 235,456 in 1961 (the year of the Military Coup d'état). This increased to 369,079 in 1968, to 437,251 in 1972, to 448,104 in 1973, and to 456,000 in 1975. (See Table VI.5.) The total number of government employees increased 93.7% in the period from 1961-1975. The average annual growth rate was 6.7% per year in this period, which was three times greater than the overall population growth rate for the same period.²⁵ The total number of employees of the executive branch increased 116.3% in the period from 1955-1973. Even though the total number of employees in the legislative and judicial branches increased respectively by 139.0% and 104.3% in the same period, this combined total constituted only 1.15% of the total number of government employees in 1973.

The number of high-ranking government employees increased most rapidly in the Third Republic and at the beginning of the Fourth Republic. In the period from 1961-1973, for example, the number of high ranking civil servants of the national government increased by 287.50% in Grade II-B, and by 127.27% in Grade III-A, as shown in Table VI.6; this was greater than the average growth rate of the executive branch overall. Some of the employees of the two

25. The average annual growth rate of the population in the period from 1961-1973 was 2.17%. Donga Yonkam 1975 (The East Asia Yearbook 1975) (Seoul: Donga Ilbosa, 1976), p. 643.

TABLE VI.5
THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES IN SOUTH KOREA
(A) THE ANNUAL GROWTH RATE

Year	Annual Growth Rate (%)	Year	Annual Growth Rate (%)
1954	45.1	1964	2.4
1955	5.0	1965	6.8
1956	1.4	1966	4.7
1957	-2.4	1967	8.0
1958	5.0	1968	7.7
1959	0.5	1969	2.6
1960	0.8	1970	8.9
1961	-5.3	1971	7.4
1962	-3.8	1972	-3.9
1963	27.0	1973	2.6

Source: Adapted from Pak Moonok, "The Civil Service System in Korea," Journal of Chungang University no. 18 (1973): 24.

Note: The estimates of the number of government employees in 1953, 1954, and 1973 were respectively 155,000; 224,900 and 453,576. The category of "government employees" includes (1) political appointees, (2) general civil servants (career bureaucrats), (3) lower technicians, and (4) manual workers, but excludes military personnel.

TABLE VI.5 (Continued)
 (B) GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES IN THE THREE BRANCHES

Branch	1955 ^a	1961	1968 ^b	1972 ^c	1973 ^c	1975 ^d
Executive	204,454	-	-	-	442,946	-
Legislative	633	-	-	-	1,513	-
Judicial	1,784	-	-	-	3,645	-
Total (A)	206,871	235,456	369,079	437,251	448,104	456,000
(A)/Pop. (%)	0.96	-	1.22	1.35	1.36	-

SOURCES: a. 1955 data from ROK, Office of Public Information Korean Report (Seoul, 1955), p. 4.

b. 1968 data from Sukchoon Cho, "The Bureaucracy," in Edward Wright, ed., Korean Politics in Transition (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1975), p. 72.

c. 1972 and 1973 data from Hapdong News Agency, Korea Annual 1974 (Seoul: Hapdong, 1974), p. 59.

d. 1975 data from Korean Annual 1976 p. 31.

TABLE VI.6
 THE GROWTH OF HIGH RANKING GOVERNMENT
 EMPLOYEES IN SOUTH KOREA
 (1961-1973) (%)

Grade	National Government (A)	Semi-Independent Agencies of the National Government (B)
I	-8.11	62.50
II-A	107.30	365.21
II-B	287.50	112.06
III-A	127.27	91.30

Source: Jungang Ilbo (The Central Daily)
 June 22, 1976, p. 1.

highest ranking grades, I and II-A,²⁶ in the National Government were transferred to newly established independent agencies, such as the new offices and administrations. Frequent reorganizations and the creation of new agencies and bureaus resulted in a rapid increase (365.21%) in grade II-A, which included positions such as the deputy commissioners of the independent agencies. The proliferation of the bureaucracy has been both a result of efforts to reform the administration and a consequence of program-oriented efforts to develop the national economy and to modernize education. Politically, the expansion of bureaucracy means the expansion of a dependent class which helps to stabilize the political authorities, a goal of the political leadership. All non-competitive career bureaucrats (including political appointees (35.1%), lower technicians (14.0%), and manual workers (5.6%), accounted for 54.7% of all government employees; while career bureaucrats accounted for 45.3% of all government employees in 1966. The increase in non-competitive government employees provided the means for the expansion of the dependent class. The efforts to rapidly modernize the nation in the economic area have tended to reinforce historical trends which contribute to bureaucratic proliferation, but which weaken the bases for democratic

26. Grade I is the highest rank in the civil service system and includes such positions as assistant vice ministers in South Korea. The pay scale per month was in the range of 125,970 - 164,970 won (about \$262-\$343 per month). Donga

control of politics.²⁷ The high degree of distrust of political parties which has been expressed by the chief executive has contributed to this trend. In South Korea, the only strong power base for the political leaders has been the bureaucracy,²⁸ not the political parties²⁹ or any elected body (such as the National Assembly).

Criticizing the political parties of South Korea, Park

Chung Hee once stated:

The irresponsible political parties have already lost their sense of national mission, and representative institution was made the scapegoat of their political struggle. What would we really expect from these political parties and from the representative institution? Can they be entrusted with the national task of peaceful unification? 30

yonkam (East Asia Yearbook 1975), p. 312. Hereafter cited as East Asia Yearbook.

27. See the remarks of Riggs on bureaucrats. Fred W. Riggs, "Bureaucrats and Political Development? A Paradoxical View," in Joseph La Palombara, ed., Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 165.

28. No career civil servant can be a member of a political party according to Article 17 of the Law of Political Parties, ROK Law No. 1246 and No. 2618, Six-Code Publication Committee, ed., op. cit., p. 26.

29. The membership of the current ruling party, the DRP, whose activity was legalized on January 1st, 1963, increased from 297,000 in July 1963 to 706,011 on August 31, 1963, and to 1.2 million in 1966. The DRP claimed 1.2 million members in 1976. Joungwon A. Kim, op. cit., p. 267. The DRP, Minju konghwa dang sayonsa (The Four-Year History of the DRP) (Seoul: the DRP, 1967), pp. 76-77.

30. East-West Cross-Current Center, ed., The October Revitalizing Reforms of the Republic of Korea (Seoul: East-West Cross-Current Center, 1972), pp. 61-62.

When the political leaders downgrade the role of the political parties, their only alternative is to rely on the bureaucracy for the efficiency of their control. This is the situation in South Korea today.

In North Korea, the expansion of the middle-elite and dependent class followed a different pattern from that of South Korea. The strategies to strengthen the middle-elite and the dependent class have been intended to strengthen the stability of the political authorities. The expansion of the middle-elites and the dependent class does not mean that they share in the political power or participate in the decision making process in North Korea, however. The leadership in both Koreas has attempted to expand the dependent class. Our brief examination of the bureaucracy in South Korea confirms this view. Now the researcher will proceed to an examination of the middle-elites in North Korea.

It has already been argued that the leaders in North Korea adopted the pattern of party-dominance as the relationship within the power structure. Thus the expansion of the party organization, rather than a development of the bureaucracy of the executive branch, has been the main strategy in the North Korean political system. They have followed the general model of the Communist party-state. The North Korean government controls the statistics on civil

servants and has not clearly delineated the total number of government personnel. However, the government-controlled North Korean Central News Agency has published some statistics on the classification of people by social groups, as exhibited in Table VI.6. The data shows the social groups in the period from 1949-1960. After 1960, the North Korean Central Yearbook stopped publishing comprehensive statistics. By 1958, North Korea had completed the collectivization of agriculture and industry. Thus, the current relative proportion of social groups is probably not drastically different from the data for 1960. In Table VI.6, a significant category within the social groups is that of office workers. There are no private enterprises in North Korea, so it is reasonable to assume that most of the bureaucrats belong to this category. Therefore the expansion of the power elite, the middle-elite and the dependent class is best reflected by the category of office workers. The growth rate of the office workers was drastic in the period from 1946-1960. The number of office workers increased from 6.2% of the population in 1946 to 13.7% in 1960. Thus, in a fifteen-year period, the number of office workers increased 120.97%, at an annual rate of 8.1%, which is 7.3 times the annual growth rate of the total population of North


TABLE VI.7
 CLASSIFICATION OF THE PEOPLE OF NORTH KOREA
 BY SOCIAL GROUPS (%)

	1946	1949	1953	1956	1959	1960
Laborers	12.5	19.0	21.2	27.3	37.2	38.3
Office Workers	6.2	7.0	8.5	13.6	13.4	13.7
Members of Agr. Coop.	-	-	-	40.0	45.7	44.4
Individual Farmers	74.1	69.3	66.4	16.6	-	-
Members of Handcraft coop.	-	0.3	0.5	1.1	3.3	3.3
Individual Craftmen	1.5	0.8	0.6	0.3	-	-
Entrepreneurs	0.2	0.1	0.1	-	-	-
Merchants	3.3	1.7	1.2	0.6	-	-
Others	2.2	1.8	1.5	0.5	0.4	0.3
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

SOURCE: North Korea Central Yearbook 1961,
 p. 321.

FIGURE VI.7

THE GROWTH RATE OF OFFICE WORKERS IN NORTH KOREA
(1946-1965)



A/B Growth Rate (%)	1946	1949	1953	1956	1959	1960	1965
		12.9	2.4	60.0	-1.5	2.2	13.9
A/B Year		46-49	49-53	53-56	56-59	59-60	65

SOURCE: Adapted from North Korean Central Yearbook 1969, p. 321;
and Complete Book of North Korea, I:106.

Korea.³¹ In 1952, Kim Il Sung noted that the category of "non-productive workers," excluding military personnel and internal security forces, had increased by 70,000 bureaucrats between June 1950 and February 1952.³²

At this time, Kim suggested that the number of bureaucrats should be minimized and that more manpower should be allocated to the area of agricultural production in North Korea. Kim's speech thus implied that even he thought that there were an excessive number of bureaucrats in the category of general administration at the time. The relative growth of office workers in North Korea has continued in all years since then, with the exception of 1959. North Korea completed the socialization of agriculture and industry in 1958. Thus the growth rate of office workers, a large percentage of whom can be assumed to be bureaucrats in state organizations, was 60.0 % in the period of 1953-1956, at the height of the process of collectivization in North Korea (see Figure VI.7). The collectivization process required the expansion

31. The annual growth rate of the population was 1.10 % in the period from 1946-1960. North Korean Central Yearbook 1961, p. 321.

32. Kim Il Sung, Kim Il Sung jojak sonjib (Selected Works of Kim Il Sung) (Pyongyang: People's Press, 1970), I: 202. Hereafter cited as Selected Works of Kim Il Sung, 1970 Edition.

of the bureaucracy and the proliferation of office workers in the middle-elite and dependent class were supposed to ameliorate some of the problems of forced collectivization. The middle-elite and dependent class could be regarded as a power base, when we recognize that they were also members of the party and contributed to the pattern of party-dominance in North Korea. The membership of the KWP rapidly increased during the same period. The North Korean Communist Party (the precursor to the KWP) had only 26,000 members in December 1945. By August 1946, however, the membership of the KWP had reached 165,000, at the time of the First KWP Congress, as displayed in Table VI.8. By the Third KWP Congress of 1956, the membership had reached 10% of the population in North Korea. This was the beginning of the collectivization period and the expansion of the KWP membership was paralleled by the proliferation of office workers in North Korea. The expansion of the KWP membership continued until it reached 12.0% of the population in 1964. This is the highest ratio of party members to population of any Communist party.³³ The party membership in North Korea

33. Richard Staar, ed., Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1973 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1973), p. 494. The number of KWP members was estimated at 1.7 million or 12.5% of the population in 1973. For the number of Communist Party members worldwide, see U.S. Department of State, World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations, 25th Annual Report (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1973); for the growth in membership of the CPSU from 1917-1966, see Ellsworth Raymond, The Soviet State (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1968), p. 194.

TABLE VI.8
THE MEMBERSHIP IN THE KOREAN WORKER'S PARTY

Date	Number of Members	% of the Population	Period of the Party
Dec. 1945	26,000	-	1st KWP Congress
Aug. 1946	165,000	-	
Sep. 1946	276,000	4.0	
Oct. 1946	400,000	-	
Aug. 1947	680,000	7.0	
Jan. 1948	708,000	8.0	
Mar. 1948	725,062	8.0	2nd KWP Congress
Dec. 1949	800,000	8.0	
Nov. 1951	600,000	6.0	4th Plenum KWP
Dec. 1952	1,000,000	9.0	5th Plenum KWP
Jan. 1956	1,164,945	10.0	3rd KWP Congress
Aug. 1961	1,166,359	10.0	4th KWP Congress
Nov. 1964	1,500,000	12.0	
Oct. 1965	1,600,000	12.0	
Nov. 1970	1,600,000	12.0	5th KWP Congress
Nov. 1976	1,600,000	12.0	

SOURCES: North Korean Yearbook Committee, Bukhan chongkam 1945-1968 (Yearbook of North Korea 1945-1968), p. 113; Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, II:712; Joson jungang yonkam 1962 (North Korean Central Yearbook 1962) (Pyongyang), p. 46; Kang Indok, ed., Bukhan jonso (Complete Book of North Korea), I:115; The 1961 North Korean Yearbook (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, JPRS, 1963), p. 131; Kim Changsun estimated that the KWP membership reached 450,000 in August 1946. Kim Changsun, Fifteen-Year History of North Korea, trans. JPRS (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1963), p. 60; Information from the 1965 Korean Yearbook, trans. JPRS (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1965), p. 48; and Richard Staar, ed., Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1973 (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1973), p. 494.

has remained at about 12.0% during the 1970's.³⁴ Thus North Korea was able to expand the middle-elite and dependent class without giving them the authority to participate in the decision making process, and they mobilized the support of the masses at the same time. In South Korea, the leadership expanded the bureaucracy in order to achieve the same function of stabilizing the system.

In summary, political structures tend to perform a given function in a given setting of time and space. However, the same function can also be performed by a different pattern of political structures in a different political setting. The pattern of excessive concentration of power prevailed during the Yi Dynasty, as an autocratic political system. The subject culture which was cultivated during Yi Korea persisted as the pattern of party dominance in North Korea, which was occupied by the Soviet military after 1945. They imposed the Soviet style of government, a "Cargo-train Government,"³⁵ so called because personnel, resources, and techniques of government were brought to North Korea by Soviet military cargo trains in the initial phase of state building.

34. Party memberships in other Communist countries have also remained constant at certain limits, although the percentage in each country is different. Paul Shoup, "Comparing Communist Nations: Prospects for an Empirical Approach," in Roger E. Kanet, ed., The Behavioral Revolution and Communist Studies (N.Y.: The Free Press, 1971), pp. 33-34.

35. Hwang Songmo, "Review of Bukham jungchi ron" (Politics in North Korea) by the Research Institute of the Far East

The subject political culture also persisted in the southern part of divided Korea as a pattern of executive-dominance similar to the pattern in Yi Korea. The functional organizations were subdivided legally, but an excessive concentration of power in the hands of a single leader has persisted in both parts of divided Korea.

The effectiveness of a system of checks and balances³⁶ varies strongly with the structural diversity of the elements balanced against one another, when these elements are representative of different control groups, and if the conflicts of out-groups do not decrease the equilibrium of the political structures, excluding the short periods of transitional disequilibrium. With respect to the two Koreas, important factors which could increase the level of effectiveness of the system of checks and balances are lacking. First, the pattern of party dominance in the North and the pattern of executive dominance in the South has prevailed. The mode of control in both North and South Korea has been monolithic -- the ruling

(Seoul, 1976), Jungang Ilbo (The Central Daily), April 28, 1976.

36. For discussions of the systems of checks and balances in the U.S. and other countries, see Gisbert H. Flanz, "Outmoded Checks and Balances and Other Problems of Constitutional Modernization," delivered at the convention of the American Political Science Association in Chicago, September 1976.

party (the KWP) in the North, and the President and the Secretariat of the President in the South. A proliferation of mid-elite and the dependent class has taken place in both North and South Korea; in the North, the leaders have expanded the membership of the KWP to include 12% of the population, while in the South, the leaders have expanded the bureaucracy as the chief instrument of control. The legislative and judicial branches of government have been forced to play the role of rubber-stamping the programs of the party chief or chief executive. Therefore, the lack of structural diversity in the elements balanced against one another has led to an ineffective system of checks and balances, and has led to an excessive concentration of power in one person. Additionally, the tendency toward crisis government has decreased the effectiveness of the system of checks and balances in the functional organizations of North and South Korean governments by restricting the participation of the other functional organizations in the decision making process.

In the present chapter the author has analyzed a tendency toward the excessive concentration of power in the functional organizations. Now, the focus of the analysis will be on the same kinds of questions about the political structure. The next chapter will be specifically concerned with the analysis of territorial organizations.

CHAPTER VII
THE TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATIONS

Both North and South Korea have adopted the unitary and centralized organization of the territory of their states,¹ because they are geographically compact and have a homogeneous society, in which vigorous regional diversity linked to differences in culture, nationality, race, or even economic interest are at a minimum. In the Yi Dynasty, the national government appointed the chiefs of the local administration and there was no experience with local representation. No system of checks and balances existed during the period of Yi Korea.

In practice, the national government directly controls the local agencies in North and South Korea, even though the Constitutions and the laws of local governments recognize local autonomy, at least ostensibly.

1. For a general survey of local government in the Yi Dynasty and in the two Koreas, see James B. Palais, Politics and Policy in Traditional Korea (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 12-13; Gregory Henderson, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 195-199; Changhyun Cho, "Bureaucracy and Local Government in South Korea," in Se-jin Kim and Chang Hyun Cho, eds., op. cit., pp. 83-114; Chang Hyun Cho, "The System of Local Government in North Korea," *ibid.*, pp. 171-181; Chang Hyun Cho, "The System of Local Government in Korea," in Asiatic Research Center, ed., Report (Seoul: Asiatic Research Center, 1971), pp. 417-435.

Local governments in North Korea today have three hierarchical levels: the province, the county and the village governments. Township units were eliminated in 1952. The higher levels of local government have assumed responsibility for controlling the lower ones, as depicted in Figure VII.1. The Constitution also states that the Local People's Committee (an executive body) should direct the work of the Administrative Committee (a substructure of the executive body) at lower levels.² The DPRK Constitution of 1948 stated that "The local organs of state power in the provinces, cities, counties, or city district and villages, towns, or workers' settlements are the respective people's assemblies."³ After a major amendment of the DPRK Constitution in 1972, it stated that "the People's Assemblies of a province (or a municipality directly under central authority), city (or district), or county, are the local organs of power."⁴ However, although the extensive enumeration of


2 . Article 124 of the DPRK Constitution of 1972.

3 . Article 68 of the DPRK Constitution of 1948. For the English text of the DPRK Constitution of 1948, see Jan Triska, ed., Constitutions of the Communist Party-States (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1969), pp. 242-253; and DPRK, Foreign Languages Publishing House (FLPH), On the Socialist Constitution of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (Pyongyang: FLPH, 1975), pp. 283-299. Hereafter cited as Socialist Constitution.

4 . Article 115 of the DPRK Constitution of 1972 in Albert P. Blaustein and Gisbert H. Flanz, eds., Constitutions of the Countries of the World (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1973-1976), vol. V.

FIGURE VII.1

THE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN NORTH KOREA



Legends:

- > Elect
- - - - -> Control
- KWP:** Korean Worker's Party
- SPA:** Supreme People's Assembly (PA), a legislative body
- CPC:** Central People's Committee (PC), an executive body
- SAC:** State Administration Council (AC)
- ACMC:** Agricultural Cooperative Management Committee
- IMC:** Industrial Management Committee

authorized functions and powers of local People's Assemblies⁵ would seem to assure local autonomy, the constitutional guarantees of local autonomy in North Korea are actually a facade used to gain a deceptive legitimacy through the appearance of popular control. For example, the deputies of the local People's Assemblies (a legislative branch) are scheduled to be elected every four years at the provincial level and every two years at the city and county levels, but the provincial People's Assemblies have been held only irregularly (i.e. first in 1949, and again in 1956, 1963, and 1967).⁶ In practice, the local KWP Committee exercises supervisory power over the People's Assembly, the People's Committee and the Administrative Committee. The main method of control used by the KWP over local governments has been the supply and placement of local government personnel. The local government, in fact, is directed and disciplined by the local KWP branch, rather than by the local People's Assembly, even though the Constitution indicates that the "local Administrative Committee is responsible to the People's Assembly and the People's Committee at the corresponding level."⁷ The local KWP members often maintain interlocking

5 .. Article 118 of the DPRK Constitution of 1972.

6 .. Complete Book of North Korea, I:178. North Korean Yearbook Publication Committee, Bukhan Chongkam 1948-1968 (Yearbook on North Korea 1948-1968) (Seoul: Institute on Communist Bloc Problems, 1968), p. 246. Hereafter cited as Yearbook of North Korea 1948-68.

7 .. Article 132 of the DPRK Constitution of 1972.

positions in both the local People's Committees and the People's Assembly of the corresponding level. Policy making authority in budget and economic planning is monopolized by the KWP at the national level, and the national government controls the provincial and county governments in accordance with the principles of "democratic centralism" as stated in Article 9 of the DPRK Constitution. This is one article which is actually put into practice, and it is used to centralize the authority.


The administrative functions are not under the control of a party at the local level in South Korea. The author argues that the pattern of relations among the power structures in the functional organizations is an executive-dominance pattern, in which the centralization of the territorial organization is carried out through the Ministry of Home Affairs of the national government. The history of local autonomy in South Korea can be periodized into three stages: 1948-1952; 1952-1961; and 1961 to date. Under Articles 96 and 97 of the ROK Constitution of 1948⁸ and the Local Governments Act of 1949, the number of local governments was set at 1,554, including one special city, nine provinces, fourteen cities, 74 townships, and 1,456 villages in South Korea. Counties were not considered as a unit of local government. During the first period, no elections for the Local Assembly or Chief of the Local Administration were held.

8. For the English text of the ROK Constitution of 1948, see Chae Kyung Oh, Handbook of Korea (N.Y.: Pageant Press, 1958), pp. 441-460.

The national government controlled personnel and budget matters through the Ministry of Home Affairs. In the second period, three elections for the local assembly and for the chief administrator were held: in 1952, 1956, and 1960. In the third period, the Military Government dissolved all the Local Assemblies in 1961. The townships and villages lost their status as legal, autonomous governments. Instead the Extraordinary Measures Act on Local Autonomy made the county, the city, and the province the local autonomous units of government. Since 1961, no elections for local government have been held. Under Article 10 of the Supplementary Rules of the ROK Constitution of 1972, elections for local government were legally postponed until the day of unification of divided Korea.⁹ Thus, local governments are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Home Affairs. The Bureau of Police and the Bureau of Local Government of the Ministry of Home Affairs control the local governments as well as internal security through a hierarchical structure from the provincial level to the precinct and neighborhood associations, as depicted in Figure VII.2.

9. Article 10 of the Supplementary Rules of the ROK Constitution of 1972. See Blaustein and Flanz, eds., op. cit., vol. V, and ROK Korean Overseas Information Services, ed., Constitution: Korea Background Series (Seoul: Korean Overseas Information Services, 1973), pp. 49-81.

FIGURE VII.2
THE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN SOUTH KOREA



LEGEND: -----> Control.

The relationship between centralization of the administration and the implementation of policies depends upon the complexity of the rule making and rule implementation structures, if the level of imposition is held constant. If the rule making and rule implementation structures are relatively simple, increased centralization tends to increase the effectiveness of implementation. However, if the rule making and rule implementation structures become complex, the extent of decentralization tends to increase the effectiveness of implementation. The term decentralization presupposed the existence of a central authority whose leaders deem it useful to delegate a portion of their centrally held power to subnational centers, for the sake of administrative expediency or in response to subnational pressures.¹⁰ Centralization here refers to the extent to which series of decisions are made by central bodies in the government.¹¹ The operationalization of decentralization poses a double problem: the number of decisions which are made by the local authorities and the importance of these decisions.

10 . Ivo D. Duchacek, Comparative Federalism: The Territorial Dimension of Politics (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), p. 112.

11 . Jean Blondel and Valentine Herman, Review Exercises for Comparative Government (N.Y.: Praeger, 1972), p. vii.

Each area of decision making could be weighted on the basis of the amount of revenue and expenditure related to it, and the importance attributed to it by the national and local levels of the government in a political system.¹²

This may be called the power approach, which can be used to measure organizational structure, and which the analyst will employ in this section of the research. Scholars have used other methods, such as the institutional approach and the survey approach for the study of organizations.¹³

The institutional approach measures the degree of autonomy, the chief executive's span of control, the worker/supervisor ratio, and the number of direct supervisors to determine the degree of centralization.¹⁴

The survey approach mainly measures personal participation in the decision making hierarchy of authority and departmental participation in decision making to determine the degree of centralization.¹⁵

12. Blondel and Herman, op. cit., p. 108.

13. Johannes Pennings, "Measure of Organizational Structure: A Methodological Note," American Journal of Sociology 79 (November 1973): 686-687.

14. D.S. Pugh, et al., "Dimensions of Organizational Structure," Administrative Science Quarterly 13, No. 1 (1968): 92-104.

15. J. Hages and M. Aiken, "Relationships of Centralization to other Structural Properties," Administrative Science Quarterly 12, No. 1 (1967): 78-79.

The researcher will examine the financing of national and local government and the level of dependence of local governments on the national government. First, the level of dependence of local governments on the national government can be operationalized by measuring the relative proportion of national government subsidies and grants to the local government's revenue. Secondly, the level of dependence can be operationalized by measuring the national government's power to control personnel in local governments. In South Korea, government employees are divided into two categories: the national and local services. The national government has the power to appoint national civil servants to high ranking positions in the local government agencies. The degree of effectiveness of policy implementation in the centralized territorial organization can be operationalized by measuring the growth rate of the gross national product (GNP) in South Korea and the gross output value of social production (GVSP) in North Korea. GNP and GVSP are not identical measures. GVSP is the sum of the gross output values of all separately enumerated production units including the values of inputs from outside each unit, while GNP is the market value of all final goods and services produced during the year.¹⁶

16. Bruce F. Davie and Bruce F. Duncombe, Modern Political Arithmetic: The Federal Budget and the Public Sector in National Economic Accounts (N.Y.: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), p. 13.

The GVSP is the sum of the national income and all material costs, including the depreciation of capital. The definition of national income by the DPRK is different from the definition of national income in the economies of Western countries. The DPRK's definition excludes non-production services, such as passenger transportation and communication, and includes turnover taxes.¹⁷ Because the method of computing the GVSP is slightly different from the method used to compute the GNP, cautious use should be made of comparisons of these two indices. GVSP contains some elements of double counting, such as when purchases for inter-enterprise production are counted more than once.

The change index in Table VII.1 refers to the annual average change of three items (national and local government finances and the GNP).¹⁸ The change index can be calculated as follows:

$$\text{Change Index} = \left(\frac{\text{Market value in current year}}{\text{Market value in last year}} \right) \times 100.$$

17. Pong S. Lee, "An Estimate of North Korea's National Income," Asian Survey 12 (June 1972): 519.

18. When there is a missing datum, the datum from the immediately previous year is used and the value is divided by the number of interval years. Thus, it is an index of the annual rate of change. Because the figures are current market values, one should be cautious in using this index in a diachronic analysis. The inflation rate should be considered. However, the change indices can be compared cross-sectionally.

All the values in Table VII.1 are current market prices. Thus the change index in GNP differs from the annual growth rate of GNP, because the growth rate of GNP must be computed with constant market prices. In the data from North Korea, as displayed in Table VII.6, there is no listing of information on local government finances for North Korea, because no data is available. The dependence index will refer to the degree of financial dependence of local governments on the national government. The computation formula is:

$$\text{Dependence index (\%)} = \frac{\text{Total of National Gov't grants and subsidies to local gov't in a fiscal year}}{\text{Total of local government finance}} \times 100.$$

The dependence indices in South Korea increased in the period of 1952-1960. Thus the degree of centralization in finances has steadily increased in South Korea. The percentage of local government revenue from local taxes decreased in the same period. (i.e., 19.5% in 1953, 20.5% in 1954, 14.2% in 1957, 14.3% in 1958, 16.4% in 1959, and 15.5% in 1960.) Thus, the average annual percentage of revenue from local taxes in local government finances in the period from 1953-1960 was only 15.8%.¹⁹ This is an extremely low figure, if one wants to call the local governments autonomous.

19. Ro Yunghi, "Jibang hengjong," (Local Administration) in Lee Hahnbeen, et al., Hankuk haengjong eui yoksajok bunsok (Historical Analysis of Korean Public Administration) (Seoul: Korean Institute of Public Administration, 1969), p. 82.

TABLE VII.1

THE FINANCES OF THE NATIONAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
IN SOUTH KOREA (1952-1973) IN WON

Year	National (Mil.)	Local (Mil.)	GNP (Mil.)	Change Index			GNP growth rate (%)	DI (%)
				Ntl.	Loc.	GNP		
1952	2,212	344	--	--	--	--	1.0	43.6
1953	6,683	799	46,220	202.1	132.3	--	5.5	53.1
1954	14,920	2,913	64,750	123.3	264.6	40.0	6.0	57.4
1955	32,378	7,921	111,488	117.0	171.2	73.1	6.1	63.6
1956	--	--	--	15.6	3.8	35.3	1.2	--
1957	42,459	8,523	191,930	15.6	3.8	35.3	8.8	59.7
1958	47,710	10,622	202,880	11.7	24.6	5.7	6.2	61.4
1959	45,540	12,666	215,800	-4.5	19.2	6.4	4.6	63.0
1960	48,456	13,713	243,140	6.4	8.3	13.0	1.8	66.7
1961	79,750	11,900	287,300	64.5	-13.2	22.3	4.8	--
1962	119,900	35,820	348,800	50.3	201.0	17.3	3.1	--
1963	110,990	42,370	448,500	7.4	18.3	40.2	8.8	--
1964	120,670	47,000	700,200	8.7	10.9	43.3	8.6	--
1965	154,150	60,670	805,300	27.7	29.1	15.0	6.1	--
1966	230,980	99,290	1,032,400	49.8	63.7	28.2	12.4	--
1967	291,250	132,420	1,269,900	26.0	33.4	25.8	7.8)	--
1968	402,880	187,730	1,598,000	38.3	41.8	25.8	12.6	--
1969	578,040	267,460	2,081,500	43.3	42.8	30.1	15.0	--
1970	597,670	320,430	2,589,200	3.4	20.0	24.4	9.7	--
1971	731,980	394,150	3,151,500	22.5	22.8	21.7	9.2	--
1972	963,110	448,310	3,860,000	31.6	13.7	22.5	7.0	--
1973	958,140	546,300	4,928,600	-0.5	21.9	27.7	16.5	--

SOURCES: All data from 1953-1960 is from Ro Yunghi, "Jibang hengjong," (Local Administration) in Lee Hahnbeen, et al., op. cit., p. 364.
Data from 1961-1973 is from these sources: Korean Development Institute (KDI), Korea's Economy: Past and Present (Seoul: Korean Development Institute, 1975), p. 344 and 349. The growth rate of the GNP for 1961-1973 is from KDI, op. cit., p. 342. The growth rate for 1952-1960 is from Korea Annual 1974, pp. 98-105.

NOTE: DI: Dependence Index.
Hypens indicate missing data.
The figures of national and local government finance and GNP are current market prices.

In the First Republic (1948-1960), when one compares the change indices of national government finance with the GNP, there were only four years (1953, 1954, 1955 and 1958) in which the change index of national government finance were greater than the change index of the GNP. In the last years of the Rhee government (1958-1959), the government acted to substantially increase the revenue of local governments. These year also correspond to the last period in which local assmeblies existed in the Rhee Administration. Local government elections were held in 1952, 1956 and 1960, but the local assemblies were dissolved in 1961. In the Second Republic (1960-1961), the change index of local government finance was greater than that of the national government, which increased the decentralization in finance for this short period. For nine of the eleven years of the Third Republic (1961-1972), the change index of national government finance was greater than that of GNP. Secondly, for seven years the change index of local government finance was greater than that of the GNP, as displayed in Table VII.1. Thirdly, for nine years, the change index of local government finance was greater than that of the national government finance. Thus, when one compares the index of national government finance with that of local government finahce in the Third Republic, it is clear that the Park Government had attempted to increase the level of autonomy in local government finance in this period.

The data shows that the local government's revenue increased more than the central government's revenue, on a percentage basis. Decentralization of the administration was attempted in financial matters in the Third Republic of South Korea to a greater extent than was true in the Second Republic.

The effectiveness of policy implementation and governmental performance in economic development can be operationalized by measuring the growth rate in the GNP. In South Korea, the annual growth rate of the GNP was greater in the Third Republic (an average annual rate of 8.69% between 1961 and 1972) than in the First Republic (an annual average of 4.58% between 1952 and 1960). Despite the correlation between an increase in decentralization in the area of finance and growth of GNP in Western industrial countries, this South Korean growth of GNP was not due completely to increased decentralization, because the level of decentralization in South Korea is far below that found in Western countries. It can be argued, however, that in the Third Republic the level of decentralization in governmental finance was increased in comparison with the First Republic. In the Third Republic, large-scale national economic planning was begun which required the active participation of local governments. So at least financially, the authority of local governments was expanded and a trend toward decentralization was established for economic

purposes. But in personnel administration, the national government played a dominant role by appointing the heads of all local agencies. The trend toward decentralization in the finances of local governments has continued into the Fourth Republic (1973-date). In 1973, for example, the change index of local government finance (21.9%) was greater than that of the national government's finance (-0.5%), as shown in Table VII.1.

In South Korea, centralization by the national government has been mainly implemented through the control of personnel, and, to a lesser degree, by the control of the finances of the local governments. These are administrative means; but centralization has also been implemented politically by the disbanding of local elections. In South Korea, the President of the national government has the authority to appoint national government employees to positions in the local governments. This has resulted in a situation where all high-level government employees (grade III-B and above) are national government employees who have been sent into local governments, while most of the lower ranking civil servants (grades 4 and 5) in local government are from the local civil service. During the First Republic, national government employees who were appointed to local governments made up an annual average of 15.5%, as displayed in Table VII.2. After the Korean War, the number of local

civil servants increased slightly. The workload of the local governments is more than half made up of work which has been delegated by the national government. (See Table VII.3). For example, according to survey data by the Ministry of Home Affairs of the national government, in the provincial government of Kyungki, only 32.1% of the work stemmed from locally-initiated projects and the routine business of local government. Overall, local government's routine work and programs account for a average of only 36.2% of the work of local governments. The national government has delegated work to the local governments on a large scale, and work overloads have often occurred, because the local governments have rarely had enough financial resources or manpower left over to achieve their own local goals, if they set any, once they finished the national government's delegated work.²⁰

In North Korea, the centralization of administration started with the land reforms of 1946, which consolidated a new power structure under the Act of Land Reform. The DPRK confiscated 1,000,325 chongbo²¹ of land owned by landlords,

20. Ro Yunghi, "Jibang jachi danche eui samu bunbe silte," (The Practices of Distribution of Work to Local Governments) Haengjong Nonchong (Journal of Public Administration) Vol. 5, No. 2 (1967):171-235.

21. One chongbo is 0.992 hectare.

TABLE VII.2

THE NUMBER OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES IN THE
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN SOUTH KOREA

Year	National Civil Service (A)	Local Civil Service (B)	Total (A+B)	(A) Total (%)
1952	6,209	35,249	41,458	15.0
1953	4,861	22,913	27,774	17.5
1954	5,651	23,572	29,223	19.3
1955	5,386	24,472	29,858	18.0
1956	5,034	25,491	30,525	16.5
1957	4,585	26,178	30,763	14.9
1958	4,116	26,580	30,696	13.4
1959	4,116	27,311	31,427	13.1
1960	4,116	28,630	32,746	12.6

SOURCE: Ro Yunghi, op. cit., in Lee Hahnbeen, et al.,
op. cit., p. 362.

TABLE VII.3

THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE WORKLOAD IN
THE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS OF SOUTH KOREA (1964-1966)

Local Government	Type	Works of the Local Gov't (%)	Works Delegated By the National Gov't (%)
Kyungki Province	Province	32.1	68.7
City of Pyongtek	Small City	32.8	67.2
City of Deku	Large City	43.7	65.3

SOURCE: Adapted from Ro Yunghi, op. cit., in
Lee Hahnbeen, et al., op. cit., p. 362

the colonial Japanese government, Japanese individuals and religious groups, and they distributed 98.1% of the land to the farmers. The remaining 1.9% of the land was turned over to the various levels of local government for public ownership.²² The one million chongbo accounted for 53% of the total cultivated land in North Korea and 95% of the land which had been rented out before 1945. About 70% of the farm households received land under this reform.²³ The formation of agricultural cooperatives began in 1953 and was completed by 1958. Also, the Act of the Nationalization of Industry²⁴ was proclaimed on August 10, 1946, and the socialization of industry was completed in 1958.

The degree of centralization in the North Korean regime is related to the four stages of development: the People's Democratic Reform (1945-1952); the Socialist Reform (1953-1956); the Socialist Revolution (1957-1960); and the Socialist Construction (1961-date). Because in the People's Democratic Reform period, the consolidation of power was the

22. North Korea Central Yearbook 1958, p. 188. DPRK, Foreign Languages Publishing House (FLPH), The Historical Experience of the Agrarian Reform in Our Country (Pyongyang: FLPH, 1974), p. 95.

23. DPRK, FLPH, op. cit. p. 94.

24. For the text of the Act, see DPRK, FLPH, Socialist Constitution, pp. 314-315.

first goal, the DPRK centralized all power structures. After the Korean War (1950-1953), the DPRK launched the Three-Year Economic Plan (1954-1956) to aid in the recovery from the war damages. Later, the North Korean leaders attempted to implement a limited decentralization in agricultural and industrial production in the stage of Socialist Reform (1953-1956). The economic planning and budgets of local governments were tightly controlled by the State Planning Commission of the national government. After the DPRK completed the socialization of agriculture and industry in 1958, the national government was able to control all sources of revenue of every level of government²⁵. The main sources of revenue in the DPRK has been the turnover tax, which is levied on consumer goods, from the profits of government-run industry, and from recovery profits, the associations' and cooperatives' income tax, and state property sales income. Partly because the percentage of the state's budget generated from personal income tax was low, it was discontinued in 1975. Thus the major source of revenue has been the turnover tax, which made up 25.7% of the state budget in 1949, 52.7% in 1957, and 53.8% in 1961.²⁶ Because of the complete socialization of agriculture and industry, the national

²⁵ . In the U.S.S.R., there is only one budget. The budget of the central government of the U.S.S.R. decides how much each local government will receive. The government of North Korea has adopted this budgetary system. For discussion of the Soviet budget, see Ellsworth Raymond, The Soviet State (New York: Macmillan, 1968), pp. 347-349.

²⁶. Yearbook of North Korea 1945-1968, pp. 364-365.

government was able to easily control the finances of local governments, and the KWP was able to centralize the personnel administration by appointing KWP members to key positions.

In the Socialist Revolution stage, the DPRK launched the Five-Year Economic Plan (1957-1961). After Kim Il Sung purged most of his rivals from the previous stages (1948-1958), he had more confidence in his power and authority. After another major purge in 1958,²⁷ Kim had to feel that he was close to the establishment of a monocratic party. In 1958, during the Socialist Revolution stage, Kim Il Sung promoted the Chollima (Flying Horse) Movement as the "general line of socialist construction" in North Korea,²⁸ and the Chongsanri method²⁹ as the mass line approach in the rural areas in 1960. The Chollima movement is the technique of mass mobilization and organization in North Korea. The goal of this movement was to combine the programs of cultural and technological

27. The KWP purged Pak Hyonyong (Deputy Premier) ex-South Korean Communist faction) in 1953, Ho Kai (Vice-Premier, Soviet-Korean faction) in 1953, Choe Changik (Deputy Premier, Yen-an faction) in 1956, and Kim Dubong (Chairman of the CC of the KWP, Yen-an faction) in 1958. Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, II: 1351-1379. Hun Ryu, Study of North Korea (Seoul: Research Institute of Internal and External Affairs, 1966), pp. 79-80.

28. Article 13 of the DPRK Constitution of 1972.

29. See the speech, "For the Correct Management of the Socialist Agrarian Economy," in Kim Il Sung, Kim Il Sung jojak sonjib (Selected Works of Kim Il Sung) (Pyongyang: KWP Press, 1968), II: 446-479; and Kim Il Sung, For the Correct Management of the Socialist Rural Economy (Pyongyang: FLPH, 1969), p. 27 and Article 12 of the DPRK Constitution of 1972. The term, Chongsanri, originated from the name of an agricultural cooperative in the village of Chongsanri in Kangso County.

revolution in order to mobilize the working force, organize them, and increase productivity in both industry and agriculture. Small teams were organized in 1958 and, after a trial period, the campaign to organize workteams spread rapidly, reaching 3,242 villages by 1959.³⁰ To solve the administrative problems caused by centralization and bureaucratization, the DPRK government attempted to decentralize the administrative structure by increasing the participation of the workers in the decision making and implementation processes in industrial plants and agricultural cooperatives. The local governments of townships was abolished in 1952 and the number of villages was reduced to conform with the boundaries of the agricultural cooperatives. There were 3,843 agricultural cooperatives in North Korea in 1958, as displayed in Table VII.4. The boundaries of the counties were changed and the number of counties was increased from 97 to 163.

It is argued that other things being equal, the number of lower-level units is inversely related to the extent of decentralization in a political system.³¹ It can

30. Ilpyong J. Kim, Communist Politics in North Korea (New York: Praeger, 1975), p. 82.

31. Jean Blondel and Valentine Herman, op. cit., p. 111.

TABLE VII.4

THE AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE
MOVEMENT IN NORTH KOREA
(1953-1958)

Year	Total of Agricultural Cooperatives	% of Total of Farm Households in North Korea
1953	806	1.2
1954	10,098	31.8
1955	12,132	49.0
1956	15,825	80.9
1957	16,032	95.6
1958	3,843 ^a	100.0

SOURCE: North Korean Central Yearbook 1958, p. 119.

NOTE: (a) Many of the small cooperative farms were consolidated into large ones in 1958.

be expected that, in general, the larger a given lower-level unit, the more resources it will have, and the more administrative and governmental talent it will muster, while a smaller unit would not be as self-sufficient. The number of local governmental units in both North and South Korea has been reduced since their division. In both North and South Korea, the larger units (city and county) rather than the villages, became the basic units of administrative and economic planning. Thus, at least this aspect of decentralization, which should also include financial, personnel, and ultimately political decentralization, has been implemented in the two Koreas.

In the Socialist Construction period (1961-date), the DPRK reorganized its economic administration into two committees: the Agricultural and Industrial Management Committees. Under the local People's Committee, these two local management committees were created at every provincial, city, and county level. These management committees are independent of the local Administrative Committee. The Agricultural Commission of the national government controls the local Agricultural Management Committees. The commissions of various heavy and light industries and the various ministries of the national government control the local Industrial Management Committees. The State Planning Commission controls the planning and budgets of the two local Management Committees. In 1962, the Tae'an system was implemented in

industrial areas to reflect the concept of decentralization and collective leadership in local industrial plants.

Article 30 of the DPRK Constitution of 1972 also reads that "the state directs.....the nation's economy through the Tae'an work system." The principle of one-man management was discarded, and a committee consisting of party cadres, managers, technicians and workers was supposed to be responsible for making decisions. A factory's KWP Committee would run the factory as the "supreme administrative organ."³² The status of the local KWP Committee was further strengthened through the Tae'an work system. Locally, it decentralized the administrative structure. However, for the KWP, it accelerated the centralization of control politically.

In North Korea, the KWP has controlled the power structures. Administratively, the North Korean regime has attempted to decentralize the structure of agricultural and industrial production since 1958. Financially, the level of centralization has been extremely high, as the state has controlled all economic resources such as state properties and cooperative properties. In personnel administration, the national and local KWP committees have controlled, in some measure, the supply, training, and promotion of every individual in local government. In 1960, North Korea

32. Kim Il Sung, "On the Further Developing of the Tae'an Work System," in a speech given at the Tae'an Electrical Machinery Plant on November 9, 1962, in Kim Il Sung, Selected Works of Kim Il Sung (Pyongyang: FLPH, 1971), III:427.

classified the employees of the people's economy into two categories: the budgetary sector and the non-budgetary sector employees, as displayed in Figure VII.4. The table shows only the data from the period of 1946-1960. Because the DPRK completed the socialization of agriculture and industry in 1958, it can be assumed that the proportion of state budgetary sector employees has not changed drastically since then. The number of state budgetary sector employees in all areas, including the "people's economy" continuously increased from 1946 (35.4%) to 1953 (39.1%) (see column A of the table). The number of state budgetary sector employees in all areas has decreased more recently from 34.9% in 1956 to 22.5% in 1960. The decentralization process began in 1958 and the trend is also indicated by the slight decentralization of personnel administration. This may possibly be because the number of national government employees in the state-owned industrial enterprises grew more slowly than the number of employees in the non-state-owned cooperatives. Because the employees of the state budgetary sector in the "people's economy" have probably not been included in the number of state farm employees, this figure is deflated. It must be much greater than the 12.0% indicated for 1960 (see column C in Table VII.5).

In this setting, the government of the DPRK increased state revenue over the years.³³ During the stage of the people's

³³. Expenditures have generally been slightly smaller than the revenue of any fiscal year, or equal to it.

TABLE VII.5
THE NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES OF THE STATE
BUDGETARY SECTOR IN NORTH KOREA (1946-1960)

Year	Total of State Budgetary Sector in All Areas (A) (1,000s)	% (A/D)	State Budgetary Sector in People's Economy (B) (1,000s)	% of (B) in People's Economy	Total Employees in DPRK (D) ^a (1,000s)
1946	92	35.4	63	24.0	260
1949	204	36.1	131	23.0	565
1953	225	39.1	171	30.0	575
1956	282	34.9	172	21.0	808
1959	362	26.2	185	13.0	1,381
1960	327	27.5	173	12.0	1,458

SOURCES: North Korean Central Yearbook 1961, p. 341; and The 1961 North Korean Yearbook, JPRS: 17,890 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1963), p. 505.

a. The total number of employees of the state budgetary sector in the people's economy does not include cooperative farm employees.

democratic reform (1945-1952) data are available only for 1946 and 1949. In this period, the annual change index of state revenue was 410.4%. (See Table VII.6) In the stage of socialist reform (1953-1956), the change index of state revenue of the DPRK maintained an annual average of 30.3%. During the later two periods of socialist revolution (1957-1960) and socialist construction (1961-date) the change index of state revenue were, respectively, 23.3% and 12.3% (see Figure VII.3). The change indices of state revenue have decreased over the four stages. Several factors have affected the decrease in these change indices of state revenue. First is the limit to growth in the Communist system; the change index of the initial period of state building was the highest among the four periods, and since then the change index has decreased in every period. The limits to the growth rate in Communist North Korea are clearly shown in Figure VII.4. Until the late 1960's, the per capita GNP of North Korea was higher than that of South Korea, but the growth rate of North Korea has decreased, while that of South Korea has exceeded that of North Korea in the 1970's.³⁴

34. Pong S. Lee based his estimate of North Korean per capita national income (Table VII.6) on Kim Il Sung's claim that it was 510 won in 1966. In that year, one dollar was equivalent to 2.26 won commercially and 1.66 won in purchasing power parity. Pong S. Lee, op. cit., p. 524. Kim Il Sung's speech at the Supreme People's Assembly on December 16, 1967. See North Korean Central Yearbook 1968, pp. 1-29 Rinn-Sup Shin, et al., Area Handbook for North Korea, p. 109.

TABLE VII.6
THE REVENUE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DPRK

Year	Revenue (A) (Million NK Won)	Gross Output (B) Value of Social Pro- duction (GVSP) (Million NK Won)	Change Index		National Income Per Capita (in 1966 NK Won)
			(A)	(B)	
1946	16	920	-	-	59
1949	213	2,000	410.4	39.1	118
1953	525	1,500	36.6	6.3	93
1954	902	-	71.6	-	-
1955	1,082	-	21.0	-	-
1956	993	3,200	-8.2	37.8	185
1957	1,251	-	26.0	-	-
1958	1,221	-	-2.4	-	-
1959	1,370	6,700	22.2	54.7	-
1960	2,019	7,300	47.4	8.6	343
1961	2,399	8,600	18.8	17.8	399
1962	2,896	9,100	20.7	5.8	417
1963	3,145	10,000	8.6	9.9	435
1964	3,499	11,000	11.3	10.0	454
1965	3,574	12,000	2.1	9.1	482
1966	3,672	13,000	2.7	8.3	500
1967	4,113	-	12.0	-	519
1968	5,018	-	22.0	-	-
1969	5,319	-	6.0	-	-
1970	6,232	-	17.2	-	-
1971	6,357	-	2.0	-	-
1972	7,430	-	16.9	-	-
1973	8,544	-	15.0	-	-
1974	9,658	-	13.0	-	-
1975	11,367	-	17.7	-	-
1976	12,513	-	10.0	-	-

SOURCES: Revenue data for 1946-59: L.N. Karshinov, People's Democratic Republic of Korea JPRS:3822 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Commerce, 1960), pp. 48-49; Revenue data for 1946-60: DPRK, Statistical Returns 1946-60 (Pyongyang: FLPH, 1961), p. 25. The figures of 1946-60 were estimated from the percentage data by the analyst. Revenue data for 1960-64: Pong S. Lee,

"An Estimate of North Korea's National Income," Asian Survey 12 (June 1972):519; Revenue data for 1965-1969: Choi Pyongkil, "Bukkoi eui jongchi kwajong kwas haengjong byonhwa" (Political Process and Administrative Change in North Korea) Bukhan (North Korea) 5 (March 1976):65-66; Revenue data for 1970-1972: Joseph S Chung, "Recent Trends in the North Korean State Budget: With Special Reference to 1971 and 1972," Journal of Korean Affairs 2 (January 1973):30; Data for GVSP: Pong S. Lee, op. cit., p.522; Revenue data for 1974-1976: Pyongyang Times May 1, 1976; Data for national income: Pong S. Lee, op. cit., p. 519.

NOTE: A hyphen indicates unavailable data.
NK Won is North Korean currency Won. One U.S. dollar was 2.05 NK won in 1972. When there are missing data, a change index is an average value of annual change.

FIGURE VII.3

THE CHANGE INDEX OF STATE REVENUE IN NORTH KOREA





FIGURE VII.4

TRENDS IN PER CAPITA GNP OF NORTH AND
SOUTH KOREA (1967-1974)

SOURCE: Korea Development Institute, Economic Comparison Between South and North Korea (Seoul: Korean Development Institute, 1975), p. 20.

Excessive centralization has the effect of deterring local initiative in industrial production. This factor also reduces the output in North Korea overall. Secondly, there has been a lack of technological improvement. When comparing the change index of gross output value of social production (GVSP) with the change index of state revenue, the change index of state revenue has been greater than that of GVSP for seven of the eleven years (excluding the one year of missing data).

In summary, under the given condition that both North and South Korea have adopted a unitary organization of the territory of the state, and that the system of checks and balances in the territorial organizations is inoperative in both sectors of divided Korea, the degree of centralization has varied strongly with the comprehensiveness of land reform in the rural areas of these predominantly agrarian societies by reducing the power bases of competing groups in the local areas, where such non-Communist groups as the Democratic National Party in North Korea, and such conservative gradualist groups as the Korean Democratic Party in South Korea maintained their power bases in local areas during the initial period of state building. However, from the First Republic through the Fourth Republic in South Korea, the political authority established a high degree of centralization through such means as the control of personnel and finance, despite occasional efforts for a

slight decentralization in finance. Another major method of centralization has been the abolition of local legislative bodies. Political elites have deliberately deterred the elections of local governments in South Korea, for example. Like the South Korean leadership, the North Korean leadership has utilized such means as the control of personnel and finance for the centralization of administration. However, the North Korean leadership has mobilized the KWP to further consolidate local power and to centralize the authority in the monolithic structure within the party.

In North Korea, the degree of organizational coherence in the KWP is likely to lead to an increase in the degree of decentralization, which will stimulate the local initiatives of economic development, but it does not mean that the national government will delegate and share political power with local governments. In North Korea, party unity was imposed at the national level during the period from 1955 to 1958, through a series of purges. Later, local autonomy was encouraged for the bottom structures, although this autonomy did not include decision making power for any basic policies or ideology. The main routes to greater production have been the improvement of administrative-guidance structures and more advanced technology in the local areas. The North Korean leadership implemented the Chollima movement as a

general mass line, the Chongsanri method for the agricultural sector, and the Tae'an work system for the industrial sector. The local party committees and land management committees have played key roles in these programs.

The tendency toward excessive centralization in the territorial organizations in both North and South Korea was the product of several factors. The first factor is that they have had no previous experience with local autonomy before 1945. The historical heritage, which lacked the demands for local autonomy from the masses, and the leaders' intolerance of local autonomy, is strongly related to the excessive centralization in the two separate experiments of state building. The second factor, which has affected the tendency of excessive centralization in both North and South Korea, is the psycho-cultural aspect of distrust of others. The extent to which one trusts his fellow citizens has been low, and the pattern of distrust in interpersonal relationship has persisted, especially in interactions with outgroups. The general socio-cultural pattern of distrust has been extended to the arena of political structures. The excessive concentration of power in one person has been the dominant characteristic of functional organizations of the structural dimension of political life in the two Koreas,

and the tendency toward centralization is a characteristic of the territorial organizations of political life in the two Koreas. As in Yi Korea, the political elites in the national arena of politics have tended to distrust the local power groups and have attempted to control all power bases, including the bases for political power as well as economic power in all levels of government in the two Koreas.

The present chapter has been concerned with the territorial organizations, their degree of centralization, and their effects on governmental performances. The next chapter will examine the economic structure in North and South Korea.

CHAPTER VIII

THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE

In the study of divided nations, comparative analysis offers a unique opportunity to assess yet another dimension of human life -- economic life under the different ideologies. First, the author will briefly explain the general types of economic systems. Using this typology, he will study the two economic systems in divided Korea. The problems of land reform and economic planning, because they exhibit strong interactions between political policy and economic policy, will be used to illustrate the differences and similarities between the two economic systems. Comparative economic analysis will further help comparativists to understand the political life in a divided nation. The study of comparative economic analysis adds much to a study of the politics of a divided nation, by showing how political decision making is affected by economic realities and by showing how political manipulation affects the economic life of a nation. By comparing the economic systems of North and South Korea, which had a common economic history, the comparativist can more readily assess the advantages and shortcomings of each of the economic systems which have evolved since the division of Korea. Comparative economic analysis can help

to answer certain questions about economic theory and economic institutions.¹ Comparative economic analysis helps researchers clearly assess the performance and outputs of economic systems. Comparative economic analysis helps analysts assess governmental performances and economic policies under different ideologies.²

The Types of Economic Systems

Scholars have employed diverse typologies of economic systems. Allan Gruchy distinguishes four types of economic systems: the capitalist system (i.e., the U.S. and Canada), the socialist system (i.e., the Scandinavian countries and Great Britain), the Communist system (i.e., the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China), and the Fascist system (i.e., Nazi Germany).³ But, from

1. George N. Hahm, Economic Systems: A Comparative Analysis, Third Edition (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1968), pp. 9-10.

2. For further discussion of comparative economic systems, see Abram Bergson, "Development Under Two Systems: Comparative Productivity Growth Since 1950," World Politics 23 (July 1971): 579-617; Kelvin Lancaster, "The Dynamic Inefficiency of Capitalism," Journal of Political Economy 81 (Sept-Oct 1973): 1092-1109; and Adolf Weber, "Agricultural Modernization in Market and Planned Economies: The German Experience," Studies in Comparative Communism 6 (Autumn 1973): 280-300.

3. Allan Gruchy, Comparative Economic Systems (N.Y.: Houghton Mifflin, 1966), pp. 18-20.

the broadest point of view, the world's major economic systems may be classified into only two groups: those with a Western democratic ethic and those with a Communist ethic. The Western ethic regards the welfare of the individual as the proper ultimate goal of national existence. The Communist ethic, in practice, is a pro-state or collectivistic ethic which puts the importance of the state over that of the individual. All economic systems rest upon two basic flows, the flow of real output or national production and the flow of national income by means of which this production is distributed. The main problem of each economic system is how to coordinate these two fundamental economic flows so that output and income are in balance at high levels of production and employment. Economic systems can be differentiated on the basis of the different ways in which these systems seek to secure this balance. Coordinating mechanisms tie the various units of the economy together. Every economic unit in the social economy is dependent on innumerable other units to furnish it with consumer goods, labor services, materials, fuel, and markets for its products. Thus one way to distinguish among economic systems is according to the prevailing coordinating mechanisms, which can be either the market

itself or the command system. Another major way in which economic systems can be classified is according to the prevailing ownership of production assets: capitalism, socialism, or the mixed economy.⁴ Communist economic systems have been further subdivided in a study by John Montias, in which their classification hinges on three criteria: first, the system's degree of mobilization of participants, particularly the peasants, workers, and employees by lower level party cadres for the promotion of regional goals; second, the extent of markets for consumer goods; and third, the degree of centralization of decision making.⁵ Using these criteria, Montias distinguishes the salient traits of four types of Communist economic systems: mobilization, centralized-administered, decentralized-administered, and market-socialist.⁶ Montias' typology includes only empirical models, and excludes analytical models.

4. Gregory Grossman, Economic Systems (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), pp. 13-36.

5. John Michael Montias, "Types of Communist Economic Systems," in Chalmers Johnson, ed., Change in Communist Systems (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1970), p. 118; and John M. Montias, "A Classification of Communist Economic Systems," in Carmelo Mesa-Lago and Carl Beck, eds., Comparative Socialist Systems (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, Center for International Studies, 1975), p. 39.

6. Montias, in Johnson, ed., op. cit., pp. 118-119. Montias, in Mesa-Lago and Beck, eds., op. cit., p. 39.

The researcher will distinguish the salient characteristics of economic systems using the following three criteria: the prevailing coordinating mechanisms (market or planning); the degree of centralization in decision making (decentralization or centralization); and ownership (capitalism, Communism, or mixed economy). Thus, twelve "ideal types" of economic systems are distinguished, as displayed in Table VIII.1. All possible combinations of economic variables are considered in this typology, even those which are purely analytical at this time. This typology includes both the analytical and empirical models of economic systems. Empirically, the characteristics of the market-decentralized capitalist "ideal type" are those of the economies of the United States and Canada, while the economic system in the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China are characteristic of the command economic system. Both empirically and analytically, the term "mixed economy" is applied to an economy which has substantial amounts of both private and public ownership. On the one hand, some Communist planned economic systems have also evolved a decentralized decision making process, while on the other, some market capitalist systems have adopted economic planning. The level and scope of economic planning are carried out in different ways, varying from indicative economic plans to imperative economic plans.

TABLE VIII.1
THE TYPES OF ECONOMIC SYSTEMS

Degree of Centralization	Ownership	Coordinating Mechanism	
		Market	Planning
Decentralized	Capitalism	Market Decentralized Capitalist	Planned Decentralized Capitalist
	Communism	Market Decentralized Socialist	Planned Decentralized Communist
	Mixed Economy	Market Socialist Decentralist Mixed	Planned Decentralized Mixed
Centralized	Capitalism	Market Centralized Capitalist	Planned Centralized Capitalist
	Communism	Market Centralized Socialist	Command
	Mixed Economy	Market Centralized Mixed	Planned Centralized Mixed

The South Korean Economic System

The acceptance of, or acquiescence to, the foreign imposition of political ideologies by the political elites in a divided nation tends to strongly affect the forms of ownership and the patterns of adjustment (market or planning) in economic life, in the initial phase of the takeover period. The gradualist-conservative elites in South Korea have continued under a capitalist market economic system with some governmental regulation of private enterprises. Thus the South Korean economy may be termed a mixed economic system under the incrementalist change by planning model, while the Communist elites in North Korea developed a socialist planned economic system under the revolutionary change by planning model. Although South Korea has pursued the capitalistic market economic system, the South Korean government has regulated private enterprise in order to implement an indicative economic development plan. The North Korean government has followed a socialistic planned economic system, which has an imperative economic plan.

With respect to South Korea, the current capitalist economic system preserves many of the features of old Korean capitalism,⁷ but at the same time, the South Korean

7. For a discussion of the Yi Korea Economic System, see James B. Palais, Politics and Policy in Traditional Korea (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 58-85.

economic system has moved far beyond the laissez-faire capitalism of Yi Korea. The current capitalism in South Korea is a form of regulated or controlled capitalism.⁸ The private enterprise system has been preserved in its basic essentials, but the government is not satisfied to stand aside while the impersonal forces of the market place largely determine the direction of economic activity and the allocation of scarce resources. A partnership has been established between public and private enterprise. The government assumes responsibility for the general direction and level of economic activity, while private enterprise meets the specific needs of both individuals and groups for various commodities and services. The collaborative guidance of welfare capitalism stands in marked contrast to the largely unregulated market guidance provided to private business in the model of theoretical competitive capitalism.

8. For general surveys of the Korean economy, see Choi Hojin, "Keundae 100 Yon Hankuk kyongjae eui sanghwang" (The 100-Years of Modern Korean Economy) Shindonga (New East Asia) No. 140 (April 1976): 128-141; Ju Jonghang, "Hankuk nongob kujo eui byonchow kwajong" (The Process of Structural Change in Agriculture in South Korea) Shindonga No. 140 (April 1976): 142-153. Wanson Tae, Development of Korean Economy (Seoul: Samhwa, 1972), pp. 3-37. Gilbert T. Brown, Korean Pricing Policies and Economic Development in the 1960's (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), pp. 15-50.

The South Korean market economy rests on two assumptions; first, that the means of production are owned privately and individually by the members of society; and secondly, that production is carried out at the initiative of private enterprise. However, the market economy in South Korea has a large public sector; thus, by law, there are no fixed boundaries between the public and private sectors. The magnitude of the government-controlled public corporations in the South Korean economy speaks for itself, as shown in Table VIII.2, but before 1961 there were only six government-controlled public corporations in South Korea. Since December 1974, with the exclusion of the banks, thirty-one public corporations, ranging from utilities to manufacturing, have been established. In July 1971, the capital assets of these public corporations were almost two trillion won, while the liabilities of these public corporations were 1.3 trillion won. The GNP of South Korea was 3.15 trillion won in 1971.⁹ Therefore, the total capital of government-controlled public enterprises was almost two thirds of the GNP of South Korea in 1971. The government also owns and controls practically

9. Korean Development Institute (KDI), Korea's Economy: Past and Present, p. 342. One U.S. dollar was equivalent to 373 won in 1971, Korea Annual 1974, p. 135.

TABLE VIII.2

THE GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
IN SOUTH KOREA

Name	Under the control of the Ministry of	Categories of Industry
Government Printing Corporation	Finance	Publication
Korean Reinsurance Corporation	"	Insurance
Korean Investment Corporation	"	Finance
Korean Stock Exchange	"	"
Korean Securities Financing Corporation	"	"
Korean Appraisal Board	"	"
Adjustment Corp.	"	"
Dai Han Textbook Printing Corporation	Education	Publications
National Textbook Corp	"	"
Agricultural Development Corporation	Agriculture & Fishery	Manufacturing
Agriculture and Fishery Development Corp	"	"
National Federation of Forestry Assc.	"	"
Korean Horse Affairs Assc.	"	Agriculture
Chinhae Chemical Corp.	Commerce & Industry	Manufacturing
Korean General Chemical Industry	"	"

TABLE VIII.2 - Continued

Name	Under the Control of the Ministry of	Categories of Industry
Korean Electric Corp.	Commerce and Industry	Utilities
Dai Han Coal Corp.	"	"
Korean Trade Promotion Corporation	"	Promotional
Korean Oil Corp.	"	Manufacturing
Korean Mining Promotion Corp.	"	Mining
Yongnam Chemical Corp.	"	Manufacturing
Korean Housing Corp.	Construction	Construction
Industrial Complex and Water Resources Dev. Corporation	"	Utilities
Korean Highway Corp.	"	Utilities
Korean Dredging Corp.	"	Service
Pohang Iron and Steel Corporation	"	"
Korean Tourist Service	Transportation	"
Korean Overseas Dev. Corporation	Health & Social Affairs	"
Korean Film Promotion Corp.	Culture & Information	Promotional
Korean Broadcasting System	"	Communications

SOURCE: Korea Annual 1974 (Seoul: Hopdong News Agency, 1974)
PP. 403-404.

all banks,, and loans are extended primarily to those investment projects which are complementary to the economic plan.¹⁰ The Korean economy remains a managed economy with varying degrees and forms of government control over trade, banks, the approval of foreign loans, agricultural price supports, and with a large amount of direct investment by the government.¹¹ The South Korean government started economic planning in 1962. Thus the economic system in South Korea can be classified as a generally capitalist planned economic system. More specifically, when one considers the magnitude of public sector ownership and the centralization of decision making, one may go further and categorize it as a planned, centralized, mixed economic system.

10. Thirty-one large corporations had outstanding loans totalling more than 30 billion won as of November 1, 1976. A handful of large corporations have received the largest loans. These corporations are primarily those enterprises engaged in construction, export, ship-building, chemicals, textiles, oil, and steel. Hankuk Ilbo, November 25, 1976.

11. David C. Cole and Princeton N. Lyman, Korean Development: The Interplay of Politics and Economics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 251.

The North Korean Economic System

The economic system in North Korea is the Communist command economic system.¹² The theoretical type of Communist economic system is constructed on the following assumptions: the absence of a strong central government and private property of any kind, and the payment of income according to "need",¹³ and not ability.

In practice the North Korean policy is different. For instance, Article 56 of the DPRK Constitution of 1972 reads "citizens...receive remuneration according to the quantity and quality of work done." The Communist command economic system in actual operation in North Korea today is characterized by a detailed form of national economic planning, strong limitations on the ownership of private property, the payment of income according to ability to produce, and severe limitations on consumer and occupational freedoms. A comprehensive economic plan

12. For general surveys of the North Korean Economy, see Joseph S. Chung, The North Korean Economy: Structure and Development (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1974), pp. 144-177; DPRK, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Democratic People's Republic of Korea (Pyongyang: FLPH, 1961), pp. 17-48; Joseph S. Chung, "Trends in the North Korean Industrial Enterprise: Control, Concentration and Management Functions," in Joseph C. Chung, ed., Patterns of Economic Development: Korea (Kalamazoo, Michigan: Korea Research and Publication, 1966), pp. 80-103; and Gerhard Breidenstein and W. Rosenberg, "Economic Comparison of North and South Korea," Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1975): 165-178.

13. Karl Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme (N.Y.: International Publishers, 1938, 1970 Printing), p. 10; and for a discussion of the issue, see V.I. Lenin, State and Revolution (N.Y.: International Publishers, 1932, 1974 Printing), p. 82.

determines the amount of capital accumulation. The main functions of the turnover tax are to raise the price of consumer goods far enough above their costs to cut consumer demand to the level of the available supply, as well as to generate the bulk of the state's revenue.

The economic system in North Korea is the command economic system. In this highly planned centralized Communist economic system, the state and the cooperatives currently own all resources of manufacturing, mining, service, and agriculture. The farmers own very limited plots of ground which are farmed by the individual families. The maximum family plot is 0.04 acres.¹⁴ The ownership of fruit trees, as well as the raising of poultry, pigs, rabbits, and bees has been permitted both for consumption at home and for sale at the peasant markets. The socialization of the economy was completed in 1958. The North Korean government had nationalized 1,034 formerly Japanese-owned industrial plants¹⁵ and the industrial outputs of the socialized sector accounted for 72.4% of the gross industrial product by the end of 1946 under the Act of the Nationalization of Industry, Transportation, Communications, Banks,

14. Joseph S. Chung, The North Korean Economy, p. 13.

15. Kim Il Sung, "The Nationalization of Important Industries is the Foundation of Independent State Building," Selected Works of Kim Il Sung 1970 ed., pp. 38-41; and for a list of the key industrial plants by Edwin Pawley, U.S. Ambassador, for the purpose of the observations of the Reparations Mission in Korea in 1946, see Edwin Pawley, Report on Japanese Assets in Soviet Occupied Korea to the President of the United States, June, 1946 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946), pp. 21-23.

etc.,¹⁶ enacted by the Provisional People's Committee of North Korea on August 10, 1946. The industrial output of the state sector increased to 91.2% of the gross industrial product (GIP) in 1963, while that of the industrial cooperatives accounted from only 8.8% of the GIP in 1963. The industrial output of the private sector decreased from 27.6% of the GIP in 1946 to zero in 1959, as displayed in Table VIII.3. The socialization of industry was completed in 1958, along with the cooperatization of agriculture. According to official statistics, since 1958 the agricultural output of the private sector has been zero percent of the gross agricultural product (GAP), excluding the agricultural output from the private garden plots.

Land Reforms

In South Korea, land reform was initiated after the National Assembly passed the Act of Land Reform on June 21, 1949.¹⁷ The former landowners were to be compensated

16. For the text of the Act of Nationalization, see DPRK, Foreign Languages Publishing House (FLPH), ed., On the Socialist Constitution of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (Pyongyang:FLPH, 1975), pp. 314-315.

17. Six Code Publication Committee, ed., Yukbob jonso (The Complete Book of Six Codes) (Seoul: Bobjon Press, 1974), p. 1732.

TABLE VIII.3

THE INDUSTRIAL AND AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT
OF NORTH KOREA (%)

<u>Industrial</u>	1946	1949	1953	1956	1958	1959	1963
Socialized	72.4	90.7	96.1	98.0	99.9	100.0	100.0
State	72.4	85.5	86.2	89.9	87.7	89.5	91.2
Coop.	0	5.2	9.9	8.1	12.2	10.5	8.8
Private	27.6	9.3	3.9	2.0	0.1	0	0
<u>Agricultural</u>							
Socialized	0	3.2	8.5	75.0	-	-	100.0
State	0	3.2	8.5	9.6	-	-	16.0
Coop.	0	0	0	65.4	-	-	84.0
Private	100.0	96.8	91.5	25.0	-	-	0

SOURCE: Adapted from North Korean Central Yearbook 1964.

NOTE: A hyphen indicates unavailable data.

TABLE VIII.4

LAND REFORM IN SOUTH KOREA

<u>Land Confiscated</u> <u>Owner</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Land Distributed</u> <u>Recipients</u>	<u>%</u>
Japanese gov't, Organizations & Nationals	30.89	Farmers	100.00
Landlords	69.11		
Total	100.00	Total	100.00
<u>Area in Chongbo¹</u>		<u>Area in Chongbo</u>	
869,667		833,881	

SOURCE: National Association of Agricultural Cooperatives, Hankuk nongjong isib yonsa, pp. 96-97.

NOTE: (1) One chongbo is 0.992 hectare.

for the confiscated land at 150.0% of the value of the average annual agricultural output.¹⁸ The government issued land bonds to the former landowners, which could be used as collateral on business investments, which were also guaranteed by the government. Recipients were to pay the same value to the government for the land over a five-year period, in installments. The government confiscated all land over the first three hectares with compensation in the form of land bonds. A total of 869,667 chongbo were confiscated, 30.89% of which had belonged to the Japanese government, various Japanese organizations and Japanese nationals, and 69.11% of which had belonged to Korean landloards (601,048 chongbo). (See Table VIII.4). The total confiscated land from the Korean landloards had made up 27.5% of all cultivated land in South Korea in 1949. Almost all the confiscated land (833,881 chongbo), which accounted for 40.2% of the total cultivated land in South Korea, was distributed to farmers over several years. (See Table VIII.4).

18. National Association of Agricultural Cooperatives (NAAC), Hankuk nongjong isib yonsa (A 20 Year History of Korean Agricultural Policies) (Seoul: NAAC, 1965), p. 95.

Even before the actual land reform laws, landlords began selling property to the farmers. In December 1945, 1,447,359 chongbo were rented, but by June 1949 it had decreased to 840,263 chongbo. During the land reform period, from 1950 to 1957, 470,022 chongbo of the 840,263 chongbo were confiscated¹⁹ and distributed to the farmers, while the remaining chongbo were kept by the farmer landlords. The economic resources of the conservative landlord's power base in the rural areas were thus greatly reduced in this period. The end result of land reform is shown in Table VIII:5. The number of households holding one or more chongbo decreased from 25.5% in 1947 to 20.9% in 1953, and, most significantly, the number of households holding three chongbo or more decreased from 1.4% in 1945 to 0.1% in 1953. Thus the large landholders were almost completely divested of their property in this period.

Compensation to the former landholders and payments by the recipients of land were not completed within the legal limits of the five-year period. In March 1955, the recipients had payed only about 43% of the total value of the property and in May 1955, the government had payed only 28% of the total compensation value to the former landowners. The payment by the recipients

¹⁹. National Association of Agricultural Cooperatives, op. cit., p. 99.

TABLE VIII.5

THE NUMBER OF FARM HOUSEHOLDS
IN SOUTH KOREA BEFORE AND AFTER
THE LAND REFORM (1947 and 1953)

Number of <u>Chongbo</u> owned	1947 %	1953 %
0.25	41.2	44.9
0.25 - 0.9	33.3	34.2
1.0 - 1.9	18.8	16.5
2.0 - 2.9	5.3	4.3
3 and over	1.4	0.1
Total	100.0	100.0
Total of Farm Households	2,172,435	2,249,132

SOURCE: National Association of Agricultural
Cooperatives, op. cit., p. 99.

and the compensation to the former landowners by the government was finally completed in 1965. Thus it took about 15 years to complete the compensation and payments for the land. In a market capitalist economic system such as South Korea, land reform has tended to weaken the land-based power elites by destroying their power base in the rural areas, although it has not simplified the social structure, partly because of the ideological base of private ownership.

In a Communist planned economic system such as North Korea, land reform had three important effects upon the economic resources, as well as political and social structures. First, land reform eliminated the sources of political funds which had flowed from a land-based elite to the opposition organizations²⁰ during the initial phase of state building. Secondly, land reform made available for taxation the revenue which had previously gone to the landlords in rent. Last, it simplified the social structure into one proletarian

20. The non-Communist parties were the North Korean Democratic Party which was formed on November 3, 1945 and was headed by Cho Mansik; and the Heavenly Way Party, which was formed on February 5, 1946. Yearbook of North Korea 1948-68, pp. 161-163.

class in a non-market and collective ownership. In 1946, 74.1% of the North Korean population was engaged in agriculture.²¹ Up to 1945, the distribution of cultivated land was extremely skewed. In 1945, wealthy farmers (4.0% of the farmers) owned 58.2% of the cultivated land, while the poor farmers (56.7% of the farmers) owned only 5.4% of the cultivated land.²² In North Korea, land reform started on March 5, 1946 and was completed shortly thereafter. The land reform in North Korea was carried out before South Korea had even started their land reform movement in 1949. The land reform in North Korea was initiated by the announcement of the Agrarian Reform Act of 1946.²³ The holdings of the Japanese government, organizations, and nationals were confiscated without compensation. Landlords who owned and farmed more than five hectares, those who leased out property, and the estates of religious groups which contained more than five hectares, lost all their land without compensation. It was then allocated to the peasants and state agencies without charge.²⁴ About one million hectares of arable

21. DPRK, FLPH, Facts about Korea (Pyongyang: FLPH, 1961), p. 9.

22. DPRK, FLPH, The Historical Experience of the Agrarian Reform in our Country, p. 8. But Kim stated different figures in 1947 and 1948. Kim Il Sung, Kim nichisei senshu (Selected Works of Kim Il Sung) (Kyoto: Sanichi Shobo, 1952), I: 217 and 114; cited in Lee Changsik, "Land Reform, Collectivization and the Peasants in North Korea," in Robert Scalapino, ed., North Korea Today (N.Y.: Praeger, 1963), p. 66.

23. For the English text, see DPRK, FLPH, Socialist Constitution, pp. 304-306.

24. Article Three of the Agrarian Reform Act of 1946 of the DPRK.

land, which constituted 53.0% of the total cultivated land, were confiscated,²⁵ and were distributed to farmers and state agencies (People's Committees), as exhibited in Table VIII.6. After the completion of the land reform, Article 6 of the DPRK Constitution of 1948 stated that the maximum land ownership could range from five to twenty hectares per household.²⁶

In the South Korean model of land reform, the government compensated the former landowners for the value of the land confiscated and the recipients paid the government for the land at the same rate. In North Korea, however, lands were confiscated without compensation, and were distributed free to farmers and state agencies. The maximum number of hectares which could be owned was set at three hectares in South Korea, and from five to twenty hectares in North Korea. In North Korea, no limit was imposed upon the acreage owned by the state and cooperative organizations, while in South Korea the government basically did not own any cultivated land.

25. Kim Il Sung, "The Result of the Land Reform and the Tasks for the Future" in Selected Works of Kim Il Sung, 1970 ed., p. 22.

26. For the DPRK Constitution of 1948 see DPRK, FLPH, Socialist Constitution and Jan Triska, ed., op. cit., pp. 242-253. In the mountain areas, a maximum of 20 hectares was allowed.

TABLE VIII.6
LAND REFORM IN NORTH KOREA

Confiscated Land Owners	%	Distributed Land Recipients	%
Japanese Government, Organizations, & Nationals	11.26	Farm Laborers	2.24
"Traitors"	1.32	Tenants without Land	60.32
Landlords	23.77	Farmers with Little Land	34.59
Landlords who Rented Land	62.13	Landlords Wishing to Farm in New Localities	0.96
Religious Groups	1.52	The People's Committees	1.89
Total	100.00	Total	100.00

SOURCE: Adapted from DPRK, FLPH, The Historical Experience of the Agrarian Reform in Our Country, p. 95.

NOTE: The total of confiscated land was 1,000,325 chongbo. One chongbo is 0.992 hectare.

The total number of hectares of land distributed was greater in absolute acreage in North Korea (about one million hectares) than in South Korea (about 0.83 million hectares), as well as in relative terms (53.0% of the total cultivated land in North Korea and only 40.2% of the total cultivated land in South Korea). When the land reforms were completed, the number of recipients farm households (724,522) which received land was 70.0%²⁷ of the total number of farm households in North Korea in 1946, and was 68.91% (1,549,532 recipient households)²⁸ in South Korea in 1957. Land reform brought benefits to the political leaderships of North and South Korea. Rhee Syngman in the South and Kim Il Sung in the North²⁹ benefited from the reduction of the power bases of competing political elites, and had their own power bases strengthened in the rural areas because of the land reform programs.

²⁷. Selected Works of Kim Il Sung, 1970 ed., p. 22. DPRK, FLPH, The Historical Experience of the Agrarian Reform in Our Country, p. 94.

²⁸. The figure is for the year of 1957. The distribution of land was finally completed in 1957. National Association for Agricultural Cooperatives, op. cit., p. 98.

²⁹. Kim Il Sung urged that during the land reform the KWP should recruit many new members to the KWP. The KWP was able to recruit 9,058 new members in several of the provinces between March 1946 and June 1946. Selected Works of Kim Il Sung, 1970 ed., p. 22.

Nevertheless, the types of ownership of cultivated land in both Koreas have changed since the land reforms. In South Korea, the limit to land ownership per farm household has been lifted because the government has come to favor the kind of large-scale mechanization possible only on large farms. In North Korea, on the other hand, a complete socialization of agriculture took place by 1958, and thus all cultivated land was held by state farms and agricultural cooperatives, in which farmers were compensated for their work based on both ownership of land and for their labor. Since 1962, however, the North Koreans no longer use the term "agricultural cooperative union." Instead, they use the term "cooperative farm."³⁰ In the "cooperative farm", the profits and compensations are based solely on labor, and the ownership of property is no longer considered in the distribution of agricultural outputs. In the "cooperative farm" system, there is a complete elimination of private ownership of land, except for the garden plots.

³⁰. For a discussion of cooperative farms, see Mun Woong Lee, "Rural North Korea under Communism: A Study of Sociocultural Change," Rice University Studies 62 (Winter 1976): 35-43.

Economic Development Plans

The commitment of the political leadership to economic development is the most critical non-economic factor in determining the pace of economic development.³¹ In South Korea, the military coup d'état of 1961 brought into power a future-oriented leadership that mobilized the nation for economic modernization. The government recognized that economic growth was the key to its own political success. The Park government, initially lacking any source of legitimacy, sought legitimacy through economic development. The political elite of the Military Government possessed a dominantly developmentalist time orientation.³² The Park government intended to actively implement economic development plans. Before 1961, there were several attempts to initiate comprehensive economic plans, as shown in Table VIII.7. Before the First Five-Year Comprehensive Economic Development Plan was implemented

31. Irma Adelman and Cynthia T. Morris, Society, Politics, and Economic Development (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967), pp. 224-226 and pp. 245-246.

32. Hahnbeen Lee, Korea: Time, Change, and Administration (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1968), p. 179.

TABLE VIII.7
THE ECONOMIC PLANS IN SOUTH KOREA

Plans	Year	Planner	Theoretical Model	Emphasis
3-Year Comprehensive Plan(Draft) ^a	1954-56	Tasca	Stability	-
Economic Reconstruction Plan (Draft) ^a	1954-59	Nathan	Balanced Growth Model	Agriculture, Fisheries & Mining
5-Year Economic Reconstruction (Draft) ^a	1954-58	Ministry of Reconstruction	"	-
3-Year Economic Plan(Draft) ^a	1960-62	EDC The Oregon Group	"	-
5-Year Economic Plan (Draft) ^a	1962-66	"	Unbalanced Growth Model	Electric Power & Agriculture
The First 5-Year Plan	1962-66	EPB	"	Agriculture, Heavy Industry, Exported-led Industry
The Second 5-Year Plan	1967-71	EPB	"	Heavy Industry
The Third 5-Year Plan	1972-76	EPB	"	Agriculture & Export-led Industry
The Fourth 5-Year Plan ^b	1977-81	EPB	"	Export-led Industry

LEGENDS: EDC: Economic Development Council;
EPB: Economic Planning Board.

NOTES: a. These plans were not implemented.
b. The plan was approved by the National Assembly in December 1976.

in 1962, there were six draft proposals which were never implemented. In April 1953, the Henry J. Tasca Plan was proposed for the reconstruction of the South Korean economy. It emphasized the stability of the economy.³³ The Nathan Plan was prepared under the supervision of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency.³⁴ The Nathan Plan was based on a balanced growth model. The plan proposed a rapid, but decelerating recovery with an implicit compound growth rate of 8.6% per annum. On the issue of industrial structure, the Nathan Plan emphasized the growth of primary production -- agriculture, fisheries and mining -- to satisfy domestic demand and meet the minimum necessary export levels. The program projected extensive import substitution to meet consumption.³⁵ The Nathan Plan was not adopted

33. Jo Sokjun, "Kihoik," (The Plans) in Lee Hahnbeen, et al., Hankuk haengong eui yoksajok bunsok, p. 409. For further details, see Henry J. Tasca, Strengthening the Korean Economy: Report to the United States President, June 15, 1953. (Washington, D.C.:Department of State, 1953), This report was classified until June, 1957.

34. Robert R. Nathan and associates, An Economic Programme for Korean Reconstruction (prepared for the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency, March, 1954).

35. David C. Cole and Young Woo Nam, "The Pattern and Significance of Economic Planning in Korea," in Irma Adelman, ed., Practical Approaches to Development Planning: Korea's Second Five-Year Plan (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969), p. 24.

by the Rhee Administration. President Rhee, who reportedly identified more with the Republicans than the Democrats of the United States, apparently concluded that the Nathan Plan would not help South Korea to obtain aid from the Eisenhower Administration in the U.S. ³⁶ Nathan was a Democrat.

Several ministry-level plans were drafted: the Five Year Agricultural Development Plan (proposed in 1955) the Three Year Livestock Plan (proposed in 1953), the Five Year Electric Power Development Plan (proposed in 1954), and the Industrial Reconstruction Plan (proposed in 1954). The Five Year (1954-1958) Economic Reconstruction Plan was a comprehensive economic plan proposed by the Ministry of Reconstruction in 1953. In 1958, the Rhee Administration established the Economic Development Council (EDC) which later drew up the Three Year (1960-62) Economic Development Plan, and the Rhee Administration finally approved this plan in January 1960. The plan followed a balanced growth approach. ³⁷

36. Joe Won Lee, "Planning Effects for Economic Development," in Joseph S. Chung, ed., op. cit., p. 5n.

37. ROK, Economic Development Council (EDC), Buheung sam kaenyon kyehoik (Three Year Economic Development Plan) (Seoul: EDC, 1960), pp. 767; and ROK, EDC, Three Year Economic Development Plan in Outline (Seoul: EDC, 1960), pp. 20.

After the Student Revolution of April 19, 1960, the Chang Cabinet drew up a new economic plan. The new Five Year Economic Plan was based on an unbalanced growth model, which emphasized key sectors (i.e., electric power and agriculture). The plan was approved by the Chang Cabinet in May 1961. The two above plans, which were approved by the Rhee and Chang Administrations, were rendered inoperative because of political turmoil (first, the Student Revolution and second, the Military coup d'etat).

The Military Government established the Economic Planning Board to control economic plan, budget and statistics. The Supreme Council for National Reconstruction approved the First Five Year Plan on December 30, 1961.³⁸ Since then, the EPB had drawn up four plans, as shown in Table VIII.7. The economic plans projected average annual target growth rates in the GNP of 7.1 % in the First Plan, 7.0 % in the Second Plan and 9.7 % in the Third Plan,³⁹ but actually achieved average annual growth rates of 7.7, %, 10.5 % and 10.9 %, respectively (see Table VIII.8). Most recently, the target growth rate of the Fourth Plan (1977-1981) is 9.2 %.⁴⁰ All four economic development

³⁸. For the details of the plan, see ROK, Economic Development Plan, Summary of the First Five Year Economic Plan 1962-1966 (Seoul: EPB, 1962).

³⁹. In the Third Five Year Plan, the target growth rate was originally 8.6 %. ROK, EPB, The Third Five Year Economic Plan, 1972-1976 (Seoul: EPB, 1971), p. 151.

⁴⁰. Hankuk Ilbo December 8, 1976, p. 4.

plans in the Park Administration followed the strategy of unbalanced growth. The First Economic Plan emphasized agriculture, mainly because the Military Government was sympathetic to the farmers and sought to mobilize support from the rural areas. The Second Economic Plan emphasized heavy industry and export-led industry, while the Third and Fourth Economic Plans emphasized investments for manufacturing industries. The basic strategy of export-led industrial development has been generally accepted throughout the four plans.⁴¹ Instead of emphasizing import substitution, most policy initiatives have promoted exports. A wide variety of export incentive schemes have been devised, and the exchange rate has been adjusted frequently and dramatically.⁴² Exports increased from \$390 million in 1962 to \$8,155 million in 1976 (1,991.0% of growth) and per capita GNP increased from \$87.00 in 1962 to \$672.00 in 1976 (672.4% growth). The average annual growth rate of the GNP has been 9.7% over the period of the first three economic plans (1962-1976), as shown in Table VIII.8. The value of exports exceeded that of imports

41. Cole and Nam, op. cit., p. 27.

42. Charles R. Frank, Jr., Kwang Suk Kim, and Larry E. Westphal, Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: South Korea (N.Y.: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1975), p. 2.; and Parvez Hasan, Korea: Problems and Issues in a Rapidly Growing Economy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), p. 57

TABLE VIII.8
A COMPARISON OF THE FOUR ECONOMIC PLANS
IN SOUTH KOREA

		ECONOMIC PLANS								
		First ^a			Second ^a		Third ^a		Fourth ^b	
	Unit	1962	1966	Avg.	1971	Avg.	1976	Avg.	1981	Avg.
GNP	1975 Value Billion Won	2,684.9	3,780.5	-	6,211.2	-	10,442.4	-	16,214.3	-
Per Capita GNP	US \$	87	126	-	226	-	672	-	1,512	-
Growth Rate of GNP	62-76:70 77-81:75	3.1	12.4	7.7	9.2	10.5	15.0	10.9	9.0	9.2
Export	Million US \$ Current Market Value	390	680	-	2,178	-	8,155	-	18,872	-
Import	"	55	250	-	1,132	-	7,560	-	20,242	-

SOURCE: Adapted from Hankuk Ilbo December 8, 1976, p. 4.

- a. The figures are the achievement of the economic plans.
b. The figure for the Fourth Economic Plan is the target goal.

for the first time in 1976.

In the Third Republic, the government greatly expanded the planning organizations at various levels, as shown in Figure VIII.1. First, a ministry-level EPB was newly created. The other newly established organizations were the Office of Planning and Coordination (OPC) of the Cabinet Secretariat, under the revision of the Governmental Organization Act of 1961 (Act No. 698) and the Planning and Control Office (PCO) in every ministry, province, city and county government.⁴³ In order to staff the newly created planning organization, 656 officials were trained in 1961.⁴⁴ Although the EPB has the overall responsibility for formulating an indicative economic plan, specific agencies were created for the actual formulation works. Those created for the Third Five Year Plan (1972-1976) were the Third Five Year Plan Deliberation Council, the Coordination Committee, the Economic Planning Working Committee and the Planning Teams.


In South Korea several factors have contributed to the rapid growth rate of the economy since 1962. The first factor has been the presence of developmentalist

43. Cabinet Decree No. 223 provided for the establishment of a Planning and Control Office in the Special City of Seoul, and Cabinet Decree No. 228 provided for the establishment of the PCO in every ministry.

44. Jo Sokjun, op. cit., p. 417.

FIGURE VIII.1

THE ECONOMIC PLANNING AND CONTROL SYSTEM
IN SOUTH KOREA



LEGENDS: —————> Control
PCO: Planning and Control Office

elites in the government, who vigorously implemented the economic development plans. The second factor has been the availability of sufficient numbers of trained workers. The third factor has been the investment of foreign capital. The fourth factor has been the development of export-led industry in South Korea. For example, the value of exports was 30.47% of the GNP⁴⁵ of South Korea in 1976. If the total investments in South Korea were financed solely from domestic savings, the average growth rate would have been only 2.9% in 1957-1968.⁴⁶ The actual growth rate of the GNP averaged 7.4% over those years, indicating that foreign capital played a crucial role in the South Korean growth rate.

The policy of rapid economic growth and development of export-led industry has not always contributed to sound economic development. South Korean economic growth in recent years has been impressive. However, this record was not achieved without creating some deeply disturbing problems. First, this policy caused regional economic

45. It is interesting to compare South Korea's data with the world average. World trade amounted to about 18% of the world gross national product in the 1960's. Karl W. Deutsch, "On Inequality and Limited Growth," International Studies Quarterly 19 (December 1975): 385.

46. Seung Hee Kim, Foreign Capital for Economic Development: A Korean Case Study (N.Y.: Praeger, 1970), p. 187.

disparities to persist in South Korea. The existing regional growth patterns cannot lead to the achievement of income equality among provinces or between urban and rural areas. In 1974, for example, the agricultural growth rate was only 6.9%, while the manufacturing and mining growth rate was 15.7%.⁴⁷ This leads to an increasing disparity between the economic life of urban and rural areas. In urban areas, the average monthly income per household member in 1971, 1972, and 1973 was, respectively, 7,133; 8,182; and 8,733 won; while in the rural areas it was 5,094; 6,269; and 7,003 won.⁴⁸ Urban-rural disparity is aggravated by the fact that the export-led industry growth policy leads to a centralization of the optimal and efficient locations of industrial plants. The policy of productivity tends to favor the urban areas such as Seoul, Inchon and Pusan and the areas around them.⁴⁹ The second problem under the policy of rapid economic development is the inequality of sectoral income distribution in South Korea. One could compare the Gini

47. Korea Annual 1975, p. 95.

48. Korea Development Institute, Korea's Economy: Past and Present, p. 365.

49. Bertrand M. Renaud, "Conflict between National Growth and Regional Income Equality in a Rapidly Growing Economy: The Case of Korea," Economic Development and Cultural Change 21 (April 1973): 443-444.

Indices of sectoral income distribution in different periods. According to the study by Taylor and Hudson, the Gini Index of sectoral income distribution in South Korea in 1960 was 0.17. South Korea ranked 16th among 52 nations in terms of sectoral income equality in 1960.⁵⁰ According to a recent analysis by the World Bank, South Korea still ranks 16th among 62 countries in terms of the equality of sectoral income distribution, with a Gini Index of 0.36.⁵¹ Even though the basic data

50. The countries ranked 1st to 15th were: Great Britain, Sweden, Israel, Australia, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Belgium, West Germany, the U.S., Uruguay, Japan, Denmark, Argentina, Austria, and Syria. Charles L. Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, Second Ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), pp. 263-265. For a discussion of the Gini Index, see Hayward R. Alker, Jr., Mathematics and Politics (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1965), pp. 41-42; Hayward Alker, Jr. and Bruce Russett, "Indices for Comparing Inequality," in Richard Merritt and Stein Rokkan, eds., Comparing Nations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 361-362. The Gini Index of inequality sums, for groups in the population, the difference between where a particular group is, on the Lorenz curve, and where the groups would be expected to be in the case of equality. The sum is divided by its maximum possible value, so that the Gini index ranges between zero (minimum inequality) to one (maximum inequality). D.G. Champernowne, "A Comparison of Measurement of Inequality of Income Distribution," The Economic Journal 84 (December 1974): 787-816; and Karl W. Deutsch, op. cit., pp. 381-398.

51. "IBRD Report Indicates Korea is a High-Ranking Country in Income Redistribution and Equality," The DRP November 1974, p. 25. The relatively equal countries, where high income brackets representing 20% of the population hold less than 45% of the whole national income are Great Britain, the U.S., Canada, Australia, Japan, Spain, Greece, Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand, Pakistan, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. See Montek S. Ahluwalia, "Income Inequality: Some Dimensions of the Problem," in Hollis Chenery, et al., Redistribution With Growth (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 8-9.

used in the two studies of the two periods are not really comparable;⁵² the recent Gini Index of 0.36 is greater than the previous index of 0.17. Although South Korea's rank has not changed, the inequality of sectoral income distribution of South Korea has become increasingly worse. The third problem stemming from rapid economic development has been the conflicts among political freedom, human rights, and economic growth. Central planning aggrandizes bureaucratic power. Local participation in developmental plans is not meaningful unless local citizens participate actively in the planning, as well as in the subsidizing of change through taxation. Planned economic development, in which the public sector is dominant, tends to imply centralized control and the curtailment of public wants to increase surplus value for investment. There appears to be some incompatibility between the policy of rapid economic growth and democratic political development. The weakening of political institutions (i.e., the legislative branch and the political parties) is a major problem because of the centralized bureaucratic power. This results in the weakening of the bases for democratic control over politics.⁵³

52. The data used in the Taylor and Hudson study are the sectors of industry (i.e., agriculture, mining, manufacturing, etc.) while the World Bank study used home economy tables.

53. Fred W. Riggs, "Bureaucrats and Political Development: A Paradoxical View," in Joseph LaPalombra, ed., Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 164-165.

North Korea has remained one of the world's most highly centralized and controlled economies. Since North Korea adopted a command economic system, the government has implemented seven comprehensive economic plans. During the so-called peaceful construction period, the one year plans of 1947 and 1948 were aimed at consolidating and raising the leading-role status of state-controlled enterprises. The plans emphasized only heavy industry and this strategy has continued in the seven economic plans in North Korea. All the seven economic plans have followed an unbalanced growth policy. A Three-Year Plan scheduled for 1951-1953 was scuttled because of the outbreak of the Korean War. The next Three-Year Plan (1954-1956) was claimed to have over-fulfilled the plan quota. The goals of the so-called Five-Year Plan (1957-1961) were actually completed by 1960, making it a de-facto four-year plan. Its aim was to complete the collectivization of industry and agriculture. The government only began to give priority to the development of light industry in the period from 1957-1960. The policy of the development of light industry continued until 1965. The Seven-Year Plan (1961-1967) became a de facto ten year plan, because of

the lack of foreign economic aid from the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, and because of a slowdown in the growth rate. In the period from 1966-1970, during the de facto Ten Year Plan, North Korea deemphasized investment in the agricultural sector and again aimed at the development of machine building. The Six Year Plan (1971-1976) emphasized qualitative growth and sectoral balances, and was aimed at the strengthening of self-sufficiency in industrial raw materials. In the agricultural sector, the plan has also stressed productivity through technical improvements.

The planners in North Korea began to recognize the limits to the growth of their economy after the Three Year Plan. Using the data on growth rate which the North Korean government has published in various sources, one can analyze the trends of economic growth. The average annual growth rate of gross industrial product (GIP) has decreased from 49.9% in the 1947-1950 period to 12.8% in the de facto ten year economic plan (1961-1970), except during the Six Year Economic Plan (1971-1976), as exhibited in TableVIII.9. The average annual growth rates of both gross agricultural product and national income (NI) ⁵⁴ have also decreased over the period of

54. The "gross industrial product" (GIP) in North Korea includes some elements of double counting, as when they count purchases for inter-enterprise production more than once. "National income" (NI) in North Korea

the seven economic plans. This can be more easily seen when one analyzes the data in relative terms. The researcher has computed an index of the slowdown in the economic growth rate, using the following computation formula:

$$\text{Index of the Slowdown} = 100 - \left(\frac{\text{current period growth rate}}{\text{previous period growth rate}} \right) * 100$$

Positive values of the index of the slowdown would indicate a real increase in the growth rate of this period in comparison with the growth rate of the previous period, and negative values of the index of the slowdown would mark a decrease in the growth rate. The index of the slowdown has decreased in all three categories (GIP, GAP, and NI) except during the period of the Six Year Plan (1971-1976). The slowdown in national income (NI) was the most dramatic among the three categories. The index of the slowdown in the category of national income from 1954-1970 had an average of -38.4%,^{5 5} while the indices of the slowdown in the categories of GIP and GAP were, respectively, -12.5% and -26.3% (see Table VIII.9).

is different from the Western national income concept. NI in North Korea excludes the capital consumption allowance and services not directly related to production and distribution.

^{5 5}. The figures for GAP and NI do not include the period of the Six Year Plan (1971-1976), because data are not available for this period.

TABLE VIII 9

THE AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATE
OF ECONOMIC INDICATORS
IN NORTH KOREA

Period	Plan	GIP		GAP		INDEX OF SLOWDOWN		
		A	B	A	B	GIP	GAP	NI
1947	1-YR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1948	1-YR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1949-50	2-YR	49.9 ^a	-	-	-	-	-	-
1954-56	3-YR	41.8	-	11.6	26.0	-16.2	-	-
1957-61 (60) ^b	5-YR	36.6	-	8.4	21.0	-12.4	-27.6	-19.2
1961-67 (70) ^c	7-YR	12.8	18.0	6.3	8.9 ^d	-65.0	-25.0	-57.6
1971-76	6-YR	18.4 ^e	14.0	-	-	43.8	-	-

LEGENDS: GIP; Gross Industrial Product,
GAP; Gross Agricultural Product,
NI; National Income,
A; Achievement,
B; Target of the Plan

SOURCES: Adapted from Joseph S. Chung, "North Korea's Seven Year Plan (1961-70): Economic Performance and Reforms," Asian Survey 12 (June 1972): 528; and DPRK, State Planning Commission, "North Korean Economic Report on the Six Year Plan (1971-76) Presented by the Statistical Board of the DPRK," Journal of Korean Affairs 5 (October 1975): 54-60.

NOTES: A hyphen indicates unavailable data.

- (a) This is the average annual growth rate of the period from 1947-50,
- (b) a de facto four year plan,
- (c) a de facto ten year plan,
- (d) data from the period of 1961-67 only,
- (e) data from the period of January 1971-August 1975 only.

The pace of economic growth in North Korea began to decline rapidly after the Three Year Plan because of several factors. First, a highly-centralized command economy may possibly be advantageous during the initial period of economic progress. However, these advantages are gradually counteracted by the shortcomings of the command economy as the economy grows and becomes more complex. When reconstruction was completed and a groundwork for industrialization was laid during the period from 1954-60, the North Korean economy would have had to shift from extensive resource exploitation to increased productivity, but diminishing returns from bottlenecked sectors began to increase inefficiency throughout the economy. In this stage, growth should have come largely from increases in productivity through expanded efficiency at the micro level. This has not been achieved. Thus the principle factor which determined the slowdown of the economy after the Three Year Plan was the low level of efficiency in productivity. Planning errors were the second factor determining the slowdown of economic growth in North Korea. Growth rate targets were set unrealistically high, statistics were inflated,^{5 6} projected needs were inaccurate, and the "wrong goods" were produced. The third factor

56. A speech by Kim Il Sung gives several examples of statistical inflation. For example, the Chairman of a village

was the high degree of dependence on foreign aid from the Soviet Union and China. Once foreign aid levels declined, North Korea's major source of capital investment for industrial development was sharply curtailed.

From 1946-50, total foreign aid for North Korea from the USSR in loans and grants came to \$546 million, while \$684 million was given in grants to South Korea by the United States in the same period.⁵⁷ South Korea had more than twice the population of North Korea, however. During the Three Year Plan period (1954-56) foreign aid made up 60% of the North Korean budget.⁵⁸

During the Three Year Plan period, the estimates of the value of foreign aid for North Korea run as high as U.S \$1.2 billion. Of this amount, the Chinese People's

People's Committee reported to the county chairman, who would in turn report to the province chairman that the village farmers had completed 100% of the autumn plowing. In another case, the village government would inflate the acreage claimed to be planted in the spring, and report it to the upper agencies, who would then try to collect taxes from the farmers based on the inflated amount. From a speech entitled "The Tasks and Roles of the Local Governments in the Current Stage," in Selected Works of Kim Il Sung, 1970 ed., pp. 198-199.

57. Korea Annual 1967, p. 187.

58. Vsevolod Holubnychy, "Soviet Economic Aid to North Korea," Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR 4 (January 1957): 19.

Republic provided 30% and the Soviet Union provided 50%.⁵⁹ Eastern Europe and Outer Mongolia accounted for the rest of the aid. During the Five Year Plan, which became a de facto four year plan (1957-60), North Korea received foreign economic aid worth \$1.428 billion; the Soviet Union provided 49%, the Chinese People's Republic provided 31%, and other countries provided 20%.⁶⁰ Data for the period from 1961-1975 are not directly available. However, following Kosygin's four day visit to Pyongyang in February 1965, and during the next five years, the Soviet Union stepped up aid for a series of industrial projects.⁶¹ In the last stages of the de facto Ten Year Plan (1961-70), the Soviet Union -- according to their own account -- assisted in the completion of fifty enterprises.⁶²

59. Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, p. 1211.

60. Charles B. McLane, "Korea in Russia's East Asian Policy," in Young C. Kim, Major Powers and Korea (Silver Springs, Maryland: Research Institute on Korean Affairs, 1973), p. 7. Jounghwon A. Kim, "Soviet Policy in North Korea," World Politics 23 (January 1970): 249.

61. Donald Zagaria and Young Kun Kim, "North Korea and the Major Powers," in William J. Barnds, The Two Koreas in East Asian Affairs (New York: New York University Press, 1976), p. 46.

62. Charles McLane, op. cit., p. 10.

By way of comparison, South Korea received U.S. aid totalling \$12.24 billion in the period from 1945-1975, according to one source.⁶³ Another source estimates a total of \$12.5 billion in the period from 1945-1970 alone. The approximate breakdown of this \$12.5 billion is as follows: \$3 billion in loans, \$4.5 billion in grants, \$3 billion in military assistance, and \$2 billion for the U.S. troops in South Korea.⁶⁴

The fourth reason for the slowdown in the growth of the North Korean economy was the Chollima movement which created chaos in the economy in 1959. Attempts to overfulfill plan quotas of the Chollima movement resulted in a sacrifice of quality for quantity. Finally, increases in defense expenditures were a great burden on the economy and forced the planners to decrease their capital investments.⁶⁵ In the period from 1963-1973, the North Korean

63. Gregory Henderson, "Korea: Militarist or Unification Policies?" in William J. Barnds, ed., op. cit., p. 165.

64. Gerhard Breidenstein, "Capitalism in South Korea," in Frank Baldwin, ed., Without Parallel: The American-Korean Relationship since 1945 (New York: Random House, 1974), p. 240. U.S. Senate sources estimated \$5 billion of U.S. military aid to South Korea for the 1949-1971 period. U.S. Congress, Senate, Korea and the Philippines: November 1972 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 24. U.S. News and World Report (January 21, 1975) estimated \$12.24 billion of U.S. military and economic aid to South Korea between 1945 and 1975.

65. Joseph S. Chung, "North Korea's Seven Year Plan (1961-1970): Economic Performance and Reforms," in op. cit., pp. 534-538.

government has allocated an average annual total of \$505 million, 13.9% of the GNP or \$42.67 per capita for military expenditures, while the South Korean government has spent \$256 million (4.04% or \$9.37 per capita). (See Table VIII.10). In absolute value, the North Korean military expenditures have been twice that of the South Korean military expenditures. In terms of the ratio of military expenditure to GNP, North Korea allocated about four times more than South Korea. In terms of the per capita military expenditure, the burden for each North Korean is 4.5 times more than that of each South Korean. In summary, North Korea has allocated more of its resources than South Korea for military expenditures.

Organizations for economic planning in North Korea have been in existence since the creation of the government of the DPRK in 1948. The State Planning Commission (SPC) is charged with the preparation of the two instruments of planning: the comprehensive economic plan and the national budget. The EPB of South Korea and the SPC of North Korea control the statistical compilations. The SPC has a core of 22 bureaus including the Bureaus of Heavy Industry Planning, Machinery Industry Planning, Light Industry Planning, and Agriculture Planning. The SPC directly controls the hierarchical organizations of the Planning Commission of each of the provincial and county local governments. The local planning commissions

TABLE VIII.10
THE MILITARY EXPENDITURE IN NORTH AND
SOUTH KOREA (1963-1973)

Year	NORTH KOREA			SOUTH KOREA		
	Military Expendi- ture (Milex) Current US \$ Millions	Milex /GNP (%)	Milex Per Capita (Constant US \$)	Military Expendi- ture (Milex) Current US \$ Millions	Milex /GNP (%)	Milex Per Capita (Constant US \$)
1963	280	12.12	33.20	158	4.19	6.62
1964	300	12.00	34.13	129	3.56	5.94
1965	350	14.00	38.13	112	3.71	6.42
1966	350	12.07	36.20	150	3.92	7.44
1967	470	15.77	44.93	185	3.91	7.80
1968	610	17.43	54.39	235	4.06	8.94
1969	615	15.37	50.79	293	4.06	10.07
1970	700	15.56	53.26	331	3.97	10.42
1971	750	15.31	53.10	401	4.46	12.53
1972	500	9.43	33.11	455	4.67	13.73
1973	625	NA	38.18	479	3.88	13.13
Annual Avg.	505	13.90	42.67	256	4.04	9.37

SOURCE: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
World Military Expenditure and Arms Trade 1963-1973
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 41.


on the provincial, county, and village levels, directly control the Agricultural Management Committees and the Industrial Management Committees of the corresponding levels, as shown in Figure VIII.2. The various state and cooperative enterprises are under the jurisdiction of the three commissions (Heavy Industry, Light Industry, and Machinery Industry), while the state farms and the agricultural cooperative farms are under the jurisdiction of the Commission of Agriculture.

In summary, the present chapter has been a discussion of the economic systems, land reforms and economic planning in the two Koreas. Acquiescence to the importation of foreign political ideologies by the political elites in a divided nation tends to affect the forms of ownership and the patterns of coordinating mechanisms (i.e., market or planning) in economic life in the early phase of state building. Although South Korea has continued to pursue the basic principles of the capitalist market economic system, the South Korean government regulates private enterprises through financial control, pricing policy, and the operation of government-controlled public corporations.

The process of industrialization has led to differences between demands and support-building in North and South

FIGURE VIII.2.

THE ECONOMIC PLANNING AND CONTROL SYSTEM IN NORTH KOREA



LEGENDS: CC of KWP, Central Committee of the KWP;
 CPC, Central People's Committee;
 SAC, State Administrative Council;
 S.Pl.C., State Planning Commission;
 Pl.C., Planning Commission;
 AMC, Agricultural Management Committee;
 IMC, Industrial Management Committee;
 SPA, Supreme People's Assembly.

Korea by increasing the discontinuities in rural-urban areas and in social stratification. The articulation of demands originated mainly from politically active members in the urban areas of both North and South Korea. The political elites in the two Koreas have looked to the traditional rural areas for support by stabilizing village life.

In a period of relatively rapid growth, there is apt to be a coalition between political elites and economic elites, with the latter group enjoying higher economic status, although deprived of political power; while the political elites are likely to become involved in corruption for their own personal and organizational monetary benefit. In the market economic system, such as in South Korea, this is especially likely when the political elites control the information on economic planning, and corruption is more likely to occur in South Korea with its system of private ownership and political fund-raising than in North Korea which has public ownership of property and public management of elections. ⁶⁶

⁶⁶.With respect to corruption in North Korea, it is possible for some officials to accumulate a large amount of wealth in North Korea. It was reported that Han Solya (former Minister of Education and Culture) possessed property worth 700,000 won (U.S.\$341,463) when he was purged. Robert Scalapino and Chong-Sik Lee, Communism in Korea, p. 886. For the remarks of Kim Il Sung on corrupt practices of local government personnel in North Korea, see Selected Works of Kim Il Sung, 1970 ed., p. 202.

The need for intensive control of all local resources in North Korea has varied with the decrease in economic aid from foreign countries, if one considers their ideological motivation to be constant. As a result of this declining foreign assistance, the socialization of industry and agriculture was accelerated in North Korea in order to meet the pressing need for the mobilization of domestic resources to take the place of foreign assistance. Meanwhile, in the same period in South Korea, (the mid-1960's), external aid has also declined, and increased taxation has been used to finance economic development through direct government investment and foreign loans. In the two Koreas, the greater the complexity of the economic structure and the mobilization of resources for rapid economic growth, the greater the likelihood of the subordination of the local administrative organizations to the local economic structure; the political leaders have reorganized the local administrative structures often in order to increase local initiative and productivity. In South Korea, the New Community Movement was initiated and was based on the concept of the Community Development Program, retaining the existing boundaries of the natural villages, but creating new economic functional organizations; while in North Korea, the villages were reorganized to conform to the boundaries of the cooperative farms.

The proponents of agricultural modernization, the development of consumer goods, and light industry were in conflict with the proponents of the development of heavy industry mainly for military use, and this conflict has led to political crises in North Korea, resulting in purges⁶⁷ of the competing elites. This kind of political crisis is more likely to occur in North Korea, under its policy of extreme autarchy and Juche (National Identity), than in South Korea, which follows the policy of the development of consumer goods industry and export-led industries.

The last three chapters have offered a comparative political analysis of the structural dimension of political life in the two Koreas. The author turns now to a discussion of the process dimension of political life in North and South Korea in the next chapter.

67. In 1956, the anti-Kim Il Sung faction, which included Pak Changok (vice Premier; Soviet faction), Choe Changik (Vice Premier; Yenan faction), Yun Konghum (Minister of Commerce; Yenan faction), Kim Sungwha (Minister of Construction; Soviet Faction), and others, advocated the development of light industry and attacked the one-man dictatorship of Kim Il Sung. The members of the anti-Kim faction were later purged. Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, pp. 511-513.

CHAPTER IX
THE PARTIES AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS

In the last three chapters, the analyst examined the political structures of the two Koreas. In this chapter he will proceed to analyze the process dimension of political life. Process refers to the activities carried on by political actors within the organizational framework of both governmental and non-governmental structures. It can be distinguished from the more stable and slower changing elements in a situation, which are called structures. This chapter explores the interactions between political culture and political action tendencies, from the "process" perspective. What are the differences and similarities in the political process dimension in North and South Korea? How do the political culture and the process dimension affect one another? To help answer these questions, the analyst will investigate factional conflicts and coalitions, party system fractionalization, the nature of the parties, the party process, and party policy (in the case of unification policy).

The Rise and Fall of Factions and the Development of Parties

Although a multi-party, non-dominant system tends to emerge in the initial phase in a developing country, such a multi-party system is likely to be of short duration. Party system fractionalization is likely to decline over time and lead to a hegemonic one-party system or to a one-predominant-and-one-half party system, either of which will tend to prevail if either of the following conditions hold:


- (1) an imposed party becomes a majority party, or
- (2) the imposed party tends to suppress the other minority parties.

In South Korea, the historical development of party politics can be divided into the following stages:

- (1) a period of confusion (1945-1948);
- (2) a period of authoritarian party politics (1948-1960);
- (3) a period of intraparty democracy (1960-1961); and
- (4) a period of development-oriented party politics (1963-date). (See Figure IX.1.)

In the period of confusion (1945-1948), a large number of parties and social groups were formed. A conservative group under the leadership of Kim Songsu and Song Jinu formed the Korean Democratic Party (KDP) on September 16, 1945. The members of the KDP have played important roles in the rise and fall of many conservative parties during the last thirty years of party politics. Over four hundred

FIGURE IX.1
 THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN SOUTH KOREA
 (1945-Date)



NOTE: * the ruling party of the period
 NARRKI: The National Association for Rapid Realization of Korean Independence
 ASC: Association to Safeguard the Constitution
 RRA: The Revitalizing Reform Association

parties and social groups were formed in this period; the elite groups were split and failed to achieve elite unity in this crucial period of state building. In the second stage (1948-1960), two major parties emerged. In an effort to muster enough parliamentary force to pass the constitutional amendment for a cabinet system, the KDP merged with the Korean Nationalist Party, accepted the leadership of Shin Ikhi (then Speaker of the House), and even changed the name of the party to the Democratic Nationalist Party. In later years the original leadership of the Democratic Nationalist Party became known as the "Old Faction." The other party formed in this period was the Liberal Party (LP). In the pre-election campaigning in May 1950, the pro-Rhee groups -- the Daehan National Party (led by Yun Chiyong and Lee Yin) and the One People's Club -- opposed the constitutional amendment for the cabinet system but supported an amendment for a direct presidential election, which had been proposed by Rhee, while the KDP advocated the cabinet system. Rhee's amendment bill was defeated on January 18, 1952,¹ showing that Rhee's support had declined substantially

1. ROK, The National Assembly, Kukhoi sokkirok (The Stenographic Record of the National Assembly) (Seoul: The National Assembly, 1948-date), Second National Assembly, 12th Session, No. 8, p. 4. (Hereafter cited as The Record of the National Assembly!)

since 1949. The opposition Democratic National Party and some independents gathered under the banner of a new negotiating group at the National Assembly, the Association to Safeguard the Constitution (ASC) consisting of sixty members. The Democratic Nationalist Party and the ASC formed the Democratic Party by merging with the Heungsadan Club led by John M. Chang (who became known later as the leader of the "New Faction") on September 19, 1955. The platform of the Democratic Party (DP) advocated:

- (1) the elimination of Communists and all other undemocratic elements;
- (2) a cabinet system;
- (3) a national economic system based on social justice and free from exploitation; and
- (4) efforts to maintain close international cooperation with friendly democratic nations.²

The platform of the conservative DP was similar to that of the KDP. Rhee announced his intention to form the Liberal Party, stating:

2. Central Election Management Committee (CEMC), Dehanminkuk jongdang sa (A History of the Political Parties in the Republic of Korea) (Seoul: CEMC, 1964), pp. 178-180; Pyongok Chough, Na eui hoikorok (My Memoirs) (Seoul: Omunkak, 1963), pp. 367-371; and Pyongok Chough, Minju jueui wa na (Democracy and Me) (Seoul: Yongsin munhwa sa, 1959), pp. 196-207.

The purpose of forming a new political party is to truly represent the farmers and workers, and to lay a strong foundation for our democratic nation. 3

Several pro-Rhee groups made up the membership of the LP: the National Association for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence (NARRKI), the Daehan National Party, the Korean Youth Corps, the National Youth Corps, the Republican Democratic Club, the One-People's Club, the Korean Federation of Trade Unions, and the Farmer's Association.⁴ The platform of the Liberal Party advocated:

- (1) that the party should be organized by farmers and workers;
- (2) that the party should uphold Ilminism (the one-people's principle);
- (3) that the party should uphold the principles of justice;
- (4) that the party should help achieve the welfare state; and
- (5) that freedom and peace should be maintained.⁵

The platform of the Liberal Party was not very different from that of the Democratic Party.

3. Donga Ilbo (The East Asia Daily), January 14, 1952, p. 1.

4. Pak Moonok, Hankuk jongbu ron (Korean Government) (Seoul: Bakyongsa, 1963), p. 529.

5. ROK, Central Election Management Committee, Dehanminkuk jongdangsa, p. 167; The Liberal Party, Jongchek chamko jaryo (Materials of Policy-Making), 2 Vols. (Seoul: The Liberal Party, 1959), I: 71-83; and ROK, Office of Public Information, Jongbu palnyon kan eui chijok (Eight-Year Achievement of the Government) (Seoul: Office of Public Information, 1958), pp. 1-33.

After the Student Revolution, an unexpectedly high number of Democratic Party members won seats in the House of Representatives in the election on July 29, 1960. Because of intra-party factional conflict within the DP, even before the general election of July 1960, the question of the division of the Democratic Party had become a subject of open discussion among some influential Old Faction members of the DP. Yun Posun, an Old Faction leader, was elected President by the National Assembly under the newly implemented cabinet system on August 13, 1960. The factional strength of the New Faction was first shown when, on August 17, 1960, the House of Representatives overrode President Yun's request that Representative Kim Doyon of the Old Faction be named as Premier.⁶ The New Faction's majority was slight, however. John M. Chang, a leader of the New Faction, won the premiership by obtaining 117 votes in the 223-member House of Representatives on August 19, 1960.⁷ Premier Chang of the New Faction failed to form a coalition cabinet with the Old Faction, so in the late Summer of 1960, the members of the Old Faction formed a new party, the New Democratic Party.

6. ROK, National Assembly, The Record of the National Assembly, 5th National Assembly, 36th Session, No. 3, p. 3.

7. Ibid., 30th Session, No. 8, pp. 5-6.

In South Korea's Second Republic, the political system could not meet the systemic overload it experienced. Party unity was shattered. The public security system was inoperative. The maximum participation of the citizens was encouraged, but the Second Republic's Chang administration failed to provide institutionalized communication channels.⁸ Different groups in conflict desired to convert their demands to outputs, causing a system input overload. This systemic input overload was worsened by the emergence of many "gatekeepers"⁹ in the political system. The incremental change model, which the Democratic Party advocated, could not produce authoritative outputs which satisfied any of the important power groups -- students, military, trade unions or intellectuals. Too many competing groups attempted to put their issues on the public agenda, and the demands of these groups often conflicted with one another. Thus, the Second Republic might be called the era of the outside initiative model of agenda building. The greater the number of gatekeepers, the greater the

8. For a discussion of institutional disequilibrium, see Elam K. Stauffer and Robert C. Bealer, "Institutional Disequilibria in the Development Process," Economic Development and Cultural Change 22 (January 1974): 265-278.

9. On the concept of "gatekeepers," see David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: Wiley, 1965), p. 90; and David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 122.

propensity for instability. A great deal of political freedom, which previously had been repressed, was now allowed, but the Chang Cabinet did not have the ability to produce the necessary outputs in the limited time available to them. The masses began to be intolerant of the low level of governmental performance in economic affairs and in public security. Stability for the political authorities requires something more than promises: it requires "outcomes"¹⁰ of government policies which satisfy the masses' demands.¹¹

On December 17, 1963, in the Third Republic, a presidential system was inaugurated under the constitutional amendment of 1962. The former military officers of the military regime formed the Democratic Republican Party (DRP), led by Park Chung Hee and Kim Jongpil. According to Kim, the party was to have two levels. The higher level was to be made up of the Secretariat, and the lower level was to consist of the party members of the National Assembly and the regular party members.¹²

10. David Easton also differentiates between "outputs" and "outcomes." See David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, pp. 351-352.

11. For a further discussion of the South Korean Second Republic, see Sungjoo Han, The Failure of Democracy in South Korea (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), pp. 178-206; and Se-Jin Kim, The Politics of Military Revolution in Korea (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971), pp. 26-35.

12. The Charter of the DRP, Articles 7, 17, 22 and 25; The DRP, Dangkyu jip (The Regulations of the DRP) (Seoul: The DRP, 1966), pp. 12-20; and the DRP, Minju konghwa

The original DRP consisted mainly of bureaucrats and the salaried class, centered around the military coup d'état group.¹³ It has been strongly influenced by business interests. The division and realignment of opposition parties in the Third Republic closely followed the pattern of the First Republic. The opposition civilian politicians started an alignment into two political parties, the Civil Rule Party and the Democratic Party (DP). The leaders of the three opposition parties (the Civil Rule Party, the New Rule Party and the Popular Party) attempted to form a merged group called the People's Party. In the course of negotiations for this merger, a serious dispute arose over the issue of who should be their presidential candidate. The Civil Rule Party (CRP) broke away from the People's Party and nominated Yun Posun as its presidential candidate. Later, the two major opposition parties (the Civil Rule Party and the Democratic Party) declared their merger to form a new party, the Masses Party on May 3, 1965. Before the general election in 1967, the opposition parties split again. The Yun Posun faction, which formed the New Korean Party (NKP), nominated Yun as their presidential candidate.

dang sayon sa (The Four Year History of the DRP) (Seoul: The DRP, 1967), p. 38.

13. The Democratic Republican Party (DRP), Minju konghwa dang sa nyonsa, p. 40; and, for a list of the founding members of the DRP in 1963, see the DRP, Minju konghwa dang sa (A History of the DRP) (Seoul: The DRP, 1973), p. 850.

The NKP also sought to achieve a coalition of the parties. A united opposition party in South Korea would bring about the establishment of a two-party system, and would consolidate the support of the urban voters¹⁴ who have been the strongest supporters of the opposition parties. After a series of meetings of the four leaders of the opposition, consisting of Yun Posun of the New Korean Party; Yu Chino of the Masses Party; Former President of the House of Councilors, Baek Nakjun; and former Premier Yi Pomsok; they agreed to the merger of the Masses Party and the New Korean Party. At the inauguration convention of this new party, which was called the New Democratic Party (NDP), on February 7, 1967, Yu Chino was elected party head and Yun Posun was nominated as their presidential candidate. The leadership of the NDP was an amalgamation of elements derived from the leadership of the Korean Democratic Party¹⁵ and traditional landed plutocrats. Since the formation of the NDP, it ranks alongside the DRP as one of the two major parties in South Korea.

14. For a further discussion of urban voters, see Young Whan Kihl, "Urban Political Competition and the Allocation of National Resources," Asian Survey 13 (April 1973): 366-379; reprinted in C.I. Eugene Kim and Young Whan Kihl, Party Politics and Elections in Korea (Silver Springs, Maryland: Research Institute on Korean Affairs, 1976), pp. 117-133; and Jae-on Kim and B.C. Koh, "Electoral Behavior and Social Development in South Korea: An Aggregate Data Analysis of Presidential Elections," The Journal of Politics 34 (September 1972): 858.

15. For a further discussion of the KDP, see Gregory Henderson, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex (Cambridge,

The evolution of the Korean party system was much simplified by the existence of only conservative parties. The party platforms of most parties in South Korea advocated representative democracy, capitalism and conservatism. The Liberal Party, at least superficially, had an extensive organization. It maintained a pyramid type of organization, consisting of national, provincial and county-level committees. However, in practice, the grass-roots had restricted access to participation in the decision making process and the party maintained a top-heavy structure. The National Committee's important positions were occupied by national assemblymen, as was customary in the National Committees of other parties at that time. However, the National Committee had little scope for independent action. The opinions of Syngman Rhee were undisputed. This was not because the party's institutions were faulty, but because Rhee's authority as Chief Executive and his authoritarian and charismatic personality made him unchallengeable. Another characteristic of the Liberal Party was that the party organization was bureaucratically arranged. The Democratic Party was not

Mass.; Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 278-299; and ROK, Central Election Management Committee (CEMC), Daehan minkuk sonkosa (A History of Elections in the ROK) (Seoul: CEMC, 1968), pp. 340-341.

much different from the Liberal Party in terms of party policies and its basic party structure. While the Liberal Party advocated a single strong leadership system, the Democratic Party advocated collective leadership and struggled against the one-man dictatorship of Rhee. The chief basis for the formation of most of the political parties in South Korea has been stimulation from above. The structure of political parties has been top-heavy. A common characteristic of most of the parties has been domination by an oligarchy. The major opposition parties, the DP, the NKP, the CRP, the MP, and the NDP, were formed as instruments in the struggle against the repressive ruling parties. The Liberal Party and the DRP were organized by former bureaucrats from the top. The other common characteristic of most of the parties was a highly centralized structure.

In North Korea, the historical development of party politics can be divided into the following stages:

- (1) the multi-party system (1945-1946);
- (2) the one-party system with a factional coalition (1947-1956); and
- (3) the Kim's circle one-party system (1956-date).

In the period of the multi-party system in North Korea, both Communist and non-Communist conservative parties were formed. After the Changan faction, led by Yi Yong (of the Korean Communist Youth Association) and

the Reconstruction faction, headed by Pak Honyong (of the Korean Communist Party Reconstruction Committee), merged, they formed the Korean Communist Party on September 11, 1945 in Seoul. The North Korean Bureau of the Korean Communist Party (the NKB of the KCP) was formed in Pyongyang on October 10, 1945. and Pak Honyong became the leader. Kim Il Sung made his first public appearance in Pyongyang on October 14, 1945. At this point, he was still unknown in public circles, North and South, but he was soon to play a key role in North Korean politics. Kim's rise to power was obviously manipulated by the Soviet military government in North Korea. Kim Il Sung took over the North Korean Bureau of the KCP on December 17, 1945, and changed its name to the North Korean Communist Party (NKCP). (See Figure IX.2.) Kim Il Sung became First Secretary of the NKCP and Ho Kai (a member of the Soviet-Korean faction and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) took the position of head of the Organization Bureau of the party. This illustrates the Soviet strategy, which was to place native Korean Communists in positions of the highest formal authority, and to place Soviet-Koreans or Russian advisors in positions of de facto power.¹⁶

16. Glenn D. Paige, The Korean People's Democratic Republic (Stanford: The Hoover Institution, 1966), p. 29.

Kim Dubong, a leader of the Yen-an faction,¹⁷ formed the New People's Party (NPP) which later merged with the NKCP to form the North Korean Workers' Party (NKWP) on August 28, 1946.¹⁸ The NKWP elected Kim Dubong as chairman and Kim Il Sung as Vice Chairman. The Communists in South Korea formed three parties between 1945 and 1946: the KCP, headed by Pak Honyong; the South Korean New People's Party (SKNPP), which was formed in July of 1946 and was headed by Baek Namun; and the Korean People's Party (KPP), which was formed in November of 1946 and was headed by Yo Unhyong. The three parties merged to form the South Korean Workers' Party (SKWP) on November 23, 1946. Ho Hon was elected Chairman and Pak Honyong and Yi Kisok were elected Vice Chairmen. Later the NKWP and the SKWP merged and were renamed as the Korean Workers' Party (KWP) on June 30, 1949. The KWP allocated key positions among the various factions which had united to form the party. Kim Il Sung was elected Chairman and Pak Honyong (of the South Korean faction) and Ho Kai (of the Soviet-Korean faction) were elected Vice Chairmen.¹⁹ Two parties were formed by the conservative, non-Communist leaders in North Korea from 1945 to 1946.²⁰

17. For a general analysis of the Yen-an faction, see Dae-Sook Suh, The Korean Communist Movement, 1918-1948 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 220-230.

18. For a general analysis of factions in North Korea, see Koon Woo Nam, The North Korean Communist Leadership

The North Korean Democratic Party (NKDP)²¹ was formed on November 3, 1945 and was headed by Cho Mansik, who was then a civil leader, the executive director of the Pyongyang Christian Youth Association and the Principal of Osan High School. Kim Il Sung reportedly urged Cho Mansik to organize a party,²² and obviously intended to mobilize the masses by using prominent civil leaders as figureheads and then taking over these organizations at a later time. These tactics were successful and the organizing of non-Communists into groups later helped the Communists to differentiate the Communist supporters from the non-supporters in the subsequent surveillances and purges of non-supporters. The NKDP was used to

1945-1965 (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1974), pp. 101-120.

19. Kang Indok, ed., Bukhan Jonso (Complete Book of North Korea) (Seoul: Research Institute of the Far East) I: 111. (Hereafter cited as Complete Book of North Korea)

20. For a further discussion of conservative parties in North Korea, see ROK, CEMC, Bukhan je jongdang (Political Parties in North Korea) (Seoul: CEMC, 1969), pp. 291-320.

21. For the Platform of the NKDP, see Kim Junyob, et al., eds., Bukhan yonku jaryo jib (Collection of Documents for North Korean Studies) (Seoul: Asiatic Research Center Press, 1969), pp. 596-597.

22. Institute of Communist Bloc Studies, Bukhan chongkam 1945-1968 (Yearbook of North Korea, 1945-1968) (Seoul: Institute of Communist Bloc Studies, 1968), p. 161. (Hereafter cited as Yearbook of North Korea, 1948-1968.)

FIGURE IX.2
THE COMMUNIST FACTIONS AND PARTIES




FIGURE IX.2 (Continued)

NOTE: The dates given are the inaugural dates of the parties.

(1) These groups were formed in South Korea in the pre-1948 period.

NKB: North Korean Bureau
 KCP: Korean Communist Party
 NKCP: North Korean Communist Party
 SKNPP: South Korean New People's Party
 KPP: Korean People's Party
 NKDP: North Korean Democratic Party
 HWRYFP: Heavenly Way Religion Youth Fraternal Party

SOURCE: Adapted from Complete Book of North Korea, I:97-225.

advantage by the North Korean Communist Party and the Soviet Military in North Korea. Several Communists became leaders of the NKDP: Choi Yongkon (Yenan Faction of Communists) who later became the Chief of Staff of the People's Army, Kim Chaek (a member of Kim Il Sung's Manchurian guerillas) who later became the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, and Kang Yanguk, who was a Methodist minister and maternal great uncle of Kim Il Sung. The NKDP had about 500,000 members in North Korea in February 1946. Disagreement between Cho and the Soviet authorities led to his arrest by the Soviet army. Cho Yongkon was elected the Chairman of the NKDP and the party was thoroughly reorganized. All Cho's supporters were purged. Later Cho became the Vice-Chairman of the KWP. In May 1956, Kang Yanguk took over the NKDP and all the local committees were abolished in 1958, because they had outlived their

function from the point of view of the Communist leadership. A second conservative, non-Communist party was the Heavenly Way Religion Youth Fraternal Party (HWRYPF), which was organized on February 8, 1946, the same day that the North Korean Provisional People's Committee was created.

The North Korean Communists and the Soviets needed to create a facade of a multi-party system. At that time the Americans and the Soviets were holding conferences in Seoul on the trusteeship of Korea and on unification. In these conferences they argued about the adequacy of democratic representation in the North and South. Political and social organizations had to be registered with the U.S. Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) after General Hodge declared that he would consult only with organized political groups.²³ Both North and South Korea needed to create a facade of democratic political organization. In March 1946, 134 political parties in South Korea were registered with USAMGIK.²⁴ Thereafter the number spiraled higher, so that in 1947 there were 344 political parties in South Korea.²⁵ When the U.S.-

23. SCAP, Summation of Non-Military Activities in Japan and Korea, No. 1, September-October 1945, p. 178-179.

24. USAMGIK, Summation, No. 6, March 1946, p. 2.

25. Grant E. Meade, American Military Government in Korea (New York: King's Crown Press, 1951), pp. 54-55.

U.S.S.R Commission opened its Second Session on May 31, 1947, 463 political parties and social organizations submitted applications for consultation,²⁶ of which thirty-eight were from North Korea. Many of the parties had no local structure or grass-roots support.

During the initial phase of the period of a one-party system with the factional coalition (1947-1956), Kim's circle acted to maintain a precarious balance ~~within~~ the factional coalition (New Kim's, Kapsan, Soviet-Korean, Yen-an, North Korean Domestic, and South Korean Domestic factions) but the latter half of this period was marked by purges of competing factions.²⁷

After the purges, Kim's circle completely controlled the KWP and the era of monocratic party politics in North Korea had begun. In the First Party Congress, all factions had one member in the Politburo, except for the Yen-an faction, which had two. But in the Third Party Congress,

26. U.S. Military Government in Korea, Monthly Summation of Non-Military Activities, No. 9, p. 16; and USAMGIK, Revised List of All Korean Political Parties and Social Organizations at the National Level under the USAMGIK, Ordinance No. 55, Seoul, 1948, p. 1.

27. For further discussion of the purges, see Complete Book of North Korea, I: 254-272; and Chong-Sik Lee, "Stalinism in the East: Communism in North Korea," in Robert A. Scalapino, ed., The Communist Revolution in Asia (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969), pp. 124-125.

the strength of Kim's faction increased and by the Fifth Party Congress, Kim's Faction completely controlled the Politburo of the KWP. (See Table IX.1)

TABLE IX.1
FACTIONS IN THE POLITBURO OF THE
KOREAN WORKERS' PARTY

Party Congress	Date	Factions				Total
		Kim's	Yenan	Soviet-Korean	Domestic	
1st	8/46	1	2	1	1	5
2nd	3/48	2	3	2	1	7
3rd	4/56	6	3	3	1	11
4th	9/61	6	2	2	1	11
5th	11/70	11	0	0	0	11

SOURCE: Complete Book of North Korea, I:105-108.

In summary, the structural model for factions in the two Koreas could be called "hierarchical factionalism" rather than "village-type factionalism" or "polycommunal factionalism."²⁸ This hierarchical factionalism operates within a highly centralized hierarchical power structure. The competitors for power are elites struggling for

28. For a further discussion of hierarchical, village-type and polycommunal factionalism, see Norman K. Nicholson, "The Factional Model and the Study of Politics," Comparative Political Studies 5 (October 1972): 292-295.

power within a highly structured, disciplined, organizational structure.²⁹ The rigid structure of political parties in the two Koreas has limited the routes to power to a single possibility -- through party positions. This kind of factionalism is characterized by vicious competition, frequent changes of mid-level office holders (if not the top leader), and purges. Issues and policies were secondary to the career aspirations of contenders for leadership. Another characteristic of hierarchical

29. The main factions of the Democratic Republican Party in South Korea were the Mainstream Kim Jongpil Faction (i.e., Kim Jongpil and Kim Yongtae) and the Non-mainstream anti-Kim Faction (i.e., Chang Hyongsun and Lee Hyosang) in the period of 1963-1967. There have been several splits and coalitions of factions of the DRP since 1967. The main factions of the New Democratic Party in South Korea in the period of 1975-1977 were the Lee Cholseung Faction, the Ko Heungmun Faction, the Shin Dohwan Faction, the Hwayohoi (Tuesday) Faction, the Jong Haeyong Faction, the Kim Yongsam Faction, and the Kyonji Fraternal Club Faction. Kwang Bong Kim, The Korea-Japan Treaty Crisis and the Instability of the Korean Political System (New York: Praeger, 1971), pp. 191-204; and Yi Kyongjae, "Sinmin dang eui dangkwon kyongjaeng," (The Struggle for Power in the New Democratic Party) Singdonga (New East Asia) no. 142 (June 1976): 96.

factionalism is the high degree of insecurity of status and position (even survival is in a state of doubt). This has been aggravated by the distrust between the competing elites and the absence of a consensus of the rules of the game.

Factionalism is related to the high level of social breakdown. This pattern of deviant behavior results from role insecurity. Security in the motivational sense is the need to preserve stable cathexes of social objects, including collectivities. Tendencies to dominance or submission, aggressiveness or compulsive independence can be interpreted as manifestations of insecurity.³⁰ The lack of consensus of rules of the game increased the level of distrust among the contenders. Thus, the strain³¹ among groups increased. Differences in background and experience also caused factional behavior, i.e., cleavages

30. Talcott Parsons, The Social System (New York: the Free Press, 1951), p. 261.

31. Strain refers to tension among groups which are built into the structure of social and political system. For further discussion of strain, see J. Siegel and A. Beals, "Conflict and Factional Dispute," Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 90 (1960): 110.

between political and military elites, and foreign-trained and domestic-trained elites.³² Disputes among various foreign-trained and domestic-trained factions have been more severe in North Korea than in South Korea. In divided Korea when the end of the independence movement suddenly placed the revolutionary elite and leaders of the independence movement in power, the revolutionaries, the leaders of the independence movement and the administrative technocrats found their groups under considerable stress. In the initial phase of nation and state building, factions provided a useful integrative function for the political community. However, there is a limit to the integrative value of a factional dispute. In both North and South Korea, the factions have been political structures which mobilize power and manipulate it for personal advantage, and are inept at providing a stable base for policies which might reduce basic social tensions. In South Korea, factional disputes have caused the frequent splits of parties, such as the division of the Democratic Party in the Second Republic and the rise of several opposition parties in 1963, while in North Korea, the factional disputes caused many purges of the leaders of the competing factions.

32. For a discussion of foreign-trained military in Asia, see Joyce C. Lebra, "The Significance of the Japanese Military Model for Southeast Asia," Pacific Affairs 48 (Summer 1975): 215-229; and John P. Lovell and C.I. Eugene Kim, "The Military and Political Change

Party System Fractionalization

In both North and South Korea, multiple parties emerged in the initial phase of state building but such a multiparty system was of short duration. In order to analyze the party system fractionalization, an index of party system fractionalization will be constructed. Multipartism can be measured by the degree of party system fragmentation based on the model of party system fractionalization constructed by Douglas Rae.³³ Vote/seat fractionalization is based upon the strength of each party rather than upon the actual number of parties in a political system. The Rae Model of party system fractionalization (PSF) is based on the probability that any two randomly selected voters will have chosen different parties in any given election. The model is derived from simple probability statistics. The values of PSF occupy a continuum, running from non-fractionalization in a

in Asia," Pacific Affairs 40 (Spring-Summer 1967): 113-123; Robert M. Price, "A Theoretical Approach to Military Rule in New States: Reference-Group Theory and the Ghanaian Case," World Politics 23 (April 1971): 398-430; and Dae-Sook Suh, "North Korea: Emergence of an Elite Group," in Richard F. Staar, ed., Aspects of Modern Communism (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1968), pp. 336-337.

33. Douglas Rae, "A Note on the Fractionalization of Some European Party Systems" Comparative Political Studies 1 (October 1968): 413-418. See also Douglas Rae, Political Consequences of Electoral Laws (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967); John K. Wildgen, "The Measurement of Hyperfractionalization," Comparative Political Studies 4 (July 1971): 233-243; and Douglas Rae, "Comment on Wildgen's 'The Measurement of Hyperfractionalization,'" Comparative Political Studies 4 (July 1971): 244-245; and

perfect one-party system (PSF = 0) to complete fractionalization (PSF = 1). The chance that two voters will have chosen the same party is equal to the sum of the squared decimal shares of the vote obtained by all the parties:

$$\text{Probability of Diadic Agreement} = \sum_{i=1}^n v_i^2 \quad \dots\dots\dots(1)$$

where V_i equals a party's decimal share of the vote.

The probability of diadic disagreement is the complement of this value:

$$\text{PSF} = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^n v_i^2 \quad \dots\dots\dots(2)$$

Because the researcher is interested in the party system fractionalization in the legislative branch, the value of V_i in equations (1) and (2) is given as the number of seats of each political party in the legislative branch. Thus the computation formula of the index of party system fractionalization in the legislative branch is:

$$\text{PSF} = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^n s_i^2 \quad \dots\dots\dots(3)$$

John K. Wildgen, "A Rejoinder to Rae," Comparative Political Studies 5(April 1972): 107-108.

where S_i is the probability of members being associated with the i^{th} party in the legislative branch.³⁴

The North Korean legislative branch is unicameral and five elections have been held in the period of 1945-1977. Only one election for the upper House of the South Korean legislature has been held (in 1960). South Korea has had unicameralism except during the Second Republic (1960-1961). Thus the present study uses only the data of the lower House of the legislature to compute the indices of party system fractionalization in the legislative branch in the period of 1948-1973 in the two Koreas. The summary of the data of the party and organizational affiliations of the assemblymen of the National Assembly in South Korea are shown in Table IX.2, to be used for computing the indices of PSF.

Table IX.2 displays the data of all major parties and independents at the time of the election results, which were published by the government. This table does not incorporate any subsequent changes of party affiliations, such as the numerous splits and mergers of parties after the election results were announced. In the Table IX.2, the category of "others" includes the parties which had three seats or less. The number of parties which nominated

34. Douglas Rae, "A Note on the Fractionalization of Some European Party Systems," op. cit., pp. 413-418.

TABLE IX.2

PARTY AND ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS OF THE
ASSEMBLYMEN OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
IN SOUTH KOREA (1948-1973)

Party	The National Assembly								
	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th	8th	9th
IND	85	126	67	27	49				19
NAKI	55								
KDP	29								
DYL	12	10							
KNYL	6								
KNP		24							
NYL		24							
NA		14							
LP			117	126	2				
DNP			15						
DP				79	175	13			
PSP						2			
CRP						41			
DRP						110	129	113	73
LDP						9			
MP							1	1	
NDP							45	89	52
PP								1	
DUP									2
RRA									73
Other	13	12	4	1	7				
Total	200	210	203	233	233	175	175	204	219

LEGENDS: IND: Independents;
NAKI: National Association for Korean Independence;
KDP: Korean Democratic Party; DYL: Daetong Youth League;
KNYL: Korean National Youth League; KNP: Korean Nationalist
Party; NYL: Nationalist Youth League; NA: Nationalist
Association; LP: Liberal Party; DNP: Democratic National Party
DP: Democratic Party; PSP: People's Party;
CRP: Civil Rule Party; DRP: Democratic Republican Party;
LDP: Liberal Democratic Party; MP: Masses Party;
NDP: New Democratic Party; PP: People Party;
DUP: Democratic Unification Party; and
RRA: Revitalizing Reform Association.

SOURCE: Adapted from ROK, Central Election Management
Committee, Daehan minkuk sonko sa (A History of
Elections in the Republic of Korea) (Seoul: Central Election
Management Committee, 1973), I:1083-1359, and II:410-411.

candidates in the elections are far greater than the number of parties which won any seats in the National Assembly. However the number of parties which nominated candidates decreased over time; The number of political parties which participated in the elections are as follows: 84 in 1948, 36 in 1950, 28 in 1954, 15 in 1958, 6 in 1963, 12 in 1967, 6 in 1971 and 3 in 1973.³⁵ In the computation of the index of party system fractionalization, the category of "other" (from the First to the Ninth National Assembly) was not considered as one group, but detailed information was used which the table does not show. However, the category of "Independents" is regarded as a single group, because Independents usually form a single negotiating group in the National Assembly. In the Ninth National Assembly, the ruling DRP and the RRA are regarded as a single group because the Head of the DRP, who is also the President of South Korea, directly controls the RRA.

The indices of party system fractionalization in the legislative branch were consistently high during the First Republic in South Korea (See Table IX.3).

35. Han Seungjo, Hankuk minju jueui wa jongchi bal jon (The Korean Democracy and Political Development) (Seoul: Bobmun sa, 1976).p. 243; and ROK, Central Election Management Committee, Daehan minkuk sonjo sa, II: 410.

TABLE IX.3

THE INDEX OF PARTY SYSTEM FRACTIONALIZATION (PSF)
IN SOUTH KOREA (1948-1973)

National Assembly	Total of Assemblymen	Total of Parties in the National Assembly	Index of PSF
1st	200	17	0.72
2nd	210	12	0.61
3rd	203	6	0.57
4th	233	4	0.58
5th	233	7	0.39
6th	175	5	0.46
7th	175	3	0.39
8th	204	4	0.50
9th	219	4	0.49

Of the nine National Assemblies, the First National Assembly had the highest index of PSF (0.72), because seventeen parties shared the two hundred seats. This clearly shows the multi-party system in this period in South Korea: the general trend of party fractionalization has declined as fewer and fewer parties have held seats in each succeeding National Assembly. In the Fifth National Assembly, the Democratic Party won 75.1% of the seats in the election, although the party split itself into two parties later. During the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth National Assemblies, independent candidates were not allowed, and the ruling DRP won a substantial number of seats. In the Eighth National Assembly, the opposition New Democratic Party (NDP) gained a substantial number of seats (89). Thus the index of party system fractionalization approached one-half, which indicates a two-party system.

In North Korea, five elections of the Supreme People's Assemblies were held in the period from 1948 to date. (See Table IX.4.) The pattern of decline in party system fractionalization in the legislature in North Korea is similar to that of South Korea. In the First Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) in North Korea, thirty organizations shared 572 seats. Of these, the KWP won only 17.8%. Twenty-nine organizations were facades of democratic representation, which were needed for the

TABLE IX.4

PARTY AND ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS OF THE
DEPUTIES OF THE SUPREME PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY (SPA)
IN NORTH KOREA (1948-1972)

Party	The Supreme People's Assembly (Year of Election)				
	1st 1948	2nd 1957	3rd 1962	4th 1967	5th 1972
KWP	102	178	371	442	531
SKWP	55	0	0	0	0
HWRYPF	35	11	4	4	5
NKDP	35	11	4	1	1
Working People's Democratic Independence	20	3	1	1	0
Healthy People's	20	1	1	1	0
Buddhist	6	1	1	0	0
People's Republic	2	2	1	1	0
Others	20	3	0	0	0
Independents	163	5	0	0	0
GFKRJ	114	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	7	4
Total	572	215	383	457	541

SOURCES: The First SPA: adapted from North Korean Yearbook Publication Committee, The Yearbook of North Korea 1948-1968, p. 125.
The Second SPA - the Fourth SPA: adapted from ROK National Assembly, Bukhan koiroi siljong jongchi pyon (Politics in North Korea) (Seoul: National Assembly, 1956), pp. 20-22.
The Fifth SPA: adapted from Editor of the Bukhan, "Bukhan choiko inmin hoieui oki daeeuiwon sonko," (Election of the 5th Supreme People's Assembly in North Korea) Bukhan (North Korea) 2 (February 1973): 121-148.

NOTE: KWP: Korean Workers' Party
SKWP: South Korean Workers' Party
HWRYPF: Heavenly Way Religion Youth Fraternal Party
NKDP: North Korean Democratic Party
GFKRJ: General Federation of Korean Residents in Japan

support of conservative groups in the initial phase of state building. Thus the index of party system fractionalization approached unity (0.901), as shown in Table IX.5. Thereafter the index of PSF has rapidly declined, approaching zero, which indicates a single-party system.³⁶ The facade of democratic representation by the multiple organizations has no longer been necessary since the Communist leadership has consolidated their power.

A significant phenomenon is that the two "fraternal parties," the Heavenly Way Religion Youth Fraternal Party (HWRYP) and the North Korean Democratic Party (NKDP) were allowed to have their members elected to public office. However, the local committees of these two parties have been abolished since Furthermore, Kang Yanguk, a relative of Kim Il-Sun, has been the head of the NKDP since 1962.³⁷ The General Federation of Korean Residents in Japan had seven members in the Fourth SPA and four members in the Fifth SPA. All of them

36. It is interesting to compare the indices of PSF of North Korea with the indices of party system fractionalization of other countries: Hungary, 0.71 in 1948 and zero since 1949; Bulgaria, 0.56 in 1948 and zero since 1949; Czechoslovakia, zero since 1948; Poland, 0.61 in 1948 and zero since 1952; and Rumania, 0.83 in 1946 and zero since 1947. Authur Banks, Cross-Polity Time-Series Data, pp. 284-292. These Communist countries also had multiple parties in their initial phase.

37. Complete Book of North Korea, I:211.

were officials of the General Federation. The usefulness of the General Federation has been recognized because the two Koreas have both competed to mobilize the support of Korean residents in Japan. South Korea has similarly coopted the officials of pro-ROK Korean resident organizations in Japan and some of these officials have become assemblymen in the South Korean Legislature.

TABLE IX.5

THE INDEX OF PARTY SYSTEM FRACTIONALIZATION (PSF)
IN NORTH KOREA (1948-1972)

Supreme People's Assembly	Total of Deputies	Total of Parties in the SPA	Index of PSF
1st	572	30	0.901
2nd	215	9	0.320
3rd	383	7	0.059
4th	457	7	0.059
5th	541	4	0.039

The Characteristics of Imposed Parties

The Korean Workers' Party in North Korea is more of an imposed party than the ruling Democratic Republican Party in South Korea. An imposed party is defined as a party which aims at substituting new goals for the one which are prevalent in the party or in a large sectors of the political system.³⁸ First, if a party is imposed and class-based, it tends to become a programmatic party. According to the Constitutional Amendment of 1972, the North Korean goal has always been to achieve "a complete victory of socialism in the northern half,"³⁹ but in 1946 the construction of socialism as the goal of the KWP was conspicuously missing from the platform of the KWP of August 1946. The platform of the KWP of August 1946 advocated land reform and the nationalization of industries. This platform and the declaration of the North Korean Workers' Party of July 1946 did not specifically use the term "Communism" or "socialism."⁴⁰

38. Jean Blondel and Valentine Herman, Review Exercises for Comparative Government (New York: Praeger, 1972), p. vii.

39. Article 5 of the DRPK Constitution of 1972.

40. For the texts of the two documents, see Daesook Suh, ed., Documents of Korean Communism 1918-1948 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 497-98; and Yearbook of North Korea, 1945-1968, p. 671.

It was the party rules that used the term "Marxism-Leninism" and "socialism," stating in the Preamble that "the Korean Workers' Party is guided in its activities by the theory of Marxism-Leninism."⁴¹ Thereafter the KWP advocated programs which were based on the revolutionary change by planning model. In South Korea, although the Inaugural Manifesto⁴² of the Democratic Republican Party of February 1963 declared that the party "endeavors "to accomplish revolutionary ideas and tasks," (referring to the tasks of the military coup d'état), the limits to the advocacy of programs show in its platform, which advocated the development of a "liberal democratic political system," which was based on the incrementalist change by planning model. Thus the DRP platform supported economic planning under the principle of the free market economic system.

The types of wants which were converted into political demands tended to depend on the image prevailing in the political culture of the purposes for which political process might be used.⁴³ In the two political systems

41. For the Rules of the Korean Workers' Party, see Yearbook of North Korea, 1945-1968, pp. 672-678; and Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee, Communism in Korea (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 1331-1349.

42. For the text of the Inaugural Manifesto of the DRP, see the Democratic Republican Party, This is the DRP (Seoul: The Democratic Republican Party, 1970), pp. 11-13; and Kim Pilju and Han Kwangnyon, eds., Naeoi jongdang jongkang jongchaek eui bikyo (Comparison of Platforms of Parties in Korea and Foreign Countries) (Seoul: Arim, 1963), pp. 225-228.

in divided Korea, the more the leaders desire the priority of stability and rapid economic development, the fewer are the fundamental rights in reality and the more the programmatic rights are promised but not fulfilled. The wants converted to political demands have been limited to certain kinds.⁴⁴ As displayed in Table IX.6, North and South Korea both promise fundamental rights, with the exception of economic rights to possession and use of property in North Korea. Civil liberties can be considered as the wants and demands. They can be considered either negatively or positively. Negative liberties are further subdivided into the protection against interference by the government, private individuals or groups. The former are divided into three types: political, economic and private rights.⁴⁵ Procedural rights are those having to do with the way in which government must proceed in dealing with substantive

43. For a further discussion of "wants" and demands, see David Easton, A System Analysis of Political Life, p. 104; and Stephen Cooney, "Political Demand Channels in the Process of American and British Imperial Expansion, 1870-1913," World Politics 27 (January 1975): 225-255.

44. For a further discussion of human rights in the Third World, see Rupert Emerson, "The Fate of Human Rights in the Third World," World Politics 27 (January 1975): 201-224.

45. Robert G. McCloskey, "Constitutional Law: Civil Liberties," in David L. Shills, ed., The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (N.Y.: Crowell, Collier and Macmillan, 1968), III: 308.

TABLE IX.6

THE PROMISE AND REALITY OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS:
THE WANTS, DEMANDS AND OUTPUTS

Liberties	North Korea		South Korea	
	Promise	Reality	Promise	Reality
I. Positive Rights				
Adequate Income	p	m	p	l, p-c
Educational Facilities	p	m	p	l, p-c
Health Services	p	m	p	l, p-c
Housing	p	m	p	l
II. Negative Rights				
A. Government				
1. <u>Political Rights</u>				
a. <u>Substance:</u>				
Voting	p	l	p	m
Political Candidacy	p	l	p	m
Political Discussion	p	l	p	l
Assembly	p	l	p	l, p-c
Organization	p	l	p	l, p-c
Petition	p	l	p	m
b. <u>Procedural:</u>	p	l	p	l, p-c
2. <u>Economic Rights</u>				
a. <u>Substance:</u>				
Possession and use of Property	n	n	p	h
Occupation	p	m	p	m
Buying & Selling	n	n	p	h
Contracting	n	n	p	h
b. <u>Procedural:</u>	p	l	p	l, p-c
3. <u>Private Rights</u>				
a. <u>Substance:</u>				
Life	p	l	p	l
Physical Liberty	p	l	p	l, p-c
Religious Belief and Practice	p	l	p	h
Artistic Expression	p	l	p	h
Privacy	p	l	p	l, p-c
b. <u>Procedural:</u>	p	l	p	l, p-c
B. <u>Interpersonal Rights</u>				
<u>Protection from</u>				
Bodily Harm	p	l	p	m
Economic Coersion	p	l	p	l
Libel	p	l	p	l
Discrimination	p	l	p	l
Involuntary Servitude	p	l	p	l

LEGENDS: In the Promise column: p = promise; n = not promised.
In the Reality column: h = high; m = middle; l = low
achievement; p-c = programmatic right.

liberties.

In North and South Korea, as shown in Table IX.6, the wants and demands for procedural rights are promised, but are only allowed at a low level. The procedural rights refer, here, to the security against arbitrary administrative action (i.e., illegal detention, coerced confessions, unreasonable search and seizure, and confiscation of private property); the security against unfair trial procedures (i.e., inadequate notice and hearings, denial of counsel); and the security against vague statutory prohibitions, ex post facto laws, and bills of attainder. In 1973, the South Korean government enacted a law involving the abolition of the pre-trial physical detention review system (habeus corpus).⁴⁶ North Korea has only achieved a medium level of liberties in five out of twenty-seven analytical categories, while South Korea has achieved a high level of liberties in four categories and a medium level of achievement in five out of twenty-seven categories. (See Table IX.6.) The rest of the categories were allowed only at a minimal level,⁴⁷ or were classified as merely programmatic rights in both North and South Korea. In

46. Albert P. Blaustein and Gisbert H. Flanz, eds., Constitutions of the Countries of the World (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1973), Vol. V, the Section on South Korea, p. 23.

47. See Article 53 of the ROK Constitution of 1972.

South Korea, the President has the power to take necessary emergency measures which suspend the freedom and rights of the people, and which are not subject to judicial deliberations.⁴⁸ Article 10 of the DPRK Constitution of 1972 states that the DPRK exercises the "dictatorship of the proletariat." The laws of the DPRK do not reflect the will and interest of all the people: only those of the workers and peasants, as stated in Article 17 of the DPRK Constitution. Thus, in the subject political culture, the wants and demands for political rights and procedural rights have not been allowed in the two Koreas.

Secondly, the degree of imposition in a single-party system varies directly with the extent to which the goal of the party is to change the values and norms of the regime. The control by the KWP over every sphere of North Korean life is highly centralized. The extent of

48. For a further discussion of human rights in the two Koreas, see U.S. Congress, House of Representatives Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations, Activities of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency in the United States (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), pp. 2-16; U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs and on International Organizations and Movements of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights in South Korea: Implications for U.S. Policy (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974), pp. 9-28.

control by the ruling party over the South Koreans is less extensive than that of the KWP in North Korea, simply because the South Korean bureaucracy plays a more active role as a control mechanism.

Thirdly, parties based on class are more likely to be extensive in organization than parties based on broad groupings. The Constitution of North Korea clearly prescribes that the "working class"⁴⁹ leads the country, relying on the ideological unity of the entire people. The membership of the KWP currently approaches 12.5% of the total population. Farmers made up 56.8% of the members of the KWP in 1969. "Workers and office workers"⁵⁰ made up 30.0% of the membership of the KWP in 1969 and the strength of this category has increased since 1953. (See Table IX.7.) The extent of the large organization of the KWP is shown in Table IX.8. The KWP maintained 20,620 committees, and 106,700 cells and subcells, and employed 58,822 full time salaried cadres at the time of the Fifth Party Congress.

49. See Article Two of the DPRK Constitution of 1972.

50. The office workers were about 11-12.5% of the total membership of the KWP. Kim Il Sung, Kim Il Sung jojak sonjib (Selected Works of Kim Il Sung) (Pyongyang: People's Press, 1970). Hereafter cited as Selected Works of Kim Il Sung, 1970 edition.

TABLE IX.7

THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE KWP BY SOCIAL GROUPS (%)

	12/1945	12/1953	4/1956	12/1969
Workers and Office Workers	30.0	21.0	22.6	30.0
Farmers	34.0	61.0	56.8	56.8
Military	36.0	16.6	19.6	12.2
Others	-	1.0	1.0	1.0

SOURCE: ROK Ministry of Defense, Army Headquarters, Bukkoi sa banseki bunsok (The Analysis of the 25-Year History of North Korea) (Seoul: Ministry of Defense, 1971), p. 38. (Hereafter cited as The Analysis of North Korea)

TABLE IX.8

THE KOREAN WORKERS' PARTY AND CADRES

Levels of KWP Committees	Number of Organizations	Cadres
Central Committee	1	4,357
Province and Direct Control Cities	13	3,243
Cities, Counties and Districts	213	16,324
Agencies	1,366	5,518
Enterprises	2,400	3,598
Villages and Workers' District	4,157	8,314
Social Associations	12,471	12,471
Cells and Subcells ¹	106,700	-
Total	127,321	53,825

SOURCE: ROK, ministry of Defense, Army Headquarters, The Analysis of North Korea, p. 44.

NOTE: (1) The number of cadres in cells and subcells are not shown because the cadres of high level organizations are concurrently the leaders of cells and subcells.

In South Korea, the National Committee of the Democratic Republican Party controlled 73 election districts of the national assemblymen and eleven intermediate level committees (nine provinces, one special and one direct control city) in 1973. These three level committees had less than 300 salaried, full-time party employees, as shown in Table IX.9.

TABLE IX.9

THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLICAN PARTY AND CADRES

Level of the DRP Committee	Number of Organizations	Cadres	
		(A)	(B)
National Committee	1	160	-
Province, Special and Direct-Control Elites	11	55	-
Election Districts ¹	73	73	-
Town, Village, Precincts	2,927	-	2,927
Voting Precincts	10,430	-	31,290
Total	13,442	288	34,217

SOURCE: The number of organizations and cadres in towns, villages and precincts, and voting precincts: The Democratic Republican Party, Minju konghwa dang sa (A History of the Democratic Republican Party) (Seoul: The DRP, 1973), p. 829.

NOTES: (1) The data as of 1973. The category (A) of cadres includes only the number of full-time salaried employees of the Party, estimated by the researcher. Category (B) of the cadres includes only part-time volunteers during the elections. The number of part-time volunteers and cadres for the three upper level committees are not available.

In addition, the DRP maintained 2,927 district branch offices in towns, villages and precincts, which had 2,927 volunteer cadres called "managers" during the general election of 1973. The lowest level cells were the offices at the voting precincts, supervised by 10,430 assistant managers. Assistant managers of the voting precincts were each helped by two youth leaders (one man and one woman) in each voting precinct. These youth leaders totalled 20,860. The DRP claimed memberships of 1,495,675 in 1963; 1,776,262 in 1967; 1,761,864 in 1971; and 1,124,955 in 1972.⁵¹ In a comparison of the DRP and the KWP, the KWP has maintained more extensive organizations than the DRP. The KWP has maintained party committees at enterprises and social associations, while the DRP has not. The KWP has organized a large number of cells and subcells, while the DRP has not. The DRP's organization heavily emphasizes election campaigning: thus the party mobilized large numbers of cadres in the voting precincts, but the DRP utilizes the local organization only during the election campaign periods. The KWP utilizes the local organization for a wide variety of purposes.

51. The DRP, Minju konghwa dang sa, p. 849.

Fourthly, an imposed one-party system which creates dependent associations, tends to be more stable than one which does not. Dependent associations are the network of auxiliary organizations connected with other groups, mainly communal groups, or with the political system which relies on those groups for support. The important dependent associations which the KWP controls include: the Korean All Occupational League (KAOL), the Socialist Labor Youth League (SLYL), the Agricultural Workers' League (AWL), the Korean Democratic Womens' League (KDWL), the Korean Literature and Artists' League (KLAL), and the National Unification Democratic Front (NUDF).⁵² The KAOL currently has 2.2 million members and controls sub-structures such as the Metallurgic Civil Engineering and Forestry, Transportation, Mining and Energy, Light Industry, Commerce, Education, Public Service, and Fishery Workers' Associations. The KAOL is the main vehicle of the Chollima Work Team Movement.⁵³

52. For a further discussion of mass organizations in North Korea, see Kim Hyonguk, Kongsanjueui eui hwaldongkwa siljae (Activities of Communism) (Seoul: Kwangmyong, 1972), pp. 850-951.

53. Complete Book of North Korea, I:216.

The SLYL has 3.0 million members and the SLYL directly controls the Korean Boy's League, which has 2.5 million members. The AWL has 2.6 million members and the KDWL has 2.5 million members. The KLAL controls eight substructures in such areas as the Writers', Music, Arts, Photography, Dancing, Drama, Movie and Composers' Associations.

The NUDF has played a unique role in North Korea. The North Korean Bureau of the Democratic Unification Front (DUF) in North Korea was formed on July 22, 1946 together with political parties and social organizations. On June 27, 1949, the DUF in North Korea merged with South Korea's Bureau of the DUF and named itself as the current NUDF.⁵⁴ As the united front for various groups in North Korea, the NUDF has presented the coalition slate for candidates in the general elections of the legislative branch. This organization is one of the major vehicles for the maintenance of the facade of democratic representation and for the propaganda about the reunification policy of the KWP. The function of the other minor "fraternal" parties is primarily that of enhancing the legitimacy of the NUDF. The KWP actually controls the NUDF. The Presidium of the NUDF consists of Kim Il Sung, Han Toksu, Kim Chanhae, and others.

54. Richard Staar, ed., Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1973 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1973), p. 495; and Rinn-sup Shinn, et al., Area Handbook for North Korea (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 230.

In South Korea, political parties have hardly created any dependent associations. In January 1959, the Liberal Party organized the Anti-Communist Youth League to mobilize the younger generation. After the Student Revolution in 1960 the party and the youth league shortly disappeared. In the initial phase, local chapters of the Democratic Republican Party were formed, based on the local organizations of the National Reconstruction Movement Council (which was a governmental agency for the community development program) but the council was dissolved after the DRP organized. In South Korea, the DRP, lacking an extensive power base such as the trade unions, has utilized the smallest unit of local administrative organization -- the neighborhood sub-precincts. Local small businessmen have usually been appointed to the non-paying position of head of the neighborhood sub-precinct by the head of the precinct. These small units of local administration have extensive organization. For instance, there are currently 277,106 neighborhood sub-precincts in South Korea (as of January 1977)⁵⁵ A neighborhood sub-precinct

55. Hankuk Ilbo (The Korea Daily) January 11, 1977, p. 3.

consists of about 20-30 households. The main official duties of the head of the neighborhood sub-precincts include playing the role of the sergeant of the Civil Defense Corps, distributing information on governmental policies and conducting various other official business. However, because the head of the subprecinct is in direct contact with the masses, he is one of the most important communication channels, administratively as well as politically. The heads of the sub-precinct have often been deeply involved in the campaigning in elections, as the infrastructure of the ruling party in South Korea.

Fifthly, a programmatic party is more centralized than a non-programmatic party. The tendency toward centralization in party administration is further reinforced by the centralized public administration in both North and South Korea. In a programmatic party, conflict between the program and democratic goals will occur and leads to attempts at compromise in the form of "democratic centralism," as practiced in North Korea.

Sixthly, the pervasive effect of the lack of consensus on the rules of the game in party politics has tended to decrease the party system institutionalization in transitional societies like North and South Korea. The

lack of consensus of rules of the game also causes the politics of distrust and consequently, "the lack of a bargaining culture."⁵⁶ Furthermore, the lack of consensus of the rules of the game among the party elites who are generally "authoritarian"⁵⁷ in their orientation toward the leadership role can be illustrated in political crises such as the revision of the Constitutional Amendments of 1952 and 1954, the revision of the National Security Act of 1958 during the Rhee Administration, the rigged election of March 1960, and the Constitutional Amendment of 1969, which allowed Park Chung Hee a third term as President. In 1952, because Rhee had lost support from many assemblymen, the Rhee supporters, recognizing that Rhee would not be elected President in the National Assembly according to existing provisions of the Constitution, proposed a direct popular election of the President.⁵⁸ The Rhee Administration forced the anti-Rhee assemblymen to appear in the National Assembly and vote for the Constitutional Amendment which Rhee advocated.

56. Chong Lim Kim and Byung Kyu Woo, "Political Representation in the Korean National Assembly," Midwest Journal of Political Science 16 (November 1972):649.

57. Young Whan Kihl, "Leadership and Opposition Role Perception Among Party Elites," Korea Journal 13 (September 1973):18; Hahn Baeho, "Kyunghyang dekan kyoljong e daehan sarye yonku" (Decision Making Process: A Case of Discontinuance of the Kyonghyang Newspaper) Bojong Nonchong (Law and Political Science Review) 11(February 1966): 78; and Yun Chonju, Hankuk jongchi chekye (Korean Political System) (Seoul: Koryo University Press, 1961), p. 275.

On September 6, 1954, the ruling Liberal Party submitted a constitutional amendment aimed at enabling Rhee to run for a third consecutive term. When it came up for a secret ballot vote on November 29, 1954,⁵⁹ the result was just one vote short of the legally required two-thirds majority needed for the passage of the amendment. At first the bill was considered defeated, but later a mathematical calculation was done which reduced the number required for the passage of the bill from 135.33 to 135.⁶⁰ Thus Rhee was made eligible for the election and he was reelected to a third term. The ruling Liberal Party, in 1958, advocated a revision of the National Security Act which would increase the control of Communist activities. However, the opposition parties claimed that it would be used to repress their political activities. To insure the passage of the revision, armed

58. ROK, Office of Public Information, Kwanbo (Government Gazette) (Seoul: Office of Public Information, 1948-Date) No. 688 (July 1952), p. 147. Hereafter cited as Government Gazette.

59. ROK, National Assembly, Honjongsa Jaryo (Documents for Constitutional History) (Seoul: The National Assembly, 1967), Vol. 4, p. 12; and ROK, Office of Public Information, Government Gazette, No. 1228 (November 1954), pp. 579-580.

60. For the details of this incident, see Lee Byongdo, et al., eds., Haebang 20 Nyon (A 20-Year History after the Independence) (Seoul: Himang Press, 1965), p. 716.

police were used to remove opposition Assemblymen from the main Chamber so that only the Liberal Assemblymen were present and were able to pass the bill.⁶¹

This an example of how the ruling party violated the existing rules of the game to achieve their goal.

In 1969 a similar case arose when the ruling Democratic Republican Party proposed the constitutional amendment which intended to allow Park Chung Hee to run for a third consecutive term. When it seems that a blockade of the National Assembly by the minority parties would preclude consideration of the bill, the ruling party simply avoided using the main chamber of the National Assembly and passed the amendment by meeting in the annex building of the National Assembly.⁶² The parliamentary rules were again violated by the party elites. There were also frequent irregularities in elections, such as the rigged election of March 1960 which caused the Student Revolution, and the rigged election of 1967 which caused student demonstrations and the closing of colleges and high schools.

The politics of distrust is related to a lack of consensus of the rules of the game even in intra-party activities. For instance, in South Korea, the leaders

61. Donga Ilbo, December 21, 1958.

62. East Asia Yearbook, 1975, p. 30.

of the parties distrusted the leaders of the other parties as well as the members of their own party. The NDP has had crises of succession twice within four years for this reason. In September 1972, for example, because of several factional struggles and the distrust of other competing elites within the New Democratic Party, the Jinsan Faction held their party convention in the Citizen's Hall, which was the officially announced site, while the Anti-Jinsan Faction had their party convention in another place. This created a split in the party leadership. A similar crisis was repeated after four years. In May 1976, the Kim Yongsam Faction attempted to reelect Kim Yongsam to the party chairmanship. The Anti-Kim Faction took over the official site, so the Kim Yongsam Faction held a separate convention. The proceedings of both conventions were voided by the Central Election Management Committee, however,⁶³ and later a new convention was held.

With respect to the ruling party, a typical example of the politics of distrust was illustrated by Kim Jinman (former majority leader) who was once one of the four powerful leaders of the ruling party, along with Baik Namok (former Party Chairman and Chairman

63. Hankuk Ilbo, May 26, 1976,

of the Policy Committee), Kim Songkon (former Chairman of the Finance Committee), and Kil Jaeho (Secretary-General), who formed the so-called the four-man control system in the DRP. Kim Jinman served for three year as an Assemblyman and vice speaker after President Park nominated him as one of the 73 Assemblymen candidates who were approved by the National Conference for Unification⁶⁴ in 1973. In 1976, when Kim Jinman was not nominated as a candidate for the National Assembly by the President, he was disgraced and must have felt personal insecurity. In an attempt to leave the country, he later was arrested in a Airport near Seoul and charged with illegal possession of foreign currency.⁶⁵ This is another example of the politics of distrust on the personal level. In North Korea the lack of consensus of rules of the game in the political process could be seen in such political crises as the purges of the North Korean Domestic faction (i.e., Oh Kisob), the South Korean Domestic faction (i.e., Pak Honyong), the Soviet-Korean faction (i.e., Pak Changok), and the Yanan faction (i.e., Mujong and Kim Dubong).⁶⁶

64. Under Article 40 of the ROK Constitution of 1972, the President of the ROK recommends in-group candidates (73) for membership in the National Assmebly and the NCU approves the slate. This group of Assemblymen form the Revitalizing Reform Association.

65. Shinhan Minbo (The New Korea) (Los Angeles) September 23, 1976, p. 1.

66. For a further discussion of purges, see

Party Processes

Evolving from a common cultural past, the two divergent political entities, North and South Korea, display a different set of characteristics that are closely associated with the nature of their party systems, as displayed in Table IX.10. The variables of political

TABLE IX.10

THE PARTY SYSTEM AND POLITICAL PROCESS

Variables of Political Process	One-party and Hegemonic System of North Korea	One-and-one-half Party system of South Korea
Functionl Scope	Omni-functional system	Electoral function
Decision Making	Closed type, Democratic Centralism	Authoritarian type
Goal-Attaining Pattern	Revolutionary Pattern	Incrementalist Pattern
Agenda Building	Mobilization Model	Mobilization Model

Yearbook of North Korea, 1948-1968, pp. 168-194;
and Complete Book of North Korea, I: 254-272.

process include the functional scope, the decision making process, the goal-attaining pattern and the agenda-building pattern. The party in North Korea is an omnifunctional system with a high level of politicization and is a system in which there is no sharing of responsibility for social function between the KWP and other social structures.

Political parties in South Korea are close to the "rational-efficient model" in terms of the manifest functions,⁶⁷ because they concentrate on the party's basic electoral function. In South Korea, the political parties are primarily concerned with electoral function and recruitment rather than other functions such as political socialization, goal specification, and goal attainment.⁶⁸ In both the North and South, the leaders alone have selected the candidates for the legislative branch. The members of the local chapters have no participation in the nominating process. There

67. For a further discussion of the rational-efficient model, see William E. Wright, "Comparative Party Models: Rational-Efficient and Party Democracy," in William E. Wright, ed., A Comparative Study of Party Organization (Columbus, Ohio: Merrill, 1971), p. 52.

68. Y.C. Han, "Political Parties and Elections in South Korea," in Se-Jin Kim and Chang-Hyun Cho, eds., Government and Politics in Korea (Silver Spring, Maryland: Research Institute on Korean Affairs, 1972), p. 143.

have been no direct primary elections comparable to the American primary elections.⁶⁹ For instance, even Article 48 of the Rules of the ruling DRP states that "the recommendation of electoral district candidates for the National Assembly ... shall be determined by the Party Administration Council ..."⁷⁰ The absence of local participation and control over the candidate selection process for the deputies of the legislative branch have directly affected the further centralization of party administration and "the oligarchical tendencies" of organization.⁷¹ The centralized control of party finance and campaign funds also have directly affected the centralization of party administration and have led to the concentration of power in the hands of elite in the National Committees of the South Korean political parties. Thus both the DRP and KWP lack

69. For a further discussion of candidate selection methods in the American primary elections and in other countries, see Leon D. Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies (New York: Praeger, 1967), pp. 201-232.

70. The Democratic Republican Party, The DRP, Republic of Korea (Seoul: the DRP, 1965), p. 87.

71. See Robert Michels, Political Parties, trans. Eden and Cedar Paul (New York: the Free Press, 1962), pp. 333-363.

democratic legitimacy.⁷² The crisis of participation was accompanied by crises in legitimacy.⁷³

Political funds, which are funneled through the Central Election Management Committee (CEMC) by private enterprises, are distributed only to the National Committees of the parties.⁷⁴ Because they were election years, greater amount of political funds were donated in 1967 and 1973 than in 1966, 1968, 1971 and 1972. (See Table IX.11). These political funds were not even enough to cover annual expenditures for the full-time salaried party employees in the national committee of

72. This argument is put forward mainly by the proponents of the party democracy model (such as Neuman and Duverger) against the rational-efficient model of parties (i.e., James Wilson, Leon Epstein and Anthony Downs). See Sigmund Neuman, "Toward a Comparative Study of Political Parties," in Sigmund Neuman, ed., Modern Political Parties (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 395-421; Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, trans. Barbara and Robert North (London: Methuen, 1954); James Q. Wilson, The Amateur Democrat (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962); Leon D. Epstein, op. cit.; and Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1957).

73. Myron Weiner and Joseph LaPalombara, "The Impact of Parties on Political Development," in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, eds., Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 428.

74. The Political Funds Act of 1962 provides the authority for the CEMC (a governmental agency) to collect and distribute political funds.

TABLE IX.11

THE POLITICAL FUNDS FUNNELED THROUGH
THE CENTRAL ELECTION MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE
TO POLITICAL PARTIES IN SOUTH KOREA
(in 1,000 won)

Party	1966	1967	1968	1971	1972	1973
DRP	29,961	85,728	32,502	16,001	14	122,768
NDP	-	65,281	31,500	14,001	9	90,741
MP	15,941	-	-	-	-	-
DP	-	506	1,500	500	-	-
JP	108	-	-	-	-	-
KIP	108	-	-	-	-	-
RRA	-	-	-	-	-	79,595
IND	-	-	-	-	-	13,404
DUP	-	-	-	-	-	3,490
Total	46,118	151,515	65,502	30,502	23	309,998

SOURCE: Jungang Ilbo (The Central Daily),
December 26, 1975.

NOTES: DRP: The ruling Democratic Republican Party;
NDP: the New Democratic Party; MP: the Masses Party;
DP: the Daejung Party; JP: the Justice Party;
KIP: the Korean Independence Party;
RRA: the Revitalizing Reform Association;
IND: Independents; DUP: the Democratic Unification Party.
The figures included only the amounts donated by private enterprises funneled through the Central Election Management Committee. There were no private enterprises' donations funneled through the governmental agency in 1974 and 1975. The data for 1976 are not available.

of the parties. ⁷⁵

75. In 1975, the DRP reportedly spent 50 million won while the NDP spent 5 million won a month just to maintain their professional staffs and other general office expenses. Jungang Ilbo (the Central Daily) December 26, 1975. In 1969, the revenue of the KWP was estimated at 304 million North Korean won: 20.0% from party membership fees, 67.6% from the profits of party publications and 12.4% from the state revenue. See ROK, Ministry of Defense, Army Headquarters, The Analysis of North Korea, p. 776. Party publications are distributed to

Decision making processes in North Korea can be characterized as having a high degree of overlapping roles and as a closed system, operating under the principles of democratic centralism. Although the decision making process in South Korea has undergone a gradual change from a monolithic, centralized and authoritarian system to pluralization and specialization,⁷⁶ the changes have had minimal impact. The distinction between the revolutionary and the incremental seems applicable to the goal-attaining patterns in North and South Korea. The Revolutionary Change by Planning Model of ideology of the North Korean leaders and Incrementalist Change by Planning Model of the South Korean leadership have directly determined the respective goal-attaining patterns.⁷⁷

Agenda building is the process through which demands of various groups in a population are translated into issues which vie for the attention of decision makers

all party members and organizations and the subscription fees are automatically deducted from their pay.

76. For further discussion of decision making, see Susan K. Purcell, "Decision-Making in an Authoritarian Regime: Theoretical Implications from a Mexican Case Study," World Politics 26 (October 1973): 28-54.

77. For example, for the politics of disjointed incrementalism, see the platform of the ruling Democratic Republican Party, and its achievement and unfulfilled planks, which were described by the opposition New Democratic Party, in The New Democratic Party, 1967 nyondo jongchi hwaldong kaehwang boko (The Report of Political Activities, 1967) (Seoul: The New Democratic Party, 1967), pp. 159-234.

(formal agenda) or the public (public agenda).⁷⁸

Agenda building in both North and South Korea could be studied by using the mobilization model. In North and South Korea, the issues are usually placed on the formal agenda by the political leaders who subsequently attempt to expand these issues to the public agenda to obtain the support required for implementation of policies. In South Korea, any groups with minimal prior access to decision makers hope to reach the formal agenda but rarely succeed; thus the outside initiation model is inoperative in South Korea.

78. Roger W. Cobb, Jennie Keith Ross, and Marc H. Ross, "Agenda Building as a Comparative Political Process," American Political Science Review 70 (March 1976): 126. For other discussion of agenda building and decision making, see Nelson W. Polsby, "Policy Initiation in the American Political System," in Irving L. Horowitz, ed., The Use and Abuse of Social Science (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1971), pp. 296-308; Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, "Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics," in Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, eds., Foreign Policy Decision-Making (Glencoe, Ill.: the Free Press, 1962), pp. 14-185; Charles E. Lindblom, The Policy-making Process (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), pp. 28-100; David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision (New York: Free Press, 1963), pp. 81-110; Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, Power and Poverty: Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 51-63; Yehezkel Dror, Public Policymaking Reexamined (San Francisco: Chandler, 1968), pp. 163-196; Charles Roig, "Some Theoretical Problems in Decision-Making Studies," in Dusan Sidjanski, eds., Political Decision-Making Process (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc., 1973), pp. 19-54.

However, some power groups (such as the big corporate conglomerates in South Korea and the military in both North and South Korea) having close contact with the leaders, often succeed in placing issues on the formal agenda directly. Thus they do not have to put their demands on the public agenda.

Party and Party Policy:
A Case Study of Unification Policy

The unification of divided Korea has been the long-standing hope of the Korean people. Thus the unification policy has been a major concern of political parties in the two Koreas. Because the Koreans maintained a unified nation on the Korean Peninsula for 1242 years,⁷⁹ reunification is an irrepressible aspiration for the Koreans. Conflict in the Korean Peninsula has persisted since the Korean division in 1945, however. The research will briefly examine conflict behavior from the perspective of conflict theory and will then analyze the current policies of unification in North and South Korea.

79. The three periods of unified Korea are as follows: Unified Silla (668-918 A.D.), Koryeo (918 - 1392 A.D.) and Yi (1392 - 1910 A.D.). See Richard Rutt, James S. Gale and His History of the Korean People (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972), pp. 121-314.

Conflict has served to establish and maintain the identity and boundary lines of societies in the era of Cold War especially in Divided Korea. Conflict refers to behavior in which different parties seek objectives which they do not plan to share.⁸⁰ Direct conflict between the political systems in a divided nation tends to increase the cohesiveness of an in-group.⁸¹ The Korean War provided an opportunity for the mobilization of tangible and intangible resources of in-groups. The Korean War also provided an opportunity for individuals to relocate based on their political beliefs, with anti-Communists going South and pro-Communists going North. Three million refugees fled to the South, while few went north. The entire southern Communist apparatus also surfaced during the direct conflict and was later purged. Conflict with another sector generally leads to the mobilization of the resources of group members and hence to increased cohesion of the in-group, so conflict serves to remove dissociating elements in a relationship and to reestablish unity. The socialization of aggression takes place in all human societies, and it serves to attenuate hostile action among members of the in-group by directing

80. Michael Haas, "International Conflict Resolution," in Michael Haas, ed., International Systems (New York: Chandler, 1974), p.348. A dispute is defined as a specific issue in a conflict.

81. For a further analysis of the Korean War, see Glenn D. Paige, The Korean Decision (New York: the Free Press, 1968), pp. 79-100. For the revisionist view, see Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), pp. 565-617.

aggressive impulses against an out-group.⁸²

Conflict resolves tension between antagonists. It has a stabilizing function and becomes an integrating component in the relationships between groups, as between the sectors of divided Korea. However, not all conflicts are positively functional for these relationships: only those which concerns goods, values or interests that do not contradict the basic assumptions upon which the relationship is founded. Conflicts in which the participants feel that they are the representatives of collectivities and groups, fighting not for self but only for the ideas of the groups they represent, are likely to be more radical than those which are fought for personal reasons.⁸³ In this context, a confrontation between the two different ideologies (liberal democracy and free market capitalism in South Korea against Communism in North Korea) could not reduce the intensity of conflict between the two Koreas.

Although groups in absolute conflict can have no

82. Dollard and Dobb analyze conflict using the frustration-aggression hypothesis. This hypothesis has undergone some modification since then. Scholars also have attempted to move from the individual to the social level of analysis. See John Dollard, Leonard Dobb, et al., Frustration and Aggression (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939), p. 1; and Elton B. McNeil, "Psychology and Aggression," Journal of Conflict Resolution 3 (September 1959): 204.

83. Lewis A. Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (Glencoe, Ill.: the Free Press, 1956), p. 118.

agreement as to the termination of the conflict, certain types of highly institutionalized conflict have built-in termination points. Conflict tends to be resolved more easily when there is a dispute over programmatic and institutional values, rather than when a dispute is over absolute values; when the goal is concrete and finite, rather than when it is vague and abstract; and when rewards are more divisible between groups, rather than when a zero-sum game is played.⁸⁴ It can hardly be said that the leaderships of the two Koreas have seriously attempted to play a non-zero-sum game toward Korean unification. Conflict also tends to be resolved more easily when institutionalized channels are utilized for handling the dispute. Up until the North-South

84. Bernard Berelson and Gary Steiner, Human Behavior (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964), pp. 619-621. A zero-sum game is, in its normal form, a game in which the value of every coalition and its complement always sum to some constant or to zero, which is the value of the grand coalition. See Steven J. Brams, Game Theory and Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1975), p. 280; John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (New York: Wiley, 1944), pp. 88-89; Anatol Rapoport, Two-Person Game Theory: The Essential Ideas (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1969), p. 78; John C. Harsanyi, "Game Theory and the Analysis of International Conflict," in James N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1969), p. 372; and James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Phaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations (New York: Lippincott, 1971), p. 350.

Joint Communique of July 4, 1972, there was no such institutionalized channel. The leadership of North Korea has consistently refused to consider the admission of the two Koreas into the United Nations, as the South Koreans have proposed, although the U.N. may well be the best available institutionalized channel for conflict resolution.

Within certain political systems, such as the personalist, centrist, and polyarchic political systems, domestic conflict varies with foreign conflict behavior.⁸⁵ Within certain groups of nations, there is a tendency for domestic conflict and foreign conflict behavior to occur simultaneously, or for the occurrence of one to be followed in time by the occurrence of the other. Wilkenfeld's study, viewed from the perspective of linkage politics and conflict behavior,⁸⁶ indicates that in the centrist group (i.e., the Communist political systems),

85. However, when Rummel does not differentiate the types of nations in his study, he finds the opposite result. R.J. Rummel, "Dimension of Conflict Behavior within and Between Nations," General Systems: Yearbook of the Society for General Systems Research 8 (1963): 35-44; and R.J. Rummel, The Dimensions of Nations (Beverly Hills; Sage, 1972), pp. 364-367.

86. Linkage politics is defined as any recurrent sequence of behavior that originates in one system and is reacted to in another. James N. Rosenau, "Toward the Study of National-International Linkages," in James N. Rosenau, ed., Linkage Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1969), p. 45; and James N. Rosenau, "Theorizing Across Systems: Linkage Politics Revised," in Jonathan Wilkenfeld, ed., Conflict Behavior and Linkage Politics (N.Y.: McKay, 1973), p. 42.

domestic conflict behavior tends to be associated with the subsequent occurrence of foreign conflict behavior.⁸⁷

Foreign conflict becomes a more probable choice of action when nations disagree on both national goals and ideologies, such as in North and South Korea. Foreign policy reflects the intention of a political system to promote its national goals and political ideology, which helps a political system in pursuing the national goal. The four types of foreign conduct⁸⁸ might be: cooperation, coordination, coexistence and conflict, as displayed in Table IX.12. Political ideology

TABLE IX.12

THE TYPES OF FOREIGN CONFLICT

Dimension of National Goal	Ideological Dimension	
	Similar	Different
Similar	Cooperation	Coexistence
Different	Coordination	Conflict

87. Jonathan Wilkenfeld, "Domestic and Foreign Conflict," in Jonathan Wilkenfeld, ed., op. cit., p. 119.

88. Han S. Park employs a similar typology using two dimensions (ideology and national interest). Han S. Park, "The Prospect of Chinese Foreign Policy: Viewed from a Conceptual Perspective," Asian Forum 6 (April-June 1974): 32-33.

is defined as a belief system characterized by high constraint, great range, and a centrality of political terms. Political ideology provides the conceptual and terminological channels into which political events can be diverted and managed,⁸⁹ and is, in part, a rationalization of group interests.⁹⁰ The two different ideologies in the two Koreas (liberal democracy and capitalism in South Korea and Communism in North Korea) have been a divisive element in North-South Korean relations. Partly because of the divisive function of ideology in the initial phase and the integrative function of ideology in the later phase of state building, the integrative function of nationalism has led to the promotion of unification policies in divided Korea, and yet the degree of emphasis on unification policies and the cooperation between the two sectors of divided Korea varies strongly with the stability of political authorities and the leaders' perception of the parity of economic capability between the two sectors of divided Korea.

89. Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief System in Mass Politics," in David E. Apter, ed., Ideology and Discontent (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1964), pp. 206-207.

90. Robert E. Lane, Political Ideology (New York: The Free Press, 1962), p. 15.

As long as the other factor determining foreign conduct of the two Koreas (national goals) is different, conflict behavior will persist. Since the manifested goal of the ruling Korean Workers' Party is the construction of socialism in the Korean Peninsula, it is unreconcilable with the goal of the ruling Democratic Republican Party as well as the minority parties in South Korea, which advocate the maintenance of a capitalist society, and the construction of a liberal democratic society. In this context, hope for national unification will be slim in the short run, and even in the long run. However, researchers should consider the impact of the international system on North-South Korean relations as well.

Ideological differences and the intensity of conflict between the East and West have strongly affected the pattern of foreign conflict behavior and domestic politics in the two Koreas. The level of conflictual behavior between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. prior to the mid-1960's and the actual conflict during the Korean War have both been partly fueled by the ideological clashes which have helped to magnify other differences. North and South Korea appear to be much more constrained by their dependence on allies than some larger countries in their respective blocs. Such constraints have often been exaggerated in Seoul and minimized in Pyongyang. In Seoul and Pyongyang the existence of external threats has been used to muster

support for the regime and to justify economic sacrifices and the need for the emergency measures which have restricted human rights.⁹¹

The pattern of the international system, as well as the intensity and scope of hostility between the essential actors, has strongly affected the scope of freedom of action and relations between North and South Korea. During the bipolar conflict period in the international system,⁹² the intensity and scope of conflicts between North and South Korea was high.⁹³ However, when the pattern of relations between the major blocs changed to multipolar détente, the degree of conflict between the two Koreas also decreased. The number of significant incidents and exchanges of fire within the demilitarized zone of the Korean Peninsula and inside South Korea, plotted over time, in a U.N. report in

91. For example, on December 6, 1971 and January 9, 1974, President Park of South Korea proclaimed a state of national emergency. The North Korean regime has been in a permanent state of emergency.

92. On the typology of the international system, and stability and instability of systems, see Morton A. Kaplan, Systems and Process in International Politics (New York: Wiley, 1957), pp. 21-52; Morton A. Kaplan, Macropolitics (Chicago: Aldine, 1969), pp. 215-242; Kyung-Won Kim, Revolution and International System (New York: New York University Press, 1970), pp. 117-135; and Kyung-Won Kim, "Korea, the United Nations and the International System," Journal of Asiatic Studies 13 (December 1972): 443.

93. For a discussion of conflict behavior in the Korean

late 1972, shows 784 in 1967, 985 in 1968, 188 in 1969, 181 in 1970, 84 in 1971 and none in 1972.⁹⁴

One of the significant events that took place in the Korean Peninsula during 1972 was an unfolding of North-South Korean relations, which reduced the level of conflict and built an institutionalized channel of communication. When the Red Cross negotiations for reuniting separated Korean families appeared to be stalemated, both Seoul and Pyongyang decided to take the political step of exchanging high ranking emissaries. On July 4, 1972, Lee Hurak, the South Korean CIA Director, and Kim Yongju, Director of the Organization and Guidance Department of the Korean Workers' Party, signed a joint communique in an effort to move toward a peaceful unification of Korea.⁹⁵ The North-South Coordinating Committee

Peninsula, see Glenn D. Paige, "Korea," in Cyril Black and Perry Thornton, eds., Communism and Political Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp.220-242; Editor of the Bukhan, "Bukkoi eui daenam dobal ilji," (Chronology of North Korean Provocations toward South Korea) Bukhan (North Korea) 3 (April 1974): 99-106; and on the Korean War, see Soon Sung Cho, Korea in World Politics, 1940-1950 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 4-5.

94. United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK), General Assembly Official Records, 25th Session, Supplement no. 26 (A/8025) (New York: the U.N., 1970), p. 29; and UNCURK, General Assembly Official Record, 27th Session, Supplement no. 27 (A/8727), pp. 16-17.

95. "Joint Communique, Seoul-Pyongyang Accord on the Independent Peaceful Reunification of Korea," Korea Annual 1973 (Seoul: Hapdong News Agency, 1973), p. 377.

co-chaired by the Lee and Kim, was formed.⁹⁶ The talks have been useful to both North and South Korea, but for different reasons. North Korea has gained in international stature while South Korea has obtained a better understanding of the strategy of the Communist regime of North Korea.⁹⁷ North and South Korea recognized their mutual benefits and attempted to play a non-zero-sum game in these negotiations. In 1972, both North and South Korea amended their constitutions to accommodate the possibility of reunification.

On the same day (June 23, 1973) the two leaders of the two Koreas announced separate proposals for national reunification, which lacked any substantial similarities. President Park proposed the admission of the two Koreas into the U.N., and proposed the following seven points:

1. to continue the South Korean effort to accomplish peaceful unification;
2. not to commit aggression against each other;
3. to secure concrete results from the South-North dialogue;
4. not to oppose North Korea's participation with South Korea in international organizations;
5. to admit both sectors into the U.N. together;
6. to expand diplomatic relations to all nations regardless of ideology; and
7. to maintain peace and to strengthen the ties of

96. For the agreement of operations of the Coordinating Committee, see "The Agreement of Structure and Operations of the North-South Coordinating Committee," Nodong sinmun (Labor News) November 5, 1972, p.3.

97. Gisbert H. Flanz, "The Goals and Options of Small Nations," delivered at the International Seminar on East Asian Affairs in Seoul, January, 1974.

friendship with friendly nations.⁹⁸

Kim Il Sung proposed a different five-point policy on unification:

1. to eliminate military confrontation;
2. to materialize collaboration between North and South in the political, economic and cultural fields;
3. to convene a Great National Conference composed of political parties and social organizations;
4. to institute the Confederal Republic of Koryeo;
5. to admit the Confederal Republic of Koryeo into the U.N.⁹⁹

Park advocated the immediate admission of the two Koreas to the U.N., while Kim advocated the sequential implementation of his five-point program. Kim called for the withdrawal of the U.S. forces from South Korea which would be followed by cooperation of the two Koreas. Kim has opposed the admission of the two Koreas to the U.N. It is significant that both Park and Kim indicate that the feelings of mutual distrust should be dissipated.

98. Park Chung Hee, "The Special Statement Regarding Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification," in Korea Annual, 1974, pp. 339-342; and Park Chung Hee, Park Chung Hee daetongryong yonsolmun jib (Collection of Speeches of President Park Chung Hee) (Seoul: Secretariat of the President, 1974), X: 163-166. For a discussion of unification policy in other periods, see Leon Gordenker, The United Nations and the Peaceful Unification of Korea, the Politics of Field Operations, 1947-1950 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959), pp. 211-238.

99. Kim Il Sung, "Let Us Prevent a National Split and Reunify the Country," in Kim Il Sung, For the Independent Peaceful Reunification of Korea (New York: International Publishers, 1975), pp. 201-207. See also, Robert A. Scalapino, Asia and the Road Ahead (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), p. 230. For a further analysis of the North Korean policy on unification in the various periods, see Byung Chul Koh, The Foreign Policy of North Korea (New York: Praeger, 1969), pp. 112-157; and DPRK, Foreign Languages Publishing House (FLPH), For Korea's Peaceful Unification (Pyongyang: FLPH, 1961), pp. 24-59.

Park urged that both sides should endeavor to "replace the feelings of mutual distrust with those of mutual confidence." ¹⁰⁰ Kim also recognized the need for a climate of trust. ¹⁰¹ So far, a series of the exchanges of polemics and the announcement of policies have not produced any concrete results toward unification. The North-South dialogue is currently stalemated.

In the near future, it might be expected that at least the intensity of conflict would decrease (even if unification is not achieved) if the following conditions hold: first, if the Sino-Soviet conflict ¹⁰² leads the North Korean leadership to maintain a neutral status in this conflict, and the Sino-Soviet conflict reduces the possibility of strong support for North Korea from either the Soviet Union or the People's Republic of China; secondly, if the pattern of the international system remains multipolar detente; thirdly, if North Korea seeks export-oriented industries, North Korea must, consequently, seek diplomatic relations with Western countries in an attempt to

100. Park Chung Hee, op. cit., p. 340.

101. Kim Il Sung, op. cit., p. 203.

102. For the Soviet and Chinese policies on Korean unification, see Jane P. Shapiro, "Soviet Policy toward North Korea and Korean Unification," Pacific Affairs 48 (Fall 1975):335-352; Robert R. Simmons, The Strained Alliance: Peking, Pyongyang, Moscow and the Politics of the Korean Civil War (New York: the Free Press, 1975), pp. 247-270. For a further discussion of Sino-Soviet relations, see James C. Hsiung, Law and Policy in China's Foreign Relations: A Study of Attitudes and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), pp. 48-71.

expand their trade with these Western countries; fourthly, if domestically, in both North and South Korea, the political authorities remain stable and the sense of legitimacy is increased, providing the two Koreas with more moderate policies on unification; fifthly, if domestically, the economic conditions and the living standards in the two Koreas are similar enough that the two Koreas do not have to compete excessively with one another or seek the hypermobilization of the masses; and sixthly, if an increasing number of technocrats rather than ideologues participate in the decision making process in the two Koreas, so that moderate domestic and foreign policies can be expected. If the above conditions hold, the probability of a coexistence pattern, rather than a conflict pattern, in the relationship between the two Koreas might be strengthened. For instance, an improved pattern of coexistence might result in the following positive measures being implemented: the admission of the two Koreas to the U.N., trade and travel between the two Koreas, and the sharing of cultural activities. However, although the first two conditions for decreased conflict seem to be met, at least in the short run, the last four conditions are more difficult and unlikely to be met in the near future.

103. President Park Chung Hee recently announced that if North Korean signs a non-aggression agreement with South Korea, South Korea will not oppose the withdrawal of the U.S. military force from South Korea. Hankuk Ilbo (The Korea Daily) January 13, 1977, p. 1.

In summary, multiple parties emerged in the initial phase of state building in both North and South Korea. However, this multi-party system was of only short duration. The indices of party system fractionalization in the legislative branch approached unity, indicating extensive party fractionalization in both North and South Korea in the initial phase of state building after independence. The North Korean scores on the indices of party system fractionalization decreased rapidly over time. The hegemonic one-party system predominates because either of the following two conditions hold: first, an imposed party becomes the majority party and second, the imposed party suppresses the other minority parties. The party system in South Korea is a predominant one-and-one-half party system: the majority party is conservative but authoritarian in character. The authoritarian party elites have not tolerated the sharing of power or fair competition with the counter-elites. The KWP of North Korea, which is an imposed party, has tended to be more programmatic than the DRP of South Korea, which is less of an imposed party. The degree of imposition in a single-party system is related to the extent to which the goal of the party is to change the values and norms of the regime: thus the level of imposition has been more extensive in North Korea, where the political elites have utilized

the strategy of the Revolutionary Change by Planning Model than in South Korea, where the leaders have adopted the strategy of the Incrementalist Change by Planning Model. In this context, the scope of wants and demands has tended to depend on the image prevailing in the political culture: even though the two Koreas had a common cultural background in the pre-1945 period, they currently convert only those wants to demands which suit the prevailing ideology of the elite. Only "suitable" demands are then converted to outputs of the system, because the leaders have adopted two different strategies of political change. Parties (such as the KWP) which are based on class are more likely to be extensive in organization than parties (such as the DRP) which are based on other broad groupings. The political crises have tended to arise from the high level of distrust of others in the political process. The politics of distrust is, in turn, caused primarily by the absence of a consensus of the rules of the game among the political elites; thus, in both North and South Korea, the realistic fear of purge has been further aggravated by the high level of distrust and the lack of consensus of the rules of the game.

In this chapter, the differences and similarities between the parties of the two Koreas have been delineated

by analyzing the variables of the political processes in party politics. First, the KWP is an omni-functional system, while the parties in South Korea are not. (The main function of parties in South Korea has been merely the nomination of candidates). Second, the revolutionary quality of the KWP's goal attaining pattern is the major difference between the KWP and the South Korean parties which have generally advocated or acquiesced to incrementalism. Third, it can be argued that the patterns of decision-making are of an extremely authoritarian type in the two Koreas. Fourth, in the pattern of agenda building, the parties of the two Koreas have had an important similarity: they both use the mobilization model of agenda building predominantly, although an inside access model is also in existence in the two Koreas. It is also argued that the party process can be characterized in general as the politics of distrust: distrust between factions, distrust between the leaders and the masses, and even distrust among the elites in a faction. In the two Koreas, even if one assumes that the elites have developed a consensus on the rules of the game, it is clear that the rules have generally been ignored.

A party is more likely to be monocratic if either of the following conditions holds: first, if no strong

institutional heritage exists in a society and the traditional norms have been authoritarian, or secondly, if a skillful and strong leader can mobilize the available resources and achieve elite unity while group conflict is at a minimal level. The first condition has been met in both North and South Korea, but the North Korean leaders have been more skillful in achieving the second condition. In North Korea, elite unity has been maintained since 1958, partly because of the extensive purges.

The organizational character of North and South Korea has generally been determined by the importance of small group loyalty (which has its roots in kinship organizations and in the traditional political culture) by the social penetration of an organization that is an extension of the core inner group such as the South Korean public security forces or the Inspection Committee of the KWP of North Korea, and by the consequent weakening of potentially competing organizations such as the parties in South Korea, and finally, by the masses' tolerance of authoritarianism. In this kind of setting, in both sectors of Korea, the performances and influences of the political parties have varied directly with the extensiveness of dependent organizations and their support for the parties, the opportunity and volume

of incentives which help determine the level of internal coherence of a party, and the interest in the organization by the populace. The performance of political parties varies inversely with the level of factionalism by reducing the level of internal coherence of the party organizations, and the reliance on non-party organizations by the power elites. (South Korea is such a case.) Finally, a case of party policy, the politics of unification, has been analyzed in the present chapter from the perspective of conflict theory.

CHAPTER X

POLITICAL CULTURE, STRUCTURE AND PROCESS: THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

In this chapter, the interaction of political culture, structure and process will be explored in a brief examination of three questions: first, what are the power bases of the two Korean regimes? secondly, what are the chances for "convergence" between the two political systems on the Korean peninsula? and finally, what will the Park Administration do to strengthen its control of power, especially in anticipation of confrontations with the North after the impending U.S. troop withdrawals? The landed upper class, which was seriously weakened during the land reform period (1950-1955) in South Korea, has reemerged as a power group in a coalition with the bourgeois in South Korea. Thus, two important conditions for democratization have not been met in South Korea. "The weakening of the landed aristocracy," and "the prevention of an aristocratic-bourgeois coalition against the peasants and workers"¹ as Barrington Moore, Jr. notes, have not taken place.

1. Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), p. 431.

The power bases of the North and South Korean systems have differed ever since the initial phase of state building (1945): the power base of the ruling elite in South Korea has been a coalition of landed aristocracy and big corporate conglomerates, while in North Korea the power base is a coalition of the peasants and workers. In South Korea, the aristocratic-bourgeois coalition has been strengthened by the economic development plans, especially when the economic plans adopted an unbalanced growth model which emphasized the growth of manufacturing and service industries over the growth of agriculture. This coalition might lead to increased private authority; however, a balance between the private authority and the public authority has not developed in South Korea.

There are several factors which have contributed to the absence of strong private authority. First, the public authority is able to manipulate the aristocratic-bourgeois coalition. Secondly, public authority has never allowed the development of intermediate interest groups. Thus, without competing interest groups, the aristocratic-bourgeois coalition has been able to limit the choices of public authority and policy options. Thirdly, a series of critical incidents has strengthened the public authority and has impeded the development of

private authority. One of these critical incidents was the conflict between the right wing and left wing elites in the period of the U.S. military occupation (1945-1948), and the subsequent elimination of the left wing elites from the political arena. The division of Korea was the most important factor which limited freedom of action in policy options; i.e., the development of the agricultural cooperatives has been impeded by the government in South Korea and even a moderate trade union movement has been discouraged. Another critical incident was the Korean War, which created an emergency government which was crisis-oriented, and which led to an expansion of bureaucratic power and the bureaucracy itself which was unparalleled in Korean history. This type of government has continued throughout the economic planning period (1961 to date). A centralized bureaucracy has been in existence since Yi Korea and has been continuously expanded since then. This is a case of "epi-development"² in South Korea. The centralized bureaucracy impeded the development of local autonomy and local industry. For example, national bureaucrats were frequently transferred from

2. James C. Hsiung, "A Revisionist View of Modernization Theory: From the East Asian Perspective," a paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 7-11, 1971, p. 11.

one local government to another, and thus did not have enough time to familiarize themselves with the the local conditions and needs or act effectively. Another incident was the military coup d'état of 1961, which further strengthened the public authority at the expense of the private authority, while ending the Second Republic and undermining the ideals of the Student Revolution of 1960, which were the only cases in which the public authority was counteracted effectively in South Korea. Thus the public authority, which controls bureaucratic power, assisted the development of the aristocratic-bourgeois coalition. The economic planning power of the bureaucracy and the coalition has provided another powerful instrument to increase the public authority.

The power base of the South Korean regime constrained policy choices. First, the concept of the modern welfare state has become part of the rhetoric of party platforms but has been largely ignored in reality. Wages for industrial workers have been kept low while housing and health policies listed in the annual policy white papers of the President and the party platforms of the ruling party have largely been ignored or implemented piecemeal. Secondly, the power base has further constrained the ruling elites' outlook: only incrementalism was allowed.

The evolution of the incrementalist change by planning model of development was very natural, limiting the further changes of socio-economic conditions. The evolution of the concept of "planning" in South Korea is mainly the product of the diffusion of policies which have been adopted from the competing North in the Korean Peninsula or elsewhere, and the concept of incrementalism is simply a reflection or a continuation of the traditional Korean pattern of political culture.

All these problems of social structure and relationships of public authority and private authority lead us to examine the prospects for increased fundamental democratization in the future. In previous paragraphs we briefly examined what has happened in South Korea; now we will turn to the exploration of what has not happened in South Korea. Why is there an absence of fundamental democratization in South Korea?

This absence of fundamental democratization can be attributed to several factors relating to the social structure and to the relationships between public and private authorities in South Korean society. First, the aristocratic-bourgeois coalition has severely impeded the growth of the middle class. The effort to transform the agrarian society of post-1945 Korea into an industrial society in South Korea was initiated mainly by the public

authority. Through the government-controlled corporations and all the state-controlled financial institutions, the semi-state bureaucracy controlled a large portion of the nation's wealth. The weak private sector could not provide the impetus for the growth of a middle class in South Korea. Of all the areas for growth, only the quasi-state bureaucracy has proliferated. The recent growth of big corporate conglomerates has not stimulated the growth of the middle class because, despite the accumulation of wealth by the corporations, the continued low level of workers' wages has prevented the movement of working class people into the middle class.

A second factor which has contributed to the absence of fundamental democratization is the "symbiosis of tradition and modernity."³ The traditional Korean pattern of political culture has persisted despite the adoption of modern technology. This adoption of modern technology has often created conflicts in Korean society. If the development in England and France can be considered models of endogenous development, Korea is a case of exogenous development. Without discussing the advantages to

3. Reinhard Bendix, Nation-Building and Citizenship, New Enlarged Edition (Berkeley: University of California Press, First, Wiley, 1964; 1977), p. 213.

latecomers in development, such as the possible shortening of the time required for development, and without going through all the theoretical arguments on various crises,⁴ I will simply advance a thesis: crises of adoption or diffusion of technology and policies for development arise in "follower societies"⁵ such as Korea. If the model of endogenous development is not useful for understanding the development of follower societies, then one must seek an alternative model, such as one based on adoption. Adoption is often part of a concerted political effort to increase the economic and social viability of a country. The process of adoption has already been complicated by the problems of military viability of the political systems in divided Korea, however.

The policy choices are limited: the ruling elite may either seek to advance their country economically and contain the consequences of that advance politically or seek to develop expanded political participation as a primary goal. We find that there is an imbalance among the components of politico-social change. An imbalance exists between the organizations of the

4. See Leonard Binder, et al., Crises and Sequences in Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).

5. Reinhard Bendix, op. cit., p. 414.

economic and political sectors. The organizations of the economic sector are more capable of implementing adopted technology than the political sector is of implementing adopted democracy. This is because existing social structures are persistent.⁶ For example, a country which quickly adopts the technology of nuclear weaponry may be unable to as quickly adopt western style elections with the same flexibility. Thus in South Korea we find the phenomena of "partial development."⁷ The critical choice made by the ruling elite has been to choose the model of "modernizing autocracy."⁸ The elites are those who concede the least to plebiscitarianism and the ruling elites have chosen to put economic growth before any other consideration in the development of the country. The impact of status inequality between the elites and the entrenched, small middle class and large lower class has mainly been ameliorated up to now by the kinship relationship and small group relations of the traditional Korean social structure. However, these relationships are gradually weakening

6. Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Harper, 1947), p. 12.

7. Reinhard Bendix, op. cit., p. 10.

8. David Apter, The Political Kingdom of Uganda (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 438.

due to factors such as rapid urbanization and industrialization. One must question how long the small group and kinship relationships will continue to function. To be sure, the breaking up of these social structures should not leave a vacuum, but should be followed by the evolution of new social structures which can take over their functions. The New Community Movement, which began in the early 1970's in South Korea may or may not provide an alternative social structure to replace the traditional structure. This movement was initiated and funded mainly by the government. To be sure, it is also another sub-structure of the public authority of South Korea. Under the conditions discussed above, fundamental democratization is simply a hope for the future, not a reality for today, so at present it is a publicly proclaimed goal for the future by the ruling elites, nothing more.

If the efforts toward fundamental democratization in Korea are postponed, what can we anticipate about the stability and legitimate order of the South Korean political system? A legitimate order depends on an organized structure maintained by the ruling elites, who exercise authority and claim legitimacy for this exercise. However, we have found that the elites are

dependent on the traditional social structure and traditional political culture for their stability and their claim to legitimacy. On the other hand, tradition can facilitate as well as hamper rapid development, but this depends on the political management of development by the ruling elites. Tradition facilitates development when it provides stability and coherence in social relations; it hampers development when it reduces the capacity of the system to adapt itself to a new environment. In South Korea individualistic and egalitarian authority relationships have not replaced the traditional relations between "masters and servants." The current concentration of centralization and power does not provide effective channels for communication. The options may be decentralization, more local autonomy, and the building of intermediate interest groups and political parties, among others. Even if the concepts of group function which presuppose the ideal of equality are not operative, at least they can provide a channel for communication and for the restructuring of the social structure of South Korea. This will hopefully increase the stability of the system and will lessen the inequality: a halfway point on the road to democratization.

The power base of the ruling elites in North Korea is different from that of South Korea. North Korea is another example of the model of exogenous development, which has been partially accommodated and which has been used in an attempt to transform tradition. The power base of the North Korean elites has been the peasants and workers. This has several consequences. First, the worker and peasant power base has enabled the construction and imposition of the revolutionary change by planning (RCBP) model of development. The transformation of the social structure from the traditional relations to socialist authority relations has been facilitated by the RCBP model. The conflicts between the two concepts of "revolutionary" and "planning" in the RCBP model have not created friction, as happened in South Korea under the incrementalist change by planning model. Secondly, the policy options have been clear cut, and goal culture and transfer culture have been easily incorporated into the RCBP model in North Korea. For example, redistributive policies have been the main characteristic in North Korea. Thus, land reform for the farmers and the lower class was implemented. Thirdly, because the ruling elites rely primarily on the class made up of peasants and

workers, sweeping changes in the social structure and authority structure have been attempted. An egalitarian authority structure has been proclaimed, but in effect, the North Korean leaders have actually reinforced the traditional authority structure by strengthening the public authority and by creating the new authority structure, the party. Because of this single power base, the proletariat, it was relatively easy for the leaders to transfer people's loyalty from the traditional state bureaucratic structure to the party bureaucratic structure. The party in North Korea is perceived, in many ways, as one of the state organizations. Even the Constitution reads "The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is guided in its activities by the Juche idea of the Korean Workers' Party,"⁹ and the state budget finances a part of the party's operating expenditures.

The North Korean regime can be characterized as a hypermobilization system under the control of the party. We can explore several reasons why the North Korean elites seek or are able to maintain a hypermobilization system. First, the lack of legitimate order at the outset of state building gave a narrow scope of options: repression became routine. Secondly, the "cargo-train

9. Article Four of the DPRK Constitution of 1972.

government" was modeled after the Soviet system, and provided the blueprint for the initial phase of state building (1945-1948). Thirdly, the autocratic methods of control were not really foreign to the Korean people because of the history of Yi Korea and the Japanese colonial period. The traditional Korean pattern of political culture provided the vehicle for maintaining the hypermobilization system in North Korea under the dominance-submission pattern of behavior from the traditional Korean culture. Thus, North Korean leaders simply imposed a similar form of authority structure on the North Korean people. Fourthly, the worker-peasant coalition enabled the government to simplify the distribution of resources to the peasants and workers through land reform, subsequent cooperative farms and state industrial plants. The worker-peasant coalition was the most traditional sector of the population. The leaders simply manipulated the transfer of loyalty from the traditional social structure (i.e., the master-servant relationship) to the party structure. Recently the populace has been coerced to extend this loyalty to Kim Il Sung's family: a cult of personality has grown up around Kim Il Sung, his son, and Kim Il Sung's

parents.¹⁰

Now we can explore another question, namely, what are the chances of "convergence" between the two Korean political systems? Theories of convergence have mainly dealt with the Soviet and American systems, which are basically different in ideology and cultural patterns. Here we deal with the North and South Korean systems, which originated from one nation in the post-1945 period. Exceptionists, who regard national culture as the essential determinant of any society, reject the possibility of convergence. Another area of non-convergence is said to be ideology and the property laws.¹¹

Raymond Aron dismisses the similarities between industrial societies as irrelevant, because industry is a means rather than an end and hence its forms do not define a society. The essence of a society is contained in the goals it posits for itself and in this respect the two societies on the Korean peninsula remain diametrically opposed.¹² In this sense, Aron's argument is probable in the case of divided Korea. In the

10. It is reported that Kim Il Sung recently chose his eldest son, Kim Jung Il to succeed him as leader of North Korea, and that the party leadership has approved the choice. It is also reported that anti-party members and divisionists who had long been hiding within the party to block an establishment of sole leadership by Kim Jung Il have been crushed. The New York Times, February 24, 1977, p. 9.

literature of comparative political analysis, there are four major theories of convergence which have been put forth: the Swedish system, Fascism, anarcho-syndicalist society and bureaucratic society. These theories of convergence are examined by Meyer,¹³ who concludes that the first three are no more than hypothetical projections. The theory of convergence in bureaucracy is the more probable one empirically, as Meyer notes. If we regard the socialist North Korean society and the capitalist South Korean society as bureaucratic, we can find that the convergence hypothesis is confirmed in this study of the two Koreas. The bureaucratic structure has been developing since the late Yi Korea period. I have already pointed out that it is a case of "epi-development" in the Korean society. Although we have not examined the so called 'rationality' of bureaucracy, and other

11. See Alfred G. Meyer, "Theories of Convergence," in Chalmers Johnson, ed., Change in Communist Systems (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970), pp. 339-340.

12. Raymond Aron, Industrial Society (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965), pp. 92-183.

13. Alfred G. Meyer, op. cit., p. 337.

characteristics in general, I would like to emphasize the authority relations between positions which are ordered systematically,¹⁴ over other characteristics of bureaucracy in the two Koreas.

The last question posed is what the Park Administration will do to strengthen its control of power, especially in anticipation of confrontations with the North after the U.S. troop withdrawals. There are several options, some of which are inevitable, and South Korea has already begun to implement some of them. First, in the strategic and military areas, the Park administration has already initiated a strengthening of the South Korean military forces and internal security forces, and they may continue to do so. Reportedly, South Korea will spend \$5 billion in the period from 1976 to 1981 to strengthen their military forces, and \$3.5 billion of this money will come from the United States government.¹⁵ If the South Korean leaders perceive that they need to compensate for their domestic shortcomings and weaknesses in the socio-economic and political spheres, they might attempt to

14. Max Weber, Essays in Sociology, ed. by H.H. Gerth and C.W. Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 196-198.

15. Hankuk Ilbo (The Korea Daily) March 12, 1977, p. 1.

build an impressive military force, which, they hope, will contribute to their power base. This is also a probable motivation in North Korea. This is despite the fact that the leaders in both North and South Korea recognize the cost of building a military force as an excessive burden, especially when it comes at the expense of economic growth, which is a more visible indicator of achievement in the two systems. The opposition New Democratic Party chief, Lee Chul Seung, recently opposed the withdrawal of U.S. troops, and in so doing strengthened Park's own position. However, Lee Chul Seung cautiously added that "domestic political development also should be achieved." He especially emphasized the need for "the normalization of the freedom of the press and the National Assembly functions."¹⁶ The Park Administration would certainly like to strengthen the civil defense corps in South Korea. Recently, the South Korean government announced that they had centralized the civil defense corps and had extended the exercises and training hours.¹⁷

16. Hankuk Ilbo, March 19, 1977, p. 1.

17. Hankuk Ilbo, March 17, 1977, p. 3.

The tight control of the civil defense corps and the reserve system implies an increasing militarization which has made it easier for the leaders to command the highly structured groups of people in the military organizations. The subsequent increase in military budgets and personnel will certainly give more power to the military-industrial establishment in South Korea.¹⁸ Currently, any movement of the South Korean troops needs the permission of the U.N. Command under the U.S.-Korea Agreement.¹⁹ The South Korean government is also preparing for the transfer of command of the South Korean military forces from the U.N. Military Headquarters to the government of the Republic of Korea.²⁰ This transfer will certainly increase the President's control of one of the most powerful groups in South Korea -- the military. This authority is enormously important to the leaders, because until now the Korean military personnel have been under the U.N. Command. This newly added power is significant politically, more so than militarily, to the political leadership.

18. President Park said that he initiated the development of the defense industry in 1972 in anticipation of the U.S. troop withdrawals. Hankuk Ilbo March 16, 1977, p. 1.

19. However, officers of the May 16, 1961 military coup d'état moved military personnel without the consent of the U.N. Command. Under the Tajon Agreement between General MacArthur and President Syngman Rhee on July 14, 1950, Rhee turned over the Korean Army to the U.N. Command. See the Agreement, in Mark W. Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu (New York: Harper, 1954), p. 169.

Secondly, in the socio-economic spheres, the Park Administration is already implementing redistributive programs, which have been postponed for a long time. For instance, the ruling Democratic Republican Party proposed the reduction of income tax for the lower income people on March 19, 1977, and the government has also initiated a national health program for about five hundred thousand low income people. Anthony Downs shows that political parties in a democracy plan their policies so as to maximize votes, and also that democratic governments tend to redistribute income from the rich to the poor.²¹ However, we have found that even if fundamental democratization is absent, the governments in the two Koreas have chosen redistributive programs to maximize votes and to show their economic achievements to the other side. Although economic indicators are important for the leaders, they do not perceive political indicators to be as important. The South Korean government recently announced that a new and small capital city will be built to the far South of the current capital city of Seoul within the next ten years. There are three significant reasons for this move. The first reason, reportedly, is the overpopulation

20. Hankuk Ilbo March 15, 1977, p. 1.

21. Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), p. 297.

of Seoul. Creating a new capital city would reduce the large urban population of Seoul. The second reason is that it would be strategically advantageous to have the capital in a position more distant from the 38th parallel, a potential combat zone in time of war. The third reason, which has never been expressed in the mass media in South Korea, is that the officials of the executive branch would be able to avoid the political violence of Seoul's urban population if they moved the capital to a newly built small city. Seoul is the center of political life and also a center of public and private colleges and universities. To be sure, it also is a center for the opposition parties. Students are one of the two important power groups in South Korea. The other is the military. The students in Seoul have held protest demonstrations in the streets of Seoul in the spring of every year for the last fifteen years to support a variety of causes. These protest demonstrations have often taken place in front of government buildings. Moving the capital might thus decrease the effectiveness of the student movements in some way.

Thirdly, in the domestic political sphere, the leadership may try to enhance the ruling party structure

by increasing their revenue sources in some way, or they may try some other options. For example, the ruling party might choose to use the local organizations of the New Community Movement as the substructure of the ruling party. This alternative would be advantageous for the ruling party because the state budget partially finances the New Community Movement.

Fourthly, President Park's task of maintaining a majority in the National Assembly is no longer a problem because of amendments to the Constitution which allow him to appoint one-third of the members of the National Assembly.²² These changes came about under the Constitutional Amendment of 1972, the so-called Yushin System (The Revitalizing Reforms). Additionally, because each medium sized election district elects two assemblymen from candidates of all the parties who run, even in urban areas where support for the ruling party is weak, the first spot usually goes to an opposition candidate and the second spot goes to a ruling party candidate. This was true in the last election. Under the Yushin System, as long as a party is able to win the presidential election, the President-elect and his party can easily win two-thirds of the seats in the

22. Usually the Presidential election is held several months before the election for members of the National Assembly.

National Assembly -- assuming that there is a two party system, as is currently the case in South Korea.

In summary, we have explored three problems: the power base and social structure, theories of convergence, and finally, the ways in which the Park Administration has, and can be expected to, strengthen its control of power. I advanced a paradigm of political systemic structure and process in the beginning of this study. Now we can ask, what can this paradigm anticipate? First, with respect to social structures and the authority structure, an authority crisis will be a major problem for both Koreas in the near future. Assuming that the modernization process will continue, the modernity in the socio-economic sector may confront the traditional social and authority structures with several problems. Secondly, a developing generation gap will make it difficult to keep conflicts in the political arena on a manageable level. The generation gap will probably generate more severe difficulties in North Korea than in the South because the first generation of revolutionaries in North Korea will be locked in a power struggle with the younger generation when the succession crisis occurs. In South Korea, on the other hand, the generation gap is more moderate, and is

limited to the socio-economic area, because most of the original independence movement leaders in South Korea have either died or retired from active politics. Thirdly, since the transformation of political culture is already underway and is leading the two Koreas in different directions, the consequences of the revolutionary change by planning model in North Korea and the incrementalist change by planning model in South Korea will further amplify the differences in the social structures and the authority structure in the two Korean systems. Thus, in the future, exchanges between the two systems will be more difficult, and the task for unification will have to solve the emerging social as well as political differences. Fourthly, the anticipated exchanges between the two systems would enhance the diffusion of policies and programs,²³ and they would also adopt some of the other sector's socio-economic programs in order to show that they can keep up with their competition on the Korean peninsula. Finally, the stability of each system will depend mainly upon the degree of legitimacy which the leadership of each system can build up. This is a Promethean task for the elites. It requires great courage and skills.

23. It is only recently that the newspapers in South Korea have been allowed to report domestic political and economic news about North Korea.

System building is no longer a problem; system management is a real challenge for the leadership. The politics of distrust, which characterizes the traditional Korean pattern of political culture, should first be transformed so as to increase the people's confidence in the leaders and regimes of each system. This transformation may also require future-oriented leadership. Unless the leaders attempt this task, fundamental democratization will be a Sisyphean task.

PART FOUR
CONCLUSIONS

CHAPTER XI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The study of a divided nation is a unique opportunity for comparativists. In this study of divided Korea, the researcher has explored the similarities as well as the differences which have developed out of their originally common history (pre-1945 Korea). To explain the political phenomena in the two Koreas, the researcher has developed a political culture thesis. In Part One, a paradigm of political systemic structure and process is developed. Part Two is a survey of the nature of the subject political culture, the politics of the transformation of the political culture and the nature of the ideologies of the ruling elites in the two Koreas. In Part Three, the functional organizations, the territorial organizations, and the economic systems of the two Koreas are analyzed from the structural perspective. North and South Korean party processes and the case study of unification policy of the two Koreas are investigated from the process perspective.

The traditional political culture in the Korean peninsula can best be characterized as a subject political culture, which resulted from the narrow world view of the Koreans. The two major factors which determined the

pattern of the traditional Korean political culture have been the Confucian culture and the agrarian social structure. The interaction of the Korean narrow world view and their closed social system have resulted in the formation of the traditional Korean authoritarian personality. In turn, the authoritarianism has been the primary cause of the evolution of the subject political culture in the Korean peninsula. The subject political culture is, basically, a kinship centered culture with a low level of system affect, which is characterized by the distrust of others, in which governmental performance is measured on the basis of personal benefit, and with a low level of participation by the masses in the decision making process. In the subject political culture, the masses' primary mechanism for the adjustment of the action tendency in their relationship with the elites is submission. On the other hand, the ruling elites exhibit an aggressive, dominant pattern of political behavior.

The attempts to transform the traditional political culture in the two Koreas have resulted in a polarized political culture in which strong conflict exists between the modern and traditional sectors. The growth of the modern sector in the populations of the two Koreas has

been partly the result of increased urbanization, exposure to mass communications and increased industrialization. In South Korea, the strategy of the transformation of the political culture has been based on the Incrementalist Change by Planning Model, which is designed to transform the traditional Koreans into "modern men," while in North Korea, the strategy of the transformation of the political culture has been based on the Revolutionary Change by Planning Model, which attempts to mold the North Koreans into "socialist men."

The political ideologies of the sponsoring superpowers and the various domestic leadership groups were the essential factors in determining the nature of the political systems of divided Korea in the initial stage of state building. However, since the 1960's, the transplanted ideologies of liberal democracy and gradualist conservatism in South Korea and Marxism-Leninism in North Korea, have undergone a process of Koreanization (i.e., the Revitalizing Reforms and Administrative Democracy in South Korea, and the Juche idea in North Korea). Once the homogeneous, pre-1945 Korean society was divided into two separate political entities, the differing ideologies of the ruling elites caused the formation of two different political cultures. Content analysis of the speeches of the two leaders of

the two Koreas empirically confirms the two models of development: the Incrementalist Change by Planning Model of Park Chung Hee, and the Revolutionary Change by Planning Model of Kim Il Sung. These two models have been used to orient political structures in the two Koreas in different directions.

The researcher argues that a leadership thesis can shed light on the reasons for the differences between the two Koreas, while the similarities of the two Koreas can be well explained by a political culture thesis. The political changes in the two Koreas can also be explained by the system-functional model and the diffusion model, simultaneously. The changes in political culture, political structure and process within the two Koreas can be explained by system-functional relationships within the political system. Furthermore, political changes can best be explained in terms of the diffusion and borrowing which occurs as a result of the interactions between countries. An explanation that relies on the effects of internal characteristics (mainly socio-political variables) of a political system, which are studied mainly by the proponents of the system-functional explanation, can be contrasted with one based on the extra-societal, external variables (i.e., the international system and the internal socio-political variables of other

political systems) of a political system, which is called the diffusion explanation and which has been generally explored in the studies of Galton's problem.¹

The following conclusions have been drawn about political structures: the set of interrelated political structures in a society tends to persist despite changes in their function. A political structure tends to perform a given function at time T_0 , although the functional scope and effectiveness of the structure's functions are related to other power structures and environmental

1. For a further analysis of the diffusion explanation and Galton's Problem, see Marc H. Ross and Elizabeth Homer, "Galton's Problem in Cross-National Research," World Politics 29 (October 1976): 1-28. Francis Galton raised the possibility that a correlation between intra-societal variables might result from contact between cultures. Naroll also suggests that cross-unit correlations can be attributed to the functional relationship and semi-diffusion. See Edward E. Tylor, "On the Method for Investigating the Development of Institutions Applied to the Laws of Marriage and Descent," Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 18 (1889): 245-272; reprinted in Frank Moore, ed., Readings in Cross-Cultural Methodology (New Haven: HRAF Press, 1963), pp. 1-25. Raoul Naroll, "Galton's Problem," in Raoul Naroll and Ronald Cohen, eds., A Handbook of Method in Cultural Anthropology (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), pp. 974-975. Almond similarly suggests endogenous and exogenous causation for the explanation of political change, in Gabriel A. Almond, "Approaches to Developmental Causation," in Gabriel A. Almond, Scott C. Flanagan, and Robert J. Mundt, eds., Crisis, Choice and Change (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), pp. 28-33.

changes. A pattern of functional organizations tends to depend heavily on the ideological perspectives of the ruling elites in the initial phase of state building, but depends mainly on the economic structure in the later phase. As economic goals are implemented, more and more of the specialist elites are created. The expansion and reorganization of public administration in both North and South Korea have occurred primarily within the scope of economic development. In the two Koreas, the expansion of the bureaucracy has had a dual goal: strengthening the stability of the political authorities and aiding in the implementation of programs; although the degree of bureaucratization has tended to vary directly with the leaders' positive attitude toward the bureaucracy.

The effectiveness of a system of checks and balances varies strongly with the structural diversity of the elements balanced against one another, if these structural elements are representative of different control groups and if the conflicts of outgroups do not decrease the equilibrium of the political structure, excluding the short periods of transitional disequilibrium. The tendency toward crisis management government under emergency measures is likely to decrease the effectiveness of a system of checks and balances in the functional organizations by decreasing participation in the decision

making process. The tendency toward political crisis and the tendency to rely on emergency measures are both related to the ruling elites' distrust of the competing elites and a lack of consensus of the rules of the game. The democratic authority structure in a political system varies more consistently with the commitment of the professional politicians to egalitarian values and norms than with the masses' commitment. Thus, authoritarian elites tend to construct relatively undemocratic authority structures, as is the case in the two Koreas, and this tendency toward a strongly authoritarian authority structure has been aggravated by the conflict between the two Koreas. Some political phenomena are better explained in terms of interactions, followed by diffusion, between political systems than in terms of system-functional explanation alone.

The subject political culture and the lack of experience with local autonomy in Korean history has tended to increase the centralization of the administration. The level of imposition has not been a constant in the two Koreas. Nevertheless, the relationship between centralization and implementation of policies depends on the complexity of the rule-making and rule-implementation structures. If the rule implementation structures become

relatively complex, as in North and South Korea, the extent of decentralization tends to increase the effectiveness of implementation, especially in the case of economic development and the mobilization of economic resources in the two Koreas. Increased centralization has varied positively with the comprehensiveness of land reform in the predominantly agrarian societies of the Korean peninsula by reducing the power bases of the counter-elites. Land reforms were initiated in the two Koreas in the same period. This is an example of the diffusion of policies in divided Korea. In North Korea, particularly, the increase in organizational coherence of a political party has tended to increase decentralization, which stimulates the local initiative for economic growth.

With respect to economic life, the acceptance or acquiescence to the foreign imposition of political ideologies by the political elites in the political systems of divided Korea has tended to strongly affect the forms of ownership and the patterns of adjustment (i.e., market or planning) in economic life, in the initial phase of the takeover period. The Communist elites in North Korea have developed a command system, while the conservative gradualist elites in South Korea have pursued a capitalist market economic system. The

diffusion of culture and policies has affected economic life. The governmental regulation of private enterprises, state economic planning, and a large public sector (i.e., government-controlled public corporations) are the result of the diffusion of culture and policies from interactions between the Korean political systems and their respective superpowers. Comprehensive state economic plans have been the most visible illustrations of the diffusion of policies between North and South Korea, although South Korean economic plans have not been imperative, as in North Korea.

Even though a multi-party, non-dominant system emerged in the initial phase in the two Koreas, such a multi-party system was of short duration. In Part Three, the researcher empirically traces the decline of the indices of party system fractionalization in the legislative branches over time in the two Koreas. A hegemonic one-party system prevailed in North Korea because the imposed party became a majority party with the assistance of Soviet military forces which occupied North Korea, and because the imposed party has suppressed the other minority parties. The KWP became a monocratic

party because no strong institutional heritage existed in North Korean society, because the traditional norm has been authoritarianism, and because a skillful and strong leader could mobilize the available resources and achieve elite unity.

The pervasive effect of strong personalism and persistent factionalism has decreased party system institutionalization in the transitional society of South Korea. The lack of a consensus on the rules of the game has also contributed to the low level of party system institutionalization, which, in turn, has increased the level of conflict behavior within the South Korean parties, which are characterized by the politics of distrust. The "hierarchical factionalism" in both North and South Korea has resulted from the centralized hierarchical power structure, the rigid party structures and governmental structures, and the differences in social and career backgrounds of the party elites in the two Koreas. The authoritarian personalities of party elites in South Korea, which have resulted from and have subsequently reinforced the subject political culture in South Korea, have also contributed to the evolution of authoritarian parties and the one-and-one-half party system in South Korea.

Party process in the two Koreas has been explored primarily in terms of four process variables: functional scope, decision-making, the goal-attaining pattern, and the agenda-building pattern. South Korean parties can generally be characterized as electoral function-oriented, utilizing an authoritarian decision making process, and having an incrementalist goal-attaining and a mobilization model of agenda building; while the Korean Workers' Party can be characterized as an omni-functional system, utilizing a closed decision making process, having a revolutionary goal-attaining pattern, and also using a mobilization model of agenda building.

As a case study of party policy, unification policy has been analyzed from the perspective of conflict theory. Although national unification has been a long standing aspiration, conflict between the two Koreas has persisted and attempts to reconcile the differences in the unification policies of the two Koreas have been in vain, at least up to now. Thus, the two Koreas have maintained a conflict pattern of relations. In the analysis of unification policies, the system-functional explanation has not adequately explained the situation, so the diffusion explanation should also be considered: namely, researchers should consider the impact of the international system and other extra-societal socio-political variables

on the unification problem (i.e., the economic policy of each sector of divided Korea, the stability of the leadership, and the kind of policies and choices made by the leadership). Furthermore, it has been argued in the research on Korean unification that the political culture thesis can shed light on the failure to reduce conflict behavior between the two Koreas: namely, that the politics of distrust have been a major factor in the failure to minimize conflict behavior in the Korean peninsula.

Changes in the political structure and socio-economic environment over time have led to the establishment of different sources of legitimacy in such components of the political system as the political authorities, the regime and the political community. The initial leadership groups in both North and South Korea sought to base their legitimacy on national political mythology by making use of the subject political culture in the Korean peninsula, but in the later stages, the leaders in North Korea have sought and have achieved legitimacy through the revolutionary ideology of Marxism-Leninism and Kim's Juche idea, and have established ideological and personal sources of legitimacy; while in South Korea, the leadership has tended to base their legitimacy on legal-conventional and performance legitimacy.

The variations in the major impetuses toward systemic transformation have affected the constitutional patterns. In a political system which receives its impetus from foreign military occupation, the constitutional patterns will vary with the sponsoring powers' constitutional patterns in the initial phase of state building. In South Korea the United States has attempted to transplant a gradualist libertarian constitutional pattern; while in North Korea, which has also lacked previous experience with any democratic forms of government, the Communist and mobilization system was easily imposed by the Soviet Union. In North Korea, the Communist and mobilization system has, since its inception, been reinforced by public policies under the Revolutionary Change by Planning Model. The stability of the mobilization^{system} has been increased by various organizations (i.e., the KWP); secondly, by the reinforcement learning achieved through formal education and mass communication; thirdly, by a high level of regime coercive control; and fourthly, by rewards, even though they are at a minimal level. In South Korea, the authoritarian pattern in the authority structure has been reinforced over time by the highly authoritarian pattern of social order, the limited autonomy of interest groups and the high degree of patrimonial rulership; and this authoritarian pattern in the authority structure has been maintained through coercive control

in the polarized political culture. The stability of a political authority or a regime has varied with the degree of elite unity; South Korea, however, has not achieved as much elite unity as North Korea. Thus, in this context, the South Korean political system could be more unstable in the near future. The stability of the political authority and the regime is also affected by the discontinuity of social stratification and the generation gap: the South Korean social class system is predominantly dualistic, with conflicts between the upper class and the lower class, and it lacks a strong middle class. These conflicts have persisted into the present and will probably persist into the future. In North Korea, although the notion of a classless society is professed, the political elites and mid-elites apparently form an upper class. However, the conflicts between the elite-midelite and the deprived groups will not reach the threshold of crisis as long as the North Korean leadership maintains regime coercive control. The younger generation has undergone a new pattern of socialization in the two Koreas, and consequently, they have different values and belief systems from the older generation. The conflict between generations is more likely to lead to a succession crisis in North Korea than in South Korea, however.

The discrepancy between the pattern of political leadership and other patterns of authority in society affect the stability of political authority and regimes: The discrepancy between the strongly authoritarian pattern of political leadership and the less authoritarian pattern of authority in the socio-economic sector may reach the threshold of a crisis in authority in the two Koreas. Under the democratic rule which has been nominally professed by the leadership in South Korea, there are more democratic patterns of authority in some sectors of the social order because of rapid economic modernization, which may well decrease the stability of the political system in the near future. In North Korea, the transformation into a socialist society is well underway, and the revolutionary ideology with its Communist pattern of socialization may create a considerable congruency of ideological commitment in both the elites and mid-elites, and has already led to an expanded dependent class in their mobilization system. However, in the process of rapid industrialization, the conflicts between the "red" ideologues and "expert" technocrats may negatively affect the congruency of ideological commitment among the elites in the near future.

This study of divided Korea, it is hoped, will be a positive contribution to the development of comparative political analysis. First, with regard to a general theory of political action, the researcher has developed the relationship between the political culture and political action tendency (which is more generally known as political behavior, although political behavior currently has the connotation of a narrower scope than political action tendency). Secondly, the researcher attempted to refine the concept of political culture, particularly the concept of subject political culture, and has explored the problems of transformation, the different strategies of transformation (i.e., the Incrementalist Change by Planning Model and the Revolutionary Change by Planning Model), and the impact of a polarized political culture on political action tendency and policies. Thirdly, it is argued that comparative political research would benefit from the simultaneous use of the system-functional explanation, which is widely employed, and the diffusion explanation, which has been neglected in the literature of comparative political research. The researcher has also presented both the political culture thesis and the leadership thesis to explain political phenomena in the two Koreas. Fourthly, and methodologically,

the researcher has attempted the simultaneous use of comparative methods and diachronic analysis for the study of divided Korea. It has been shown that diachronic analysis and comparative methods are complementary; and that they help explain political phenomena; particularly the subject of political change. Also, from the methodological point of view, the study of divided nations partially satisfies the research design of "most different systems,"² which is considered preferable by several scholars in comparative political research.

For further research concerning divided Korea, and for the study of divided nations in general, the researcher here presents several suggestions: First, a case study of policies would shed light on the study of divided Korea, and on divided nations in general. For instance, the researcher has partially explored the policies of administrative reorganizations, land reforms, economic planning, education and unification from the perspective of macro-analysis. A study of

2. See Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry (New York: Wiley, 1970), pp. 34-39.

public policy in divided nations would give a better picture of the political systems of divided nations at the micro-level of analysis and the study of public policy would contribute to the evaluation of political outputs and outcomes of a political system. The studies on public policy in the past have generally been on economic development, planning, defense, and foreign policy. Both the system-functional explanation and the diffusion explanation can be further developed in the study of policy science. The analyst would suggest that further research be carried on in policy areas such as welfare policy, social security policy, national health plans, urban policy, rural community development policy, criminal justice policy, taxation policy, income redistribution policy and trade policy. Secondly, my suggestions for further research concerning divided Korea include studies on: civil-military relations, the recruitment pattern of elites, the career pattern of elites, the structure and operations of the legislative and judicial branches, and finally, the process of bureaucratization.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF DIVIDED NATIONS

(A) Books and Articles in Western Languages

- Baldwin, Frank, ed. Without Parallel: The American-Korean Relationship Since 1945. New York: Pantheon, 1974.
- Bark, Dong-Suh. "A Comparison of Administration under Different Ideologies." Journal of Asiatic Studies 13 (December 1970): 279-292.
- Barnds, William J., ed. The Two Koreas in East Asian Affairs. New York: New York University Press, 1976.
- Breidenstein, Gerhard, and Rosenberg, W. "Economic Comparison of North and South Korea." Journal of Contemporary Asia 5 (Summer 1975): 165-203.
- Byun, Hyungyun. "A Comparative Study of Economic Systems in South Korea and North Korea." Journal of Asiatic Studies 13 (December 1970): 233-239.
- Clemens, Walter, Jr. "GRIT at Panmunjom: Conflict and Cooperation in Divided Korea." Asian Survey 13 (June 1973): 531-559.
- Flanz, Gisbert H. "Korea and Vietnam: Two Constitutional Experiments." St. John's Law Review 42 (July 1967): 18-37.
- Flanz, Gisbert H. "Korean Reunification: Constitutional and Political Aspects." Delivered at the International Symposium on Change and Security in East Asia, Seoul, January 21-24, 1974, and in Park Jekyu, trans. and ed., Tong Asia eui pyonghwa wa anbo (Peace and Security in East Asia). Seoul: Kyongnam University Press, 1974, pp. 239-252.
- Flanz, Gisbert H. "The Goals and Options of Small Nations." The Korea Herald January 24, 1974, p. 3.

- Galtung, Johan. "Divided Nations as a Process: One State, Two States, and In-between -- The Case of Korea." Unification Policy Quarterly 1 (April 1975): 43-60.
- Hahn, Bae-ho. "The Parties and the Politics in the Two Koreas: A Preliminary Comparative Analysis." Journal of Asiatic Studies 13 (December 1970): 251-259.
- Henderson, Gregory; Lebow, Richard; and Stoessinger, John, eds. Divided Nations in a Divided World. New York: McKay, 1974.
- Herz, John. "Korea and Germany as Divided Nations: The Systemic Impact." Asian Survey 15 (November 1975): 957-970.
- Kim, C.I. Eugene, and Kihl, Young Whan, eds. Party Politics and Elections in Korea. Silver Spring, Maryland: Research Institute on Korea Affairs, 1976.
- Kim, Jounghwon A. Divided Korea: The Politics of Development, 1945-1972. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975.
- Kim, Jounghwon A., and Kim, Carolyn C. "The Divided Nations in the International System." World Politics 25 (July 1973): 479-507.
- Kim, Se-jin, and Cho, Chang-hyun, eds. Korea: A Divided Nation. Silver Spring, Maryland: Research Institute on Korean Affairs, 1976.
- Kim, Young C., ed. Major Powers and Korea. Silver Spring, Maryland: Research Institute on Korean Affairs, 1973.
- Korean Development Institute. Economic Comparison between South and North Korea. Seoul: Korea Development Institute, 1975.
- Research Center for Peace and Unification. Socio-Cultural Comparison between South and North Korea. Seoul: Research Center for Peace and Unification, 1975.
- Sievers, Bruce R. "The Divided Nations: International Integration and National Identity: Patterns in Germany, China, Vietnam and Korea." in Jan F.

Triska, ed., Communist Party-State: Comparative and International Studies. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969, pp. 160-188.

Suh, Dae-Sook, and Lee, Chae-Jin, eds. Political Leadership in Korea. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1976.

Yim, Yong Soon. "A Comparative Study of Foreign Policy: The Case of Two Koreas." Journal of Korean Affairs 5 (January 1976): 1-24.

(B) Monographs and Articles in the Korean Language

Hahn, Bae-ho. "Nam buk han eui jongchi cheje bikyo sosol (I)" (Toward a Comparative Analysis of the South and North Korean Political Systems(I)) Journal of Asiatic Studies 14 (September 1971):3-46.

Hahn, Bae-ho. "Nam buk han eui jongchi cheje bikyo sosol (II)" (Toward a Comparative Analysis of the South and North Korean Political Systems (II)). Journal of Asiatic Studies 15 (March 1972): 1-19.

2. BOOKS AND MONOGRAPHS ON THE TWO KOREAS

Adelman, Irma, ed. Practical Approaches to Developmental Planning: Korea's Second Five-Year Plan. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969.

Asiatic Research Center, ed. Report. Seoul: Asiatic Research Center, 1971.

Brown, Gilbert T. Korean Pricing Policies and Economic Development in the 1960's. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973.

Cho, Soon Sung. Korea in World Politics, 1940-1950. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967.

- Choy, Bong-youn. Korea: A History. Rutland, Vermont: Tuttle, 1971.
- Chung, Joseph S. North Korean Economy: Structure and Development. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1974.
- Chung, Joseph S., ed. Patterns of Economic Development: Korea. Kalamazoo, Michigan: The Korean Research and Publications, 1966.
- Chung, Kyung C. Korea: The Third Republic. New York: Macmillan, 1971.
- Cole, David, and Lyman, Princeton. Korean Development: The Interplay of Politics and Economics. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971.
- DPRK, Foreign Languages Publishing House. Facts About Korea. Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961.
- _____, _____. For Korea's Peaceful Unification. Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961.
- _____, _____. The Historical Experience of the Agrarian Reform in Our Country. Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1974.
- _____, _____. On the Socialist Constitution of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1975.
- _____, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961.
- _____, Statistical Office. Statistical Returns of the National Economy of the DPRK, 1946-1960. Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961.
- Democratic Republican Party. The DRP, the Republic of Korea. Seoul: The Democratic Republican Party, 1965.
- _____. This is the DRP. Seoul: The Democratic Republican Party, 1970.

- East-West Cross-Current Center, ed. The October Revitalizing Reforms of the Republic of Korea. Seoul: East-West Cross-Current Center, 1972.
- Frank, Charles R., Jr.; Kim, Kwangsuk; and Westphal, Larry. Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: South Korea. New York: Columbia University Press, 1975.
- Gordenker, Leon. The United Nations and the Peaceful Unification of Korea, 1947-1950. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959.
- Hahm, Pyongchoon. The Korean Political Tradition and Law. Second Edition. Seoul: Hollym, 1971.
- Han, Sungjoo. The Failure of Democracy in South Korea. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974.
- Han, Wookun. The History of Korea. Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1971.
- Hasan, Parvez. Korea: Problems and Issues in a Rapidly Growing Economy. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976.
- Henderson, Gregory. Korea: The Politics of the Vortex. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968.
- Henthorn, William E. A History of Korea. New York: The Free Press, 1971.
- Hong, Sungchick. The Intellectual and Modernization: A Study of Korean Attitudes. Seoul: Social Research Institute, 1967.
- Hopdong News Agency. Korea Annual, 1963-1976. Seoul: Hopdong News Agency, 1963-1976.
- Kang, Younghill. The Grass Roof. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1931.
- Karshinov, L. N. People's Democratic Republic of Korea. JPRS:3222. Washington, D.C.: Department of Commerce, 1960.
- Kim, Changsun. Fifteen-Year History of North Korea. Trans. U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Technical Service. JPRS:18,925. Washington, D.C.: Department of Commerce, 1963.
- Kim, C. I. Eugene, and Kim, Han-Kyo. Korea and the Politics of Imperialism, 1876-1910. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968.

- Kim, Heung Hee. Foreign Capital for Economic Development: A Korean Case Study. New York: Praeger, 1970.
- Kim, Ilpyong J. Communist Politics in North Korea. New York: Praeger, 1975.
- Kim, Il Sung. For the Correct Management of the Socialist Rural Economy. Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1969.
- Kim, Il Sung. For the Independent Peaceful Reunification of Korea. New York: International Publishers, Co., Inc., 1975.
- Kim, Il Sung. Juche: The Speeches and Writings of Kim Il Sung. Ed. Li Yuksa. New York: Grossman Publisher, 1972.
- Kim, Il Sung. Let Us Embody More Thoroughly the Revolutionary Spirit of Independence, Self-Sustenance, and Self-Defense in all Fields of State Activity. New York: New World Front, 1970.
- Kim, Il Sung. Revolution and Socialist Construction in Korea. New York: International Publishers, 1971.
- Kim, Il Sung. Selected Works of Kim Il Sung. Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1971, 5 vols.
- Kim, Kwan Bong. The Korea-Japan Treaty Crisis and the Instability of the Korean Political System. New York: Praeger, 1971.
- Kim, Se-Jin. The Politics of Military Revolution in Korea. Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1971.
- Kim, Se-Jin, and Cho, Chang-Hyun, eds. Government and Politics of Korea. Silver Spring, Maryland: Research Institute on Korean Affairs, 1972.
- Koh, Byung Chul. The Foreign Policy of North Korea. New York: Praeger, 1969.
- Korea Development Institute. Korea's Economy: Past and Present. Seoul: Korea Development Institute, 1975.

- Lee, Hahnbeen. Korea: Time, Change and Administration. Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1968.
- Lee, Sungnyong, et al., eds. Korean Studies Today: Development and State of the Field. Seoul: Institute of Asian Studies, 1970.
- Meade, Edward G. American Military Government in Korea. New York: King's Crown Press, 1951.
- Nam, Koon Woo. The North Korean Communist Leadership, 1945-1965. University, Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1974.
- Nathan Associates. Economic Programme for Korean Reconstruction, Prepared for the U.N. Korean Reconstruction Agency. New York: Nathan Associates, 1954.
- Oh, Chae Kyung. Handbook of Korea. New York: Pageant Press, 1958.
- Oh, John Kie-Chang. Korea: Democracy on Trial. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968.
- Paige, Glenn D. Korean People's Democratic Republic. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1966.
- Paige, Glenn D. "Korea" in Cyril Black and Thomas P. Thornton, eds. Communism and Political Revolution. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964, pp. 215-242.
- Palais, James B. Politics and Policy in Traditional Korea. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975.
- Park, Chung Hee. Major Speeches by Korea's Park Chung Hee. comp. Shin Bum Shik. Seoul: Hollym, 1970.
- Park, Chung Hee. Major Speeches by President Park Chung Hee. Seoul: Samhwa, 1974.
- Park, Chung Hee. New Year Press Conference, January 15, 1976. Seoul: Korean Overseas Information Services, 1976.
- Park, Chung Hee. Our Nation's Path. Seoul: Donga Publishing Co., 1962.
- Park, Chung Hee. The Country, The Revolution and I. Seoul: Hollym, 1970.

- Park, Chung Hee. To Build a Nation. Washington, D.C.: Acropolis Books, 1971.
- Park, Chung Hee. Toward Peaceful Unification. Seoul: Kwangmyong, 1976.
- Pauley, Edwin. Report on Japanese Assets in Soviet-Occupied Korea to the President of the United States, June 1946. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946.
- ROK, Economic Development Council. Three Year Economic Development Plan in Outline. Seoul: Economic Development Council, 1960.
- _____, Economic Planning Board. Korean Statistical Yearbook 1963. Seoul: Economic Planning Board, 1964.
- _____, _____. Preliminary Count of Population and Housing Census, 1970. Seoul: Economic Planning Board, 1971.
- _____, _____. Summary of the First Five Year Economic Plan, 1962-1966. Seoul: Economic Planning Board, 1962.
- _____, _____. The Third Five-Year Economic Development Plan, 1972-1976. Seoul: The Government of the Republic of Korea, 1971.
- _____, House of Representatives. Selected Laws and Regulations Pertaining to the National Assembly, Republic of Korea. Revised Edition. Seoul: Secretariat of the House of Representatives, 1958.
- _____, Korean Overseas Information Service, ed. Constitution: Korea Background Series. Seoul: Korean Overseas Information Service, 1973.
- _____, _____. The October Revitalizing Reforms, Korea, Policy Series no. 10. Seoul: Korean Overseas Information Series, 1972.
- _____, Office of Public Information. Korea Report. Seoul: Office of Public Information, 1955.
- Rutt, Richard. James Scarth Gale and His History of the Korean People. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1976.

- Ryu, Hun. Study of North Korea. Seoul: Research Institute of Internal and External Affairs, 1966.
- Scalapino, Robert, ed. North Korea Today. New York: Praeger, 1963.
- Scalapino, Robert, and Lee, Chong-Sik. Communism in Korea. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972, 2 vols.
- Shinn, Rinn-Sup. Area Handbook for North Korea. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969.
- Simmons, Robert R. The Strained Alliance: Peking, Pyongyang, Moscow and the Politics of the Korean Civil War. New York: The Free Press, 1975.
- Suh, Daesook, ed. Documents of Korean Communism, 1918-1948. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970.
- Suh, Daesook. Korean Communist Movement, 1918-1948. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967.
- Suh, Daesook. "North Korea: Emergence of an Elite Group" in Richard F. Staar, ed., Aspects of Modern Communism. Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1968, pp. 319-343.
- Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Summation of Non-Military Activities in Japan and Korea. no. 1, September - October 1945.
- Tae, Wan-son. Development of Korean Economy: Past, Present and Future. Seoul: Samhwa, 1972.
- Tasca, Henry J. Strengthening the Korean Economy: Report to the United States President, June 15, 1953. Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1953.
- United Nations, General Assembly, 24th Session. Report of United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (A/7553). 1969.
- _____, _____, 25th Session. Report of United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (A/8026). 1970.

- United Nations, General Assembly, 26th Session.
Report of United Nations Commission for the
 Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (A/8427).
 1971.
- _____, _____, 27th Session. Report of United Nations
 Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation
 of Korea (A/8727). 1972.
- U.S. Air Force. A Preliminary Study of the Impact
 of Communism upon Korea. Maxwell Air Force
 Base, Alabama: Air University, Human Resources
 Research Institute, 1951.
- U.S. Army Military Government in Korea. Summation,
 no. 6, March 1946.
- _____. Summation, no. 9, 1946.
- _____. Revised List of All Korean Political Parties
 and Social Organizations at the National Level
 under the USAMGIK Ordinance no.55. Seoul: 1948.
- U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Directory of North
 Korean Officials. Washington, D.C.: Central
 Intelligence Agency, 1972.
- U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee
 on International Organizations of the Committee
 on International Relations. Activities of the
 Korean Central Intelligence Agency in the
 United States. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
 Office, 1976.
- _____, _____, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific
 Affairs, and on International Organizations
 Movements. Human Rights in South Korea: Implications
 for U.S. Policy. Washington, D.C.: Government
 Printing Office, 1974.
- _____, Senate. Korea and Phillippines, S. Report,
 93rd Congress First Session. Washington, D.C.:
 Government Printing Office, 1973.
- U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Technical
 Services. Excerpts from North Korean Central
 Yearbook, 196-1975. Trans. Joint Publication
 Research Service. Washington, D.C.: Department
 of Commerce, 1962-1976.

- U.S. Department of State. North Korea: A Case Study in the Techniques of Takeover. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961.
- Vreeland, Nena, et al. Area Handbook for South Korea. 2nd Edition. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975.
- Wagner, Edward W. The Literati Purges: Political Conflict in Early Yi Korea. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974.
- Weems, Benjamin. Reform, Rebellion and the Heavenly Way. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1964.
- Wright, Edward, ed. Korean Politics in Transition. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1975.
- (B) In the Korean Language
- Baeg, Bong. Kim Il Sung wonsu (General Kim Il Sung). Pyongyang: Inmun Gwahaksa, 1972.
- Bang Insun. Buhan joson nodongdang eui hyongsong kwa baljon (The Formation and Development of the Korean Workers' Party). Seoul: Asiatic Research Center, 1967.
- Chough Pyongok. Minju jueui wa na (Democracy and Me). Seoul: Youngsin Munhwa Sa, 1959.
- _____. Na eui hoikorok (My Memoirs). Seoul: Omunkak, 1963.
- DPRK, Academy of Social Science. Center for Language. Hyondae joson mal sajon (Modern Korean Dictionary). Pyongyang: Academy of Social Science Press, 1968.
- _____, Central Korean News Agency. Choson jungang yonkam, 1948-1975 (The Central Korean Yearbook). Pyongyang: Central Korean News Agency, 1948-1975.
- Democratic Republican Party. Dangkyu jip (The Regulations of the Party). Seoul: The Democratic Republican Party, 1966.

- Democratic Republican Party. Minjukonghwa dang sa (A History of the Democratic Republican Party). (Seoul: The Democratic Republican Party, 1973).
- . Minjukonghwa dang sa nyon sa (The Four Year History of the Democratic Republican Party). Seoul: The Democratic Republican Party, 1967.
- Donga yonkam 1975 (East Asia Yearbook 1975). Seoul: Donga Ilbo Sa, 1975.
- Han Seungjo. Hankuk minjujueui wa jongchi baljon (The Korean Democracy and Political Development). Seoul: Bobmun Sa, 1976.
- Institute of Contemporary Politics. Yushin Jongchi eui jido inyom (The Idea of the Revitalizing Reform Politics). Seoul: Kwangmyong Press, 1976.
- Kang Indok, ed. Bukhan jonso (Complete Book of North Korea). 3 vols. Seoul: Research Institute of the Far East, 1974.
- Kang Indok, et al., eds. Bukhan yoram (Survey of North Korea). Seoul: Ministry of Public Information, 1968.
- Kang Jujin. Ijo dangjeng sa yonku (A Study on Factions in Yi Korea). Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1971.
- Kim Hyonguk. Kongsanjueui eui hwaldong kwa silje (The Activities of Communists). Seoul: Kwangmyong, 1972.
- Kim, Il Sung. Kim Il Sung sonjip (Selected Works of Kim Il Sung). 6 vols. Pyongyang: The Korean Workers' Party Press, 1963-1971.
- Kim Il Sung. Kim Il Sung jojak sonjip (Selected Works of Kim Il Sung). 6 vols. Pyongyang: People's Press, 1970.
- Kim Il Sung. Sinnyon sa 1976 (The New Year's Message, 1976). Pyongyang: Samsak Sa, 1976.
- Kim Junyeob; Kim Changsun; Yi Ilson; and Bak Gwannog, eds. Bughanyonku jaryo jib (Collection of Documents for North Korean Studies). Seoul: Asiatic Research Center Press, 1969.

- Kim Pilju, and Han Kwangyon, eds. Naeoi jongdang Jonggang jongcheg eui bigyo (Comparison of the Platforms of Parties of Korea and Foreign Countries). Seoul: Alim Press, 1963.
- Lee Byongdo; Jo Pungyon; Kim Yongsang; Shin Sangcho; and Mun Hibaek, eds. Haebang 20 nyon (A 20 Year History after the Liberation). Seoul: Himang Press, 1965.
- Lee Hahnbeen, et al. Hankuk haengjong eui yoksa jok bunsok (Historical Analysis of Korean Public Administration). Seoul: Korean Institute of Public Administration, 1969.
- Liberal Party. Jongchek chamko jaryo (Materials for Policy Making). 2 vols. Seoul: The Liberal Party, 1957.
- National Association of Agricultural Cooperatives. Hankuk nongjong 20 nyon sa (The 20 Year History of Korean Agricultural Policies). Seoul: National Association of Agricultural Cooperatives, 1965.
- New Democratic Party. 1967 nyeondo jeongchi hwaldong kaehwang bogo (The Report of Political Activities in 1967). Seoul: The New Democratic Party, 1967.
- North Korean Yearbook Publication Committee. Bukhan chongkam 1945-1968 (Yearbook of North Korea 1945-1968). Seoul: Institute on Communist Bloc Problems, 1968.
- Park Chung Hee. Park Chung Hee daetongryong sonjip (Selected Works of President Park Chung Hee). 6 vols. Seoul: Jimun Kak, 1969.
- Park Chung Hee. Park Chung Hee yonsolmun jip (The Collection of Speeches of President Park Chung Hee). 12 vols. Seoul: Secretariat of the President, 1961-1975.
- Park Moonok. Hankuk jongbu ron (Korean Government). Seoul: Bakyongsa, 1963.
- Pyongyang Press. Onul eui joson (North Korea Today). Pyongyang: Pyongyang Press, 1973.

- ROK, Central Election Management Committee. Bukhan je jongdang (Political Parties in North Korea). Seoul: Central Election Management Committee, 1969.
- _____, _____. Daehan minkuk jongchang sa (A History of Political Parties in the Republic of Korea). Seoul: Central Election Management Committee, 1964.
- _____, _____. Daehan minkuk songo sa (A History of Elections in the Republic of Korea). Seoul: Central Election Management Committee, 1968.
- _____, _____. Daehan minkuk songo sa (A History of Elections in the Republic of Korea). 2 vols. Seoul: Central Election Management Committee, 1973.
- _____, Economic Development Council. Buheung sam kaenyon kyehoik (Three Year Economic Development Plan). Seoul: Economic Development Council, 1960.
- _____, Ministry of Defense. Bukkoi sa banseki bunsok (An Analysis of the 25-Year History of North Korea). Seoul: Ministry of Defense, 1971.
- _____, Ministry of Public Information. Kwanbo (Government Gazette). Seoul: Ministry of Public Information, 1948-date.
- _____, _____. comp. Park Chung Hee daetongryong yondu kija hoikyon (New Year Press Conference of President Park Chung Hee). Seoul: Ministry of Public Information, 1976.
- _____, National Assembly. Bukhan koiroi siljong: jong chi pyon (Politics in North Korea). Seoul: The National Assembly, 1956.
- _____, _____. Gukhoi sogki rok (The Stenographic Record of the National Assembly). Seoul: The National Assembly, 1948-date.
- _____, _____. Honjong sa jaryo (Documents for Constitutional History). 4 vols. Seoul: The National Assembly, 1967.
- _____, Office of Public Information. Jongbu palnyon kan eui chijok (Eight-Year Achievement of the Government). Seoul: Office of Public Information, 1958.

ROK, Unification Board. Nam buk han bikyo (Comparison of North and South Korea). Seoul: Unification Board, 1973.

_____. Nam buk han kyoyuk yokryang bikyo (The Comparison of Educational Capacities of North and South Korea). Seoul: Unification Board, 1972.

Six Codes Publications Committee. Yugbob jeonso (The Complete Book of the Six Codes). Seoul: Bobjeon Press, 1974.

Social Science Press. Kim Il Sung dongji eui rojag saegin (Indices of Comrade Kim Il Sung's Works). Pyongyang: Social Science Press, 1970.

Yun Chonju. Hankuk jongchi chekye (Korean Political System). Seoul: Koryo University Press, 1961.

3. ARTICLES ON THE TWO KOREAS

(A) In Western Languages

Cho, Sukchoon. "Korean Experience of Administrative Reforms Since Her Independence." Korean Journal of Public Administration vol. 7, no. 2 (1969): 278-300.

Choe, Changgyu. "The Concept of Loyalty and Filial Piety vs. Democracy." Korea Journal 12 (June 1972): 13-20.

Chung, Joseph S. "North Korea's Seven Year Plan (1961-70): Economic Performance and Reforms." Asian Survey 12 (June 1972): 527-545.

_____. "Recent Trends in the North Korean State Budget: with Special Reference to 1971 and 1972." Journal of Korean Affairs 2 (January 1973): 24-30.

Hahn, Bae-ho, and Kim, Kyu-taik. "Korean Political Leaders (1952-1962): Their Social Origins and Skills." Asian Survey 3 (July 1963): 305-323.

"IBRD Report Indicates Korea is a High-Ranking Country in Income Redistribution and Equality." The DRP November 1974, p. 25.

- Kang, Thomas H. "Confucian Behavior Toward the Modernization of Korea, 1864-1910." Korea Journal 13 (July 1973): 4-15.
- Kihl, Young Whan. "Leadership and Opposition Role Perception among Party Elites." Korea Journal 13 (September 1973): 4-23.
- _____. "Urban Political Competition and the Allocation of National Resources: The Case of Korea." Asian Survey 13 (April 1973): 366-379.
- Kim, Chong Lim, and Woo, Byung Kyu. "Political Representation in the Korean National Assembly." Midwest Journal of Political Science 16 (November 1972): 626-651.
- Kim, C.I. Eugene, and Kim, Kesu. "The April 1960 Korean Student Movement." The Western Political Quarterly 17 (March 1964): 83-92.
- Kim, Jae-on, and Koh, B.C. "Electoral Behavior and Social Development in South Korea: An Aggregate Data Analysis of Presidential Elections." The Journal of Politics 34 (September 1972): 825-859.
- Kim, Jounghwon A. "Soviet Policy in North Korea." World Politics 22 (January 1970): 237-254.
- Kim, Kyungdong. "Social Change in South Korea." Journal of Korean Affairs 4 (January 1975): 3-15.
- Kim, Kyong-Won. "Ideology and Political Development in South Korea." Pacific Affairs 38 (Summer 1965): 164-176.
- _____. "Korea, the United Nations and the International System." Journal of Asiatic Studies 13 (December 1970): 433-452.
- Koh, B.C. "Chuchesong in Korean Politics." Studies In Comparative Communism 7 (Spring-Summer 1974): 84-97.
- Lee, Mun Woong. "Rural North Korea Under Communism: A Study of Sociocultural Change." Rice University Studies 62 (Winter 1976): 1-176.

- Lee, Pong S. "An Estimate of North Korean's National Income." Asian Survey 12 (June 1972): 518-526.
- Pak, Moonok. "The Civil Service System in Korea." Thesis Collection of Chung Ang University no. 18 (1973): 301-369.
- Park, Chonghong. "Historical Review of Korean Confucianism." Korea Journal 3 (September 1963): 5-11.
- Park, Chung Hee. "The New Year Message of 1975." The DRP Janaury 1975, p. 4.
- The Korea Herald. Seoul, Daily.
- The People's Korea. Pyongyang, Weekly.
- Renaud, Bertrand M. "Conflict between National Growth and Regional Income Equality in a Rapidly Growing Economy: The Case of Korea." Economic Development and Cultural Change 21 (April 1973): 429-445.
- Scalapino, Robert A. "Korea: The Politics of Change." Asian Survey 3 (January 1963): 31-40.
- Shapiro, Jane P. "Soviet Policy towards North Korea and Korean Unification." Pacific Affairs 48 (Fall 1975): 345-352.
- Winn, Gregory F. "Ideology and Reality in Korean Behavior." Studies in Comparative Communism 7 (Spring-Summer 1974): 98-106.
- Yang, Key P. and Henderson, Gregory. "An Outline History of Korean Confucianism." Journal of Asian Studies 18 (November 1958): 81-101.
- Yi, Huidok. "Formation of Confucian Ethics in Korea." Korea Journal 13 (February 1973): 10-16.
- Yi, Myonggu, and Douglas, William A. "Korean Confucianism Today." Pacific Affairs 40 (Spring-Summer 1967): 43-59.

(B) In the Korean Language

Choi Hojin. "Keundae 100 yon hankuk kyongje eui sanghwang " (The 100 Year History of Modern Korean Economy). Shindonga (The New East Asia) no. 140 (April 1976): 128-141.

Choi Pyongkil. "Bukkoi eui jongchi kwajong kwa haeng jong byonhwa " (Political Process and Administrative Change in North Korea). Bughan (North Korea) 5 (March 1976): 61-73.

Donga Ilbo (The East Asia Daily). Seoul, Daily.

Editor of Bughan. "Bughan choigo inmin hoieui ogi deeuwon sonko" (The Election of the 5th Supreme People's Assembly). Bughan (North Korea) 2 (February 1973): 117-148.

_____. "Bughan eui denam dobal ilji" (Chronology of North Korean Provocations towards South Korea). Bughan (North Korea) 3 (April 1974): 99-105.

Hahn Baeho. "Kyunghyang paekan kyoljonge kwanhan sare yonku" (Decision Making Process: A Case of Discontinuance of the Kyunghyang News). Bobjong Nonchong (Law and Political Science Review) 11 (February 1966): 73-94.

Hankuk Ilbo (The Korea Daily). Seoul, Daily.

Hankuk Jayu Sinmun (The Korea Liberty News). Philadelphia, Weekly.

Ju Jonghang. "Hankuk nongob kujo eui byonchon kwajong" (The Process of Structural Change in Agriculture) in South Korea). Shindonga (The New East Asia) no. 140 (April 1976): 142-153.

Jungang Ilbo (The Central Daily). Seoul, Daily.

Kim Changsun. "Hyongmyong jontong keseung kwa Kim Jeong Il hukae ron" (The Continuity of Revolutionary Tradition and Succession by Kim Jeong Il). Bughan (North Korea) 5 (August 1976): 52-60.

- Kyunghyang Sinmun (The Kyunghyang News). Seoul, Daily.
- Minju Joson (The Democratic Korea). Pyongyang, Weekly.
- Nodong Simun (The Labor News). Pyongyang, Weekly.
- Pag Yonghon. "Bughan gyogwaso eui neyong bunsog"
(A Content Analysis of North Korean Textbooks).
Bughan (North Korea) 4 (May 1975): 104-111.
- Park Chung Hee. "Sinyon sa 1976" (The New Year Message,
1976). Sisa (The News) January 1976, pp. 8-11.
- Pyongyang Sinmun (The Pyongyang News). Pyongyang, Weekly.
- Ro Yunghi. "Jibang jachi danche eui samu bunbe siltae"
(The Practices of Distribution of Works to Local
Governments). Haengjong nonchong (Journal of
Public Administration) Vol. 5, no. 2 (1967):
171-235.
- Seoul Sinmun (The Seoul News). Seoul, Daily.
- Sinhan Minbo (The New Korea News). Los Angeles, Weekly.
- Yi Kyungjae. "Sinmin dang eui dangkwon kyongjaeng"
(The Struggle for Power in the New Democratic
Party). Shindonga (The New East Asia) no. 142
(June 1976): 88-101.
- Yom Hongchol. "Bughan eui jongchi sahoi hwa gwajong" (The
Process of Political Socialization in North
Korea). Bughan (North Korea) 4 (October 1975):
104-115.

4. GENERAL BOOKS AND MONOGRAPHS

- Adelman, Irma, and Morris, Cynthia T. Society, Politics and
Economic Development: A Quantitative Approach.
Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967.
- Alker, Hayward R., Jr. Mathematics and Politics. New York:
Macmillan, 1965.

- Allard, Erik, and Rokkan, Stein, eds. Mass Politics: Studies in Political Sociology. New York: Free Press, 1970.
- Almond, Gabriel A; Flanagan, Scott C; and Mundt, Robert J., eds. Crisis, Choice, and Change: Historical Study of Political Development. Boston: Little, Brown, 1973.
- Almond, Gabriel, and Verba, Sidney. The Civic Culture: Political Attitude and Democracy in Five Nations. Boston: Little, Brown, 1963.
- Apter, David E. Choice and the Politics of Allocation A Developmental Theory. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971.
- _____. Political Change: Collected Essays. London: Frank Cass, 1973.
- _____. The Politics of Modernization. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965.
- _____, ed. Ideology and Discontent. New York: Free Press, 1964.
- Arensberg, Conrad M., and Niehoff, Arthur H. Introducing Social Changes: A Manual for Americans Overseas. Chicago: Aldine, 1964.
- Atkinson, John W., and Birch, David. The Dynamics of Action. New York: John Wiley, 1970.
- Bachrach, Peter, and Baratz, Morton. Power and Poverty: Theory and Practice. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970.
- Banks, Arthur S., comp. Cross-Polity Time-Series Data. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971.
- Banks, Arthur S., ed. Political Handbook of the World, 1975. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975.
- Beer, Samuel H., and Ulam, Adam B., eds. Patterns of Government: The Major Political Systems of Europe, Third Edition. New York: Random, 1973.
- Bendix, Reinhard. Nation-Building and Citizenship. New Enlarged Edition. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977.
- Berelson, Bernard, and Steiner, Gary. Human Behavior. New York: Harcourt, Brace, World, 1964.

- Blalock, Hubert M., Jr. Theory Construction: From Verbal to Mathematical Formulations. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969.
- Blaustein, Albert P., and Flanz, Gisbert H., eds. Constitutions of the Countries of the World. 14 vols. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1971-1977.
- Blondel, Jean, and Herman, Valentine. Review Exercises for Comparative Government. New York: Praeger, 1972.
- Brams, Steven J. Game Theory and Politics. New York: Free Press, 1975.
- Braybrooke, David, and Lindblom, Charles E. A Strategy of Decision: Policy Evaluation as a Social Process. New York: Free Press, 1970.
- Cohen, Leonard J., and Shapiro, Jane P., eds. Communist Systems in Comparative Perspective. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1974.
- Coser, Lewis A. The Functions of Social Conflict. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956.
- Chenery, Hollis B., et al. Redistribution with Growth. London: Oxford University Press, 1974.
- Dahl, Robert A. Modern Political Analysis. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963.
- _____. Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961.
- Davie, Bruce F., and Duncombe, Bruce F. Modern Political Arithmetic: The Federal Budget and the Public Sector in National Economic Accounts. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970.
- Davies, James C. Human Nature in Politics. New York: Wiley, 1963.
- d'Entrèves, Passerin A. The Notion of the State. London: Oxford University Press, 1967.
- Dewey, John. Human Nature and Conduct. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1944.

- Dollard, John, et al. Frustration and Aggression. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939.
- Dougherty, James E., and Phaltzgraff, Robert L., Jr. Contending Theories of International Relations. New York: Lippincott, 1971.
- Downs, Anthony. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper & Row, 1957.
- Dror, Yehezkel. Public Policymaking Reexamined. Scranton, Pa.: Chandler, 1968.
- Dubin, Robert. Theory Building. New York: Free Press, 1969.
- Duchacek, Ivo. Comparative Federalism: The Territorial Dimension of Politics. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970.
- Duchacek, Ivo. Rights and Liberties in the World Today. Santa Barbara, Calif.: American Bibliographical Center-Clio Press, 1973.
- Duverger, Maurice. Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State. translated by B. & R. North. New York: Wiley, 1954.
- Easton, David. A Framework for Political Analysis. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965.
- _____. A Systems Analysis of Political Life. New York: Wiley, 1965.
- Edelman, Murray. The Symbolic Uses of Politics. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1964.
- Epstein, Leon D. Political Parties in Western Democracies. New York: Praeger, 1967.
- Ernst, Morris. The Comparative International Almanac. New York: Macmillan, 1967.
- Fagen, Richard R. The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969.
- Field, G. Lowell. Comparative Political Development: The Precedent of the West. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1967.

- Fleron, Frederic J., Jr. Communist Studies and the Social Sciences. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969.
- Friedrich, Carl J. Limited Government: A Comparison. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974.
- Friedrich, Carl J., and Brzezinski, Zbigniew K. Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy. New York: Praeger, 1956.
- Gibbs, Jack. Sociological Theory Construction. Hindsdale, Ill.: Dryden Press, 1972.
- Gouldner, Alvin W. The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology. New York: Basic Books, 1970.
- Grossman, Gregory. Economic Systems. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1967.
- Gruchy, Allan G. Comparative Economic Systems. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1966.
- Gurr, Ted. Why Men Rebel. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970.
- Haas, Michael, ed. International Systems: A Behavioral Approach. New York: Chandler, 1974.
- Hagen, Everett E. On the Theory of Social Change: How Economic Growth Begins. Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1962.
- Hahn, George N. Economic Systems: A Comparative Analysis. Third Edition. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1968.
- Hoffmann, Erik P., and Fleron, Frederic J., Jr., eds. The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy. New York: Aldine-Atherton, 1971.
- Holsti, Ole R.; Hopmann, P. Terrence; and Sullivan, John D. Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Studies in Behavioral Sciences. New York: Wiley, 1973.
- Holt, Robert T., and Turner, John E., eds. The Methodology of Comparative Research. New York: Free Press, 1970.

- Holt, Robert T., and Turner, John E. The Political Basis of Economic Development: An Exploration in Comparative Political Analysis. New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1966.
- Horowitz, Irving L., ed. The Use and Abuse of Social Science. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1971.
- Hoselitz, Bert F., and Moore, Wilbert E. Industrialization and Society. UNESCO-Mouton, 1966.
- Hsiung, James C. Ideology and Practice: The Evolution of Chinese Communism. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970.
- Hsiung, James C. Law and Policy in China's Foreign Relations: A Study of Attitudes and Practice. New York: Columbia University Press, 1972.
- Inkeles, Alex, and Smith, David H. Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974.
- Janowitz, Morris. The Military in the Political Development of New Nations: An Essay in Comparative Analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964.
- Johnson, Chalmers, ed. Change in Communist Systems. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1970.
- Johnson, Chalmers. Revolutionary Change. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966.
- Kanet, Roger E., ed. The Behavioral Revolution and Communist Studies. New York: The Free Press, 1971.
- Kaplan, Abraham. The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology for Behavioral Science. San Francisco: Chandler, 1964.
- Kaplan, Morton A. Macropolitics: Selected Essays on the Philosophy and Science of Politics. Chicago: Aldine, 1969.
- . System and Process in International Politics. New York: Wiley, 1957.
- Kautsky, John H. The Political Consequences of Modernization. New York: Wiley, 1971.

- Kim, Kyung-Won. Revolution and International System. New York: New York University Press, 1970.
- Kolko, Joyce, and Kolko, Gabriel. The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954. New York: Harper and Row, 1972.
- Kuhn, Thomas S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 2nd Edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970.
- Lane, Robert E. Political Ideology: Why the American Common Man Believes What He Does. New York: The Free Press, 1962.
- LaPalombara, Joseph, ed. Bureaucracy and Political Development. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.
- _____, and Weiner, Myron, eds. Political Parties and Political Development. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966.
- Lasswell, Harold, and Kaplan, Abraham. Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950.
- Lau, C. D., trans. Mencius. Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1970.
- Lauer, Robert H. Perspectives on Social Change. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1973.
- Leighton, Alexander. My Home is Legion: Foundations for a Theory of Man in Relation to Culture. New York: Basic Books, 1959.
- Lenin, V. I. State and Revolution. New York: International Publishers, 1932.
- Lifton, Robert J. Thought Reform and the Philosophy of Totalism. New York: Norton, 1963.
- Lindblom, Charles E. The Policy-Making Process. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968.
- Liu, Alan P.L. Communication and National Integration in Communist China. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1971.

- Macridis, Roy C., and Brown, Bernard E., eds. Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings. Fourth Edition. Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1972.
- Marx, Karl. Critique of the Gotha Programme. A Revised Translation. New York: International Publishers, 1938, 1970.
- Mayer, Lawrence C. Comparative Political Inquiry: A Methodological Survey. Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1972.
- McClelland, David C. The Achieving Society. New York: The Free Press, 1961.
- McClosky, Robert G. "Constitutional Law: Civil Liberties." In The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, edited by David Sills. New York: Crowell, Collier and Macmillan, 1968.
- McIlwain, Charles H. Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1947.
- Merritt, Richard, and Rokkan, Stein, eds. Comparing Nations: The Use of Quantitative Data in Cross-National Research. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966.
- Merton, Robert K. Social Theory and Social Structure. Revised and Enlarged Edition. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1957.
- _____, and Nisbet, Robert. Contemporary Social Problems. Third Edition. New York: Harcourt, 1971.
- Mesa-Lago, Carmelo, and Beck, Carl, eds. Comparative Socialist Systems: Essays on Politics and Economics. Pittsburg: University Center for International Studies, 1975.
- Meyer, Alfred G. The Soviet Political System. New York: Random House, 1965.
- Michels, Robert. Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy. translated by Eden and Cedar Paul. New York: Dover Press, 1959.

- Moore, Frank, ed. Readings in Cross-Cultural Methodology. New Haven: HRAF Press, 1963.
- Morse, Chandler, et al. Modernization by Design: Social Change in the Twentieth Century. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1966.
- Namenwirth, Zvi, and Lasswell, Harold D. The Changing Language of American Values: A Computer Study of Selected Party Platforms. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publication, Inc., 1970.
- Naroll, Raol , and Cohen, Ronald, eds. A Handbook of Method in Cultural Anthropology. New York: Columbia University Press, 1973.
- Neuman, Sigmund, ed. Modern Political Parties. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956.
- Paige, Glenn D. The Korean Decision, June 24-30, 1950. New York: The Free Press, 1968.
- Parsons, Talcott. The Social System. New York: The Free Press, 1951.
- _____. The Structure of Social Action. 2 vols. New York: The Free Press, 1968.
- _____, and Shils, Edward E., eds. Toward a General Theory of Action. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951.
- Pound, Ezra, trans. Confucius. New York: New Directions, 1969.
- Pound, Roscoe. The Development of Constitutional Guarantees of Liberty. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957.
- Przeworski, Adam, and Teune, Henry. The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry. New York: Wiley, 1970.
- Pye, Lucian W. Aspects of Political Development. Boston: Little, Brown, 1966.
- _____. Politics, Personality and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962.

- _____. The Spirit of Chinese Politics. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1968.
- _____, and Verba, Sidney, eds. Political Culture and Political Development. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965.
- Rae, Douglas. Political Consequences of Electoral Laws. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967.
- Rapoport, Anatol. Two-Person Game Theory: The Essential Ideas. Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1966.
- Raymond, Ellsworth. The Soviet State. New York: Macmillan, 1968.
- Rejai, Mostafa. The Strategy of Political Revolution. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1973.
- Ripley, Randall B. Congress: Process and Policy. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1975.
- Rosenau, James N., ed. Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems. New York: The Free Press, 1969.
- _____, ed. International Politics and Foreign Policy. New York: The Free Press, 1969.
- Rossiter, Clinton. Conservatism in America: The Thankless Persuasion. New York: Vintage Books, 1962.
- Rummel, R. J. The Dimensions of Nations. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1972.
- Russett, Cynthia E. The Concept of Equilibrium in American Social Thought. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966.
- Sabine, George H. A History of Political Theory. Fourth Edition. Hindsdale, Ill.: Dryden Press, 1973.
- Scalapino, Robert A. Asia and the Road Ahead: Issues for the Major Powers. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1976.
- Scalapino, Robert A., ed. The Communist Revolution in Asia: Tactics, Goals and Achievements. 2nd Edition. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969.

- Sidjanski, Dusan, ed. Political Decision-Making Processes: Studies in National, Comparative, and International Politics. Washington, D.C.: Jossey-Bass, Inc., 1973.
- Singer, Milton. "Political Culture." In The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences edited by David L. Sills. New York: Crowell, Collier and Macmillan, 1968, vol. 3.
- Skilling, H. Gordon, and Griffiths, Franklyn, eds. Interest Groups in Soviet Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971.
- Snyder, Richard C; Bruck, H.W.: and Sapin, Burton, eds. Foreign Policy Decision Making. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1962.
- Sorøuf, Frank. Party Politics in America. Second Edition. Boston: Little, Brown, 1972.
- Starr, John B. Ideology and Culture. New York: Harper and Row, 1973.
- Stone, Philip; Dunphy, Dexter C.; Smith, Marshall S; and Ogilvie, Daniel M. The General Inquirer: A Computer Approach to Content Analysis. Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1966.
- Taylor, Charles L., and Hudson, Michael C. World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators. Second Edition. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972.
- Triska, Jan, ed. Constitutions of the Communist Party-States. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1969.
- Tullis, F. LaMond. Politics and Social Change in Third World Countries. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1973.
- U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. World Military Expenditure and Arms Trade, 1963-1973. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975.
- U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research. World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations. 25th Annual Report. Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1973.

- von Bertalanffy, Ludwig. General System Theory.
Revised Edition. New York: George Braziller, 1973.
- von Neumann, John, and Morgenstern, Oskar. Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1944.
- Wallace, Anthony. Culture and Personality. 2nd Edition.
New York: Random House, first 1962, 1970.
- Weaver, Gary R., and Weaver, James H., eds. The University and Revolution. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969.
- Weber, Max. Basic Concepts in Sociology. Trans. H.P. Secher. New York: The Citadel Press, 1962.
- _____. Essays in Sociology. Trans. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. New York: Oxford University Press, 1946.
- _____. The Methodology of Social Sciences. Trans. and eds. Edward A. Shils, and Henry A. Finch. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1949.
- _____. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. Edited with an Introduction by Talcott Parsons. New York: The Free Press, 1947.
- Welty, Paul T. The Asians: Their Heritage and Their Destiny. New York: Lippincott, 1973.
- Wilkenfeld, Johnathan, ed. Conflict Behavior and Linkage Politics. New York: McKay, 1973.
- Wilson, James Q. The Amateur Democrat. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962.
- Wilson, Richard W. The Moral State: A Study of the Political Socialization of Chinese and American Children. New York: The Free Press, 1974.
- Wright, William E., ed. A Comparative Study of Party Organization. Columbus, Ohio: Merrill, 1971.
- Wylie, Lawrence. Village in the Vaucluse. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961.
- Yearbook on International Communist Affairs. 1966-1976.
Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1966-1975.

5. GENERAL ARTICLES

- Allport, Freud. "J-Curve Hypothesis of Conforming Behavior." Journal of Social Psychology 5 (1935): 141-183.
- Almond, Gabriel. "Comparative Political Systems." Journal of Politics 18 (1956): 391-409.
- Barringer, Herbert R. "Social Stratification and Industrialization in Korea." ILCORK Working Paper #11 (Social Science Research Institute, University Of Hawaii, 1971.)
- Bergson, Abram. "Development under Two Systems: Comparative Productivity Growth Since 1950." World Politics 23 (July 1971): 579-617.
- Brodbeck, May. "Methodological Individualism: Definitions and Reduction." Philosophy of Science 25 (January 1958): 1-22.
- Champernowne, D.G. "A Comparison of Measures of Inequality of Income Distribution." The Economic Journal 84 (December 1974): 787-816.
- Cobb, Roger; Ross, Jennie Keith; and Ross, Mark H. "Agenda Building as a Comparative Political Process." American Political Science Review 70 (March 1976): 126-138.
- Cooney, Stephen. "Political Demand Channels in the Processes of American and British Imperial Expansion, 1870-1913." World Politics 27 (January 1975): 225-255.
- Deutsch, Karl W. "On Inequality and Limited Growth." International Studies Quarterly 19 (December 1975): 381-398.
- Deutsch, Karl W. "Social Mobilization and Political Development." American Political Science Review 55 (September 1961): 493-511.
- Emerson, Rupert. "The Fate of Human Rights in the Third World." World Politics 27 (January 1975): 201-226.

- Emerson, Rupert. "Post-Independence Nationalism in South and Southeast Asia: A Reconsideration." Pacific Affairs 44 (Summer 1971): 173-192.
- Flanz, Gisbert H. "Outmoded Checks and Balances and other Problems of Constitutional Modernization." Delivered at the Convention of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 1976.
- Gabennesch, Howard. "Authoritarianism as a World View." American Journal of Sociology 77 (March 1972): 857-875.
- Heirich, Max. "The Use of Time in the Study of Social Change." American Sociological Review 29 (June 1964): 386-397.
- Hsiung, James C. "A Revisionist View of Modernization Theory: From the East Asian Perspective." Delivered at the 1971 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 7-11, 1971.
- Hurwitz, Leon. "An Index of Democratic Political Stability: A Methodological Note." Comparative Political Studies 4 (April 1971): 41-68.
- Lancaster, Kelvin. "The Dynamic Inefficiency of Capitalism." Journal of Political Economy 81 (September 1973): 1092-1109.
- Lebra, Joyce C. "The Significance of the Japanese Military Model for Southeast Asia." Pacific Affairs 48 (Summer 1975): 215-229.
- Lovell, John P., and Kim, C.I. Eugene. "The Military and Political Change in Asia." Pacific Affairs 40 (Spring-Summer 1967): 113-123.
- Markus, Gregory B., and Nesvold, Betty A. "Governmental Coerciveness and Political Instability: An Exploratory Study of Cross-National Patterns." Comparative Political Studies 5 (July 1972): 231-244.
- Maslow, A.M. "A Theory of Human Motivation." Psychological Review 50 (1943): 370-396.
- McClosky, Herbert. "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics." American Political Science Review 58 (1964): 361-382.

- Merelman, Richard M. "The Development of Political Ideology: A Framework for the Analysis of Political Socialization." American Political Science Review 63 (September 1969): 750-767.
- New York Times. New York, Daily.
- Nicholson, Norma K. "The Factional Model and the Study of Politics." Comparative Political Studies 5 (October 1972): 291-314.
- Pennings, Johannes. "Measures of Organizational Structure: A Methodological Note." American Journal of Sociology 79 (November 1973): 686-704.
- Price, Robert M. "A Theoretical Approach to Military Rule in New States: Reference-Group Theory and The Ghanaian Case." World Politics 23 (April 1971): 398-430.
- Prothro, James W., and Grigg, Charles M. "Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement." Journal of Politics 22 (1960): 276-294.
- Pugh, D.S., et al. "Dimensions of Organizational Structure." Administrative Science Quarterly 13 (1968): 92-104.
- Purcell, Susan K. "Decision-Making in an Authoritarian Regime: Theoretical Implications from a Mexican Case Study." World Politics 26 (October 1973): 28-54.
- Rae, Douglas. "A Note on the Fractionalization of Some European Party Systems." Comparative Political Studies 1 (October 1968): 413-418.
- _____. "Comment on Wildgen's 'The Measurement of Hyperfractionalization'." Comparative Political Studies 4 (July 1971): 244-245.
- Ross, Marc H., and Homer, Elizabeth. "Galton's Problem in Cross-National Research." World Politics 29 (October 1976): 1-28.
- Rummel, R.J. "Dimension of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations." General Systems: Yearbook of the Society for General Systems Research 8 (1963): 35-44.

- Siegel, J., and Beals, A. "Conflict and Factionalist Dispute." Journal of Royal Anthropological Institute 90 (1960): 107-117.
- Skilling, M. Gordon. "Interest Group and Communist Politics." World Politics 18 (April 1966): 435-451.
- Stauffer, Elam K., and Blase, Melvin G. "Institutional Disequilibria in the Development Process." Economic Development and Cultural Change 22 (January 1974): 265-278.
- Tolman, E.C. "Principles of Performance." Psychological Review 62 (1955): 315-326.
- Tucker, Robert C. "Culture, Political Culture, and Communist Society." Political Science Quarterly (June 1973): 173-190.
- Weber, Adolf. "Agricultural Modernization in Market and Planned Economies: The German Experience ." Studies in Comparative Communism 6 (Autumn 1973): 280-300.
- Wei, Yung. "A Methodological Critique of Current Studies on Chinese Political Culture." Journal of Politics 38 (February 1976): 114-140.
- Wildgen, John K. "A Rejoinder to Rae." Comparative Political Studies 5 (April 1972): 107-108.